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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
TRADING DEMOCRACY FOR SECURITY? THE EFFECTS OF THE
INTERNATIONAL DRUG WAR ON THE QUALITY OF DEMOCRACY IN THE
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, 1996 - 2008
by
Leah Hutton Blumenfeld
Florida International University, 2010
Miami, Florida
Professor Eduardo Gamarra, Major Professor
The purpose of the research is to study the relationship between international drug
interdiction policies and domestic politics in fragile democracies, and to demonstrate how
international drug control policies and the use of force fit the rhetoric of war, are
legitimized by the principles of a just war, but may also cause collateral damage and
negative unintended consequences. The method used is a case study of the Dominican
Republic. The research has found that international drug control regimes, primarily led
by the U.S. and narrowly focused on interdiction, have influenced an increasingly
militarized approach to domestic law enforcement in the Dominican Republic. The
collateral damage caused by militarized enforcement comes in the form of negative
perceptions of citizen security, loss of respect for the rule of law and due process, and
low levels of civil society development. The drug war has exposed the need for
significant reform of the institutions charged with carrying out enforcement, the police
force and the judicial system in particular. The dissertation concludes that the extent of
drug trafficking in the Dominican Republic is beyond the scope of domestic reform
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efforts alone, but that the programs implemented do show some potential for future
success. The dissertation also concludes that the framework of warfare is not the most
appropriate for the international problems of drug traffic and abuse. A broader,
multipronged approach should be considered by world policy makers in order to address
all conditions that allow drugs to flourish without infringing upon democratic and civil
rights in the process.

vi

TABLE OF CONTENTS
CHAPTER

PAGE

I.

INTRODUCTION

1

II.

LITERATURE REVIEW
Drugs, Democracy, and the NUCs of Militarization
Drugs, Security, and Democracy
Levels of the Drug War Game
Conclusions

7
7
11
16
19

III.

THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS
Is the War on Drugs a Just War?
Changing Paradigms in IR and Definitions of Security
Conclusions

20
20
37
45

IV.

MODERN DRUG POLICY IN HISTORICAL CONTEXT
Drugs in the Americas: A Brief History
U.S. Drug Policy: The Baseline
Evaluation & Conclusions

46
46
78
98

V.

THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC AS A CASE STUDY
A Brief History of Democracy in the Dominican Republic
Dominican Democracy and Institutions
U.S. Assessment of the Dominican Republic: The INCSR
Democracy and Public Opinion
Conclusions

101
104
114
119
133
139

VI.

THE DOMINICAN CASE ON THE GROUND
Internal Evaluations of the PSD
Press Evaluations of the Drug Predicament
Independent Evaluations of the PSD
Conclusions

141
145
157
162
195

VII.

DISCUSSION
Security and Democracy
Just War Theory Revisited
Conclusions
Epilogue -- War on Supply vs. War on Demand: Policy Alternatives

199
199
207
217
220

LIST OF REFERENCES

226

VITA

235

vii

I. Introduction
The state is the institution with a monopoly on the legitimate use of force – Max Weber
In a democracy the citizen is responsible for the kind of military the state possesses and
how it is used – Michael Walzer
Those who would give up essential liberty to purchase a little temporary safety, deserve
neither liberty nor safety – attributed to Benjamin Franklin
This dissertation examines the relationship between international drug interdiction
policies and domestic politics in fragile democracies through a case study of the
Dominican Republic. It also seeks to demonstrate how international drug control policies
and the use of force fit the rhetoric of war, and are legitimized by the principles of a just
war, but may cause collateral damage and negative unintended consequences. As
LaMond Tullis wrote in 1995, the way that drug related laws “combine to create
unintended socioeconomic and political consequences ought not to be surprising. The
dimensions of the consequences, however, may be alarming” (135). The main purpose of
this dissertation is not to measure whether we are winning or losing the war on drugs, but
rather whether a policy of war is justified at all.
The international drug trade has remained a salient issue for international relations
in general, as involvement in the trade and efforts to deal with it are not uniform in all
states, but nearly all states are affected by drugs in some way. In the late 20th century,
drug traffic was the fastest growing area of international crime and a primary concern
behind new legislation and the organization of law enforcement (Dorn, et al., 1992).
Much scholarship on the relative success of the drug war measures the stated objectives
of policy. This research contributes to a growing literature on the unanticipated effects of
policy, and demonstrates the ways that a policy in one issue area can have effects
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elsewhere. By doing so, we can demonstrate how framing a policy in a single-minded
way limits options and chances for success.
Drugs are prominent but relatively understudied in academia; further it is a topic
that is under-theorized and ideologically polarized (Hinojosa, 2007). Indeed, drug policy
tends to follow one path in the United States – that of keeping drugs from crossing into
U.S. territory. Drug producing and trafficking countries are often thought to be
synonymous with developing and less-developed countries. Yet even in the 1990s Tullis
(1995) pointed out that “the distinctions between producing and consuming countries
have materially decreased” and that “much less is known (either in quantitative or
qualitative terms) about the impact of drug production, consumption, and trade in
developing countries” (vii). Alternative strategies are rarely discussed, and this has
numerous implications for other states, particularly those that rely on the U.S. to aid their
own anti-drug efforts.
Further, while drugs are not usually conceived of as a traditional security issue,
the specter of geonarcotics is a threat to the security and sovereignty of states, especially
in the Caribbean basin:
Drug related problems [are] the single most important serious security issue
confronting the internal order of Caribbean nations, their regional policies with
other Caribbean states, and their international relations with the United States
and European powers” (Brana-Shute, 2000: 98).
But security for the state is not the same as security for those within it, and the concept of
the drug problem has changed over time in U.S. government circles. It has morphed from
being a concern of health, to crime, to a matter of national security. As a matter of
national security it was then only a small step to calling responses to drugs war. In places
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where democracy is not long-established, the use of force to combat drugs has the
potential for abuse and to compromise state-society relations. A measure of tension
exists between domestic political responsibilities and international obligations for leaders
in the Dominican Republic. If the United States is leading a militarized drug war in the
Caribbean, then what is at stake in the Dominican Republic where democracy, human
rights, and civil liberties are already fragile?

Methods, Data, and Significance of the Study
The following are the main research questions that will be addressed:
Question #1: Is the international war on drugs a just war?
Question #2: Are efforts to implement policies in the war on drugs a threat to democratic
practices and civil liberties?
Question #3: Are domestic political concerns congruent with international concerns?
From these questions three hypotheses follow:
Hypothesis #1: The war on drugs is not uniformly just in all areas where it is fought.
Hypothesis #2: Police and military efforts to confront the drug problem are implemented
at a cost to due process and civil liberties in fragile democracies.
Hypothesis #3: Domestic political and economic concerns are addressed by state leaders
secondarily to international concerns.
The method for testing the hypotheses above will be through a case study of the
Dominican Republic. The research covers a roughly 12-year period beginning in 1996
with the election of Dominican President Leonel Fernández. This election represents the
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beginning of a successful transition to democracy, and precedes the implementation of
Plan Colombia and the Andean Initiative, the benchmark of U.S. counter-drug policy.
To address these questions, the following chapters include a history of drugs in
the Western Hemisphere and an evaluation of U.S. policies, including the State
Department’s International Drug Control Strategy. In conjunction with this, I review
components of Dominican policy, especially those laws and enforcement practices
supported by the U.S. I also evaluate the role of Dominican reform policies aimed at
bringing the presence of the state back to the national territory and reforming the police
and judicial systems, while building civil society and preserving inchoate democratic
practices. The examination will assess whether or not these policies and their related
enforcement guidelines adhere to the principles of a just war and achieve their stated
goals.
In relation to this, and to the second and third questions above, democracy is a
large term that does not lend itself to a simple definition or obvious, universal
measurements. As the dependent variable in this study, I will attempt to assess it through
measurements of several democratic indicators. In the Caribbean context, democracy
exists alongside deep poverty and inequality. The work of securing civil and social rights
is intricately linked to consolidation of political rights. A small state and new democracy
like the Dominican Republic has the challenge of addressing internal concerns for
economic and civic development, while confronting both internal and external pressures
to engage in the drug war – and to do it all with limited resources.
Measures of democracy usually entail an examination of electoral processes.
Interest in democracy and common measures for it do not necessarily accurately reflect
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how democratic a society is. Bollen (1991) argues that various political rights and
liberties within a society can indirectly gauge and reflect the power that groups have. For
him, rights are the characteristics of the electoral system, and liberties are the freedom of
the population within the political system, including the media and the opposition. While
many scholars have tended to emphasize rights over liberties, or vice-versa, I would add
that little attention is given to elite power in the military and the judiciary in addition to
those areas of elite activity that are considered political. It is even less often that the
police are included and truly examined as a part of the judicial branch and as having
influence over liberties. Thus, political democracy could be decreased if rights are high
but liberties are infringed upon by law enforcement, or if law enforcement is incapable of
protecting those rights and liberties. Therefore, this study looks at judicial and law
enforcement institutions, especially efforts to implement improved codes of criminal
procedure in Dominican law and to reduce or eliminate corruption within the system.
The quality of a democratic system can also be measured by the confidence
citizens have in their institutions. These include the executive, the judiciary, the police,
and the military, as well as confidence in the economy. Equally important are
participation in politics, perceptions of corruption within governing and civil institutions,
and the administration of justice in general. These items together make up an index for
citizen support of democracy. Confidence in the system and institutions includes citizen
perceptions of security. This study uses public opinion data, recently gathered by
Dominican research groups such as Newlink and Centro Juan Montalvo, as a way to
gauge both citizen perceptions of their governing institutions, as well as their own
security and freedom within their daily lives as Dominican citizens. Data from within the
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institutions of interest offers an additional and often contrasting perception and
evaluation of the level of citizen security, civil society, and civil institution development.
The nexus of the domestic and the international is not easily disentangled but a
case study, done properly and carefully, can shed light on its particulars as well as inform
other studies elsewhere. While some argue that there is little truly cross-national research
on drugs and drug policies, the more individual case studies are done, the more
knowledge about their effects can be generated, and some generalizations can be made
(MacCoun and Reuter, 2002). This study will contribute to that body of knowledge and
may have implications for democracy in the region as a whole. Most of the countries in
Central and South America are coping with the drug trade, as are European and other
nations the world over. By looking at both the domestic political effects and the
international context in which they take place, we can begin to see the constraints placed
on all leaders as they struggle with a complex transnational issue.
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II. The Historical Context: A Literature Review
This chapter reviews the body of scholarly literature on the questions about drugs,
democracy, and state and citizen security. By seeing how these questions overlap and
have been approached by academics, I will begin to show where my interest in justice fits
into the discussion of the war on drugs, and ultimately whether war is the most
appropriate and efficient method for combating drug traffic.

-- Drugs, Democracy, and the NUCs of Militarization -In the U.S. drugs are seen as a threat to the country from the outside, and the
narrow focus of U.S. drug control strategy is to stop the flow of drugs into the U.S. by
combating production in and shipment from source countries. Elsewhere by contrast,
drug production takes root in poor and weakly institutionalized areas in response to the
huge demand for drugs in the U.S. and Europe and their resulting profitability. By
supplying money and military training to those who cooperate, the war on drugs is then
quite literal in these areas. In addition, “U.S. military and police assistance” tend “to take
priority over aid for socioeconomic goals or democratic institutions” (Youngers and
Rosin, 2005: 4). In other words, the military approach to drugs as a security threat to the
state is separate from any approach that would address elements of human security for
many of those involved in the drug trade.
War terminology is a powerful metaphor but a poor and problematic guide for
policy:
The drug war mentality ensures that U.S. drug control resources are skewed
toward interdiction and law enforcement efforts. But such policies, which fail to
take into account the complex social and economic roots of both illicit drug
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production and consumption, tend to shift the pattern of players in the drug trade
without significantly reducing the trade itself (Youngers and Rosin, 2005: 4).
As more time passes and the trade grows, the distinction between producing and
consuming areas becomes less clear, while the positive effects of economic development
and democracy-building programs may be “undermined by the unexamined
consequences of U.S. military and police assistance” (ibid.: 5).
Collateral damage in the war on drugs is “extensive” while its impact on the
availability of drugs in the U.S. is “marginal at best” (Youngers, 2005: 339). Cases
studied throughout Latin America show,
U.S. drug control policies have contributed to confusing military and law
enforcement functions, militarizing police forces, and bringing the military into
a domestic law enforcement role. They have thus strengthened military forces at
the expense of civilian authorities (ibid.: 340).
In the U.S., policy goals and measures are good for domestic politics, both for campaigns
and for maintaining program budgets, but they do not seem to address whether any real
progress is made.
Adam Isacson (2005) argues that historically the U.S. sees the Latin American
region as a source of threats rather than an area with potential for cooperation and
development. For this reason, policy frequently turns to militaries to solve problems. As
part of the Andean Strategy, the U.S. has encouraged Latin American militaries to take
on roles that would be unthinkable for the U.S. military at home. This is an especially
problematic tactic during a time of democratic reform throughout the region.
“Many analysts view the U.S. military’s expanded domestic drug war powers as a
dangerous erosion of the posse comitatus principle” (Isacson, 2005: 33). I would add
that it also creates a bad precedent and sets a poor example for other countries combating
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drugs. Isacson points out that some legislators and military personnel in the U.S. have
even suggested that principles like posse comitatus should be re-examined or changed if
they limit what a government can do to protect its people. The implications of this kind
of thinking are troubling, especially within the U.S. where democracy is supposed to be
entrenched and unwavering. “If this principle [posse comitatus] is being eroded in
Washington, the damage is likely to be far greater in the rest of the hemisphere” (ibid.:
53).
In 2002, the Dominican Republic ranked among the top ten recipients of U.S.
military training (Isacson, 2005). Colombia is the number one recipient of U.S. military
and police aid – and it also serves as the basis for how the U.S. understands the region as
a whole in the war on drugs. It serves as the benchmark for the emphasis on military,
security, and counter-insurgency approaches. Further, during the Bush administration the
war on drugs became synonymous with the war on terror. Some fear that the increased
unregulated military aid and the latitude to name various groups “terrorists” are likely to
harm peaceful opposition to government in Latin America. This latitude is also likely to
circumvent due process in the name of controlling terrorism.
The Caribbean is a “transit zone” within the U.S. policy framework. One point of
contention has been the U.S. military presence in the region and the role of the military in
counter-drug measures. A second point of contention concerns the definition of national
security for the states involved and the fact that the anti-drug mission is dominant in the
U.S. security agenda for the region. Caribbean leaders are often critical of the militarized
approach and instead propose a multidimensional security approach that addresses the
social, health, and trade problems associated with drugs and drug trafficking. As counter-
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terrorism is superimposed on counter-drug efforts, many Caribbean leaders fear that the
multiple dimensions of security – the problems of poverty, unemployment and so on –
will be abandoned further from the narrow focus of U.S. policy in the name of terror.
In addition, the emphasis on terror takes away from the development of
democratic institutions, including police reform and the development of democratic
policing where forces adhere to principles of accountability, transparency, and
responsiveness to their communities. This kind of reform is important because
historically the militarization of police forces is characteristic and profound in Latin
America (Neild, 2005). Many foreign police forces receive military training from the
U.S. at WHINSEC (formerly known as the School of the Americas) and with money
from the State Department or Pentagon budget. “Military training of police goes directly
against efforts across the region during the 1980s and 1990s to bring police under civilian
control and increase accountability,” and military tactics and skills are “profoundly
antithetical to democratic policing standards” (ibid.: 69-70). Officers need to be able to
act through their own judgment and communication skills rather than use force and obey
a command hierarchy as do soldiers on a battlefield. While police training may be
helpful to DEA operations abroad, it “has not proven an adequate tool to deal with local
police corruption” (ibid.: 74).
In theory, supply suppression could be successful with additional use of force, but
in most of the main supply or trafficking regions, significant external inputs would be
necessary. A more ambitious war on drugs may have some success in the target country,
but so far efforts usually succeed in displacing traffic rather than eliminating it.
Examples abound, from Mexico’s highly successful eradication programs in the 1970s, to
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Thailand’s success at reducing heroin production in the early 1990s while neighboring
Laos and Myanmar increased theirs (Craig, 1981; Tullis, 1995). As long as the market is
viable, the production side will migrate to the areas of least resistance.

-- Drugs, Security, and Democracy -The Dominican Republic is “the clearest example” of the eroding distinction
between military and police tasks, where the U.S. encourages security forces to become
involved in anti-drug and law enforcement tasks that would be illegal in the U.S. (Beruff
and Cordero, 2005: 320). The military is in charge of the Dirección Nacional de Control
de Drogas (Office of National Drug Control or DNCD), whose directors are high ranking
officers. Beruff and Cordero (2005) suggest that because the largest drug busts in the
Dominican Republic occur in the capital city of Santo Domingo and in the eastern region,
rather than along the Haitian border or any other permeable geographic area in the
country (of which there are many), “the drug trade has penetrated the upper echelons of
the Dominican government” (321). Thus, the enemy in the war on drugs exists within the
same institutions as our allies.
The infiltration of trafficking hastens processes of social disorganization through
its systemic and corruptive effects. Tullis’s (1995) examination of the cases of Colombia
and Bolivia shows that “traditional values are eroded as illegality permeates a society,
violence becomes a way of life, and people become less inclined to accept norms on
which consensual politics (including liberal democracy) rest” (170). Drug traffic brings
more violence and this increasing violence “severely weakens each country’s efforts to
create modern democratic institutions” (ibid.: 171). This argument supports the idea that
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drugs are a threat to democracy, but complicates international efforts to use local military
and police institutions to control local traffic.
A democracy requires more than just the holding of elections. In a citizenship
democracy, the electoral system is based in a society that supports the political and civil
rights of each of its citizens. The society also has some measure of existential security
through policies and programs that address poverty, unemployment, or inequality, and
incorporate marginal or previously excluded sectors into the system to some degree.
Election results have meaning and citizens participate when they know they are free to
make their own voting choices, the results will be respected, and no change in leadership
will diminish their rights or destroy the system.
As the Dominican Republic made its transition to democracy during the 1990s,
the necessary conditions for democratic consolidation remained “unincorporated” in
Latin America (Rogers, 1999: 39). Instead, what are labeled “perverse” democratic
processes have allowed drug traffic and other illicit activities to persist (ibid.: 40). Drugs
are a threat to democracy on two fronts – money and its associated corruption, and the
militarization of efforts to combat the trade (ibid.). Indeed, “drug corruption is now a
major threat to democratic [re]construction in many parts of the world” (Griffith, 1997:
9). These words continue to be true today as drug-related violence “undermines and
wrecks the institutional basis for the maintenance of good government and public safety”
both in the Western hemisphere and in the face of democratization efforts in the middle
east and central Asia (ibid.: 8). But if war is the legal equivalent of violence, is it good
policy to fight fire with fire?
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Using Puerto Rico as a case study, Jorge Rodriguez Beruff (2000) has examined
the “political consequences of drugs-driven state restructuring, particularly in relation to
security policy and forces” (162). He notes that post-Cold War security includes
nontraditional issues such as drug traffic. While Puerto Rico differs from other
Caribbean states because of its relationship to the U.S. and its geostrategic position, some
aspects similar to other cases can be seen. His finding – that drug interests are not
undermining the state in spite of related problems of crime and corruption – is the
opposite of what one would expect and presents an interesting comparison and perhaps
cautionary example. In Puerto Rico, “anti-drug strategies may have had the effect of
strengthening state power and its instruments of force” (ibid.: 163). The concern then is
less with governability than an emerging authoritarianism.
Beruff cites the growth of criminality and violence in Puerto Rico since the
1950’s, and public opinion polls that show the perception of the relationship between
drugs and violence from the 1970’s on. Crime has increased especially in housing
projects and urban areas. By 1992, there was broad popular support for gubernatorial
candidate (and eventual winner) Pedro Rosseló’s “strong hand against crime and drugs”
platform (Beruff, 2000: 167). He advocated harsher punishments, larger police budgets,
and the use of the National Guard to combat the problem. His hard-line approach was
“also in line with the stronger anti-crime and anti-drug policies in the United States, and
with mounting federal concern regarding the role of the island (and neighboring U.S.
Virgin Islands and the Dominican Republic) in drug trafficking” (ibid.: 167-168). The
implementation of the president’s plan involved sending forces to occupy several housing
projects. Occupation by National Guard and police forces brought increased arrests and
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seizures of drugs, but no decrease in murder or other violence. Further, none of the
policy measures “shielded the middle-class neighborhoods from robberies and drugrelated executions” (ibid.: 171). Much of the criminal activity simply relocated. The
enforcers themselves were not immune from corruption, and by the late 1990s funding
for these operations had dropped even as drug traffic to the United States was increasing.
Additional polling data after five years of strong-hand policies showed that the majority
felt the problem had gotten worse. A study like this demonstrates how the anti-crime,
anti-drug agenda is legitimizing and allowing for the emergence of a military-police
complex but one that does not appear to be able to fulfill its mission to reduce drugs and
crime (ibid.: 176). Increased militarization did not bring with it increased democracy or
citizen security.
According to Kincaid and Gamarra (1996), the pattern in the Latin American
region is “a recourse to military intervention in support, and in place, of normal police
responsibilities” (211). The pattern differs in the late 20th century from earlier periods in
that it is done with the initiative of civilian elected governments rather than along with
coups and dictatorships. In other words, there is now some level of civilian control over
the military even as the pattern persists. The authors argue that although the pattern is
not necessarily unusual from a world perspective, or contradictory to democratic norms,
the cases they examine do suggest a new model of public security “with significant and
unfavorable implications for the institutions and practices of democracy” (ibid.: 212).
The military is generally given the responsibility for national security or defense,
and police are in charge of public security, where the definition of public security is “the
maintenance of public order and the enforcement of laws” (Kincaid and Gamarra, 1996:
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212). There are some exceptions; militaries often have the capacity to intervene when
conditions exceed police capabilities, such as during natural disasters or large-scale riots.
The problem Kincaid and Gamarra find is when the exceptions become the norm – when
government authority declares a state of emergency or state of siege because of
widespread opposition to a particular policy or increased levels of violence and crime in
relation to drugs. The government calls upon the military to intervene in what are
ongoing conditions of unrest or normal law enforcement issues, rather than temporary
and acute crises.
Military forces are also generally charged with the function of protecting
collective interests, those of the nation as a whole. Thus when they enter into a public
security function it is “likely to be accompanied by the suspension or downgrading of
some citizen rights” (Kincaid and Gamarra, 1996: 213). In the case of a single riot or
disaster, this downgrade would again be temporary. With the issue of drugs comes the
potential to suspend citizen rights indefinitely. And when there are no citizen rights or
individual security, there can be no democracy. The trend of “policization” of the
military, to borrow Kincaid and Gamarra’s word, appears to be happening in the
Dominican Republic. A merging of police and military roles has appeared and
neighborhoods often still resemble war zones even as reform programs progress.
Kincaid and Gamarra are skeptical about the ability of a military presence to deter
crime and violence, especially in the long run. In the Dominican Republic organized
crime is likely to diversify, as they have at least as many resources to work with as do the
enforcement bodies. Further, broader economic conditions have placed a toll on the
general population and provided a space for drug money to infiltrate. Militarization is a
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possible remedy but unlikely cure for these deeper causes and conditions. The
Dominican government’s plan attempts to cover some of these other causes, but as
Kincaid and Gamarra point out, far-reaching changes are needed to address all factors of
the public security crisis in order to reduce violence overall.

-- Levels of the Drug-War Game -In a book about the U.K.’s domestic drug market, Dorn et al. (1992) reject the
notion that drug traffic is dominated by large organizations such as cartels or the mafia.
They focus instead on the numerous smaller actors and connections between them and
law enforcement. Their book focuses on the nature of traffic and trade in the U.K and
recognizes the inherent difficulties of studying the illicit. They also examine the nature
and structure of enforcement and whether there is an equitable application of penalties.
The authors are concerned with the development of a national police force in the
U.K. as a response to drug crime and are “critical of the upward escalation in
imprisonment that characterizes most developed countries’ response to drug trafficking”
(Dorn et al., 1992: xvii). They describe first the “Mr. Big” strategy which goes after the
major dealers and organizers, and is the priority of DEA and other U.S. operations. This
strategy is familiar but problematic in that there seems to be no set definition of how ‘big’
a big target must be. The strategy may disrupt the flow of traffic but does not necessarily
stop all drugs from entering the market. It may target individuals who are visible but not
necessarily the top organizers, and there are always new ‘godfathers’ in training ready to
step into their places.
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Indeed, traffickers are adept at developing counter-strategies. Dorn et al. note a
“tendency for traffickers to keep their organisations small and flexible, an understandable
response to enforcement that for several decades announced its commitment to
immobilizing large organisations” (1992: 75). Where there has been some move to
middle- and lower-level enforcement, one can expect to see similar new counterstrategies as “drug markets and law enforcement continuously interact and shape one
another” (ibid.: 75). By extension, one might also expect an increase in militarized
efforts by drug enforcement bodies to be met by additional military-style and violent
resistance, or by vigilante justice.
The formal organizational structure of the police force and its operations is only
part of the drug enforcement story. Informal aspects, particularly the organizational
culture, are just as important:
On the one hand there are acceptably creative interpretations of formal rules and
regulations. On the other there are ways of working that come to be defined as
unacceptable because either they result in successful legal challenges by defence
lawyers in court, or they cause difficulties for other enforcement officers or
operations, or they may become indistinguishable from corruption. The line
between creativity and corruption can be a narrow one (Dorn et al., 1992: 119).
In other words, enforcement personnel may bend or break the rules themselves in their
efforts to find and punish traffickers. How far they can bend the rules, or whether they
can break them, depends on the level of toleration within their units or the justice system
as a whole. In some cases, the informal or corrupt organizational structure can appear to
overtake the formal-legal one, whether real or perceived. If police are viewed by others
or themselves as being above the law, an additional set of problems can arise,
compounding those already brought on by crime itself. The policies to be investigated
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here make this point particularly relevant for the Dominican Republic since the data deals
directly with official corruption, police practices, and the public perceptions of them.
Similar to Dorn et al. (1992), Payan (2006) argues that modern government
agencies are bureaucratic, and have rigid standard operating procedures and vertical
structures that make it difficult to respond to the versatile, flexible, and horizontal
structure of drug organizations. Organizational theory provides two perspectives from
which to study agency behavior in the war on drugs. These are 1) bureaucratic politics,
in the style of Graham T. Allison’s Essence of Decision, and 2) organizational culture.
The bureaucratic politics approach argues that policy choice is a political result and not
necessarily the best choice in every case. The organizational culture approach seeks to
demonstrate that values and norms within an organization may be either conducive or
detrimental to the execution of a policy – or a reason that reform efforts fail.
Organizational culture is treated as something complex that emerges over time,
and is something that requires additional time to change once it has been established.
Culture stems from the social need the organization is created to fulfill (Payan, 2006).
For this study I ask what the primary purpose the Dominican National Police was created
to fulfill. It may have been the protection of the public on the one hand, but it could also
have been for the protection of elites, leaders, and their interests. The missions and tasks
of an organization are important, as are the training and socialization systems that prepare
the newest members of the organization to do their duties – and to fit in with everyone
else already there. These systems may be formal or informal and will affect how
members of the institution fulfill their duties and the mission of the organization. New
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members may also confront conflicts between their formal training and the actual
practices within the organizational structure and hierarchy.

Conclusions
As this literature shows, the framing of the drug war has been an important
element of its execution. The war has focused on an outward military strategy against a
foreign threat, and scholarly interest has lain in evaluating the effectiveness of a
militarized approach and its influence over domestic institutions and civil society. The
literature suggests that drug organizations and violence may be a threat to states through
corruption, but that hard-line policies have not been able to eliminate this corruption nor
dismantle the drug trade or dealing at any level. Repressive measures from the state have
the unintended and negative potential to cut off civil liberties, limit citizen security, and
harm the rights of people and the democratic system they were designed to protect. Even
more troubling are the assertions made by those in power that these trade-offs are
necessary. Finally, the nature and structure of the drug trade, the internal characteristics
of the organizations charged with its control, and the broader national contexts in which
the drug trade flourishes have been less well addressed.
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III. Theoretical Considerations
Is war the right policy for dealing with international drug traffic? To answer this
question one needs a framework through which to view and assess the war on drugs, and
a way to evaluate a level of justice within U.S. policy, Dominican policy, and reform to
its systems. In this chapter, I will examine both just war theory in the Western tradition
as it relates to the war on drugs, and conceptions of security in International Relations
and their relevance and importance to the international drug trade.

Is the War on Drugs a Just War?
Politicians in the U.S. have frequently used the rhetoric of war when framing an
issue: the War on Poverty, the War on Drugs, and the War on Terrorism. This section
explores just war doctrine as a way to measure the legitimacy of the drug war in action.
Just war doctrine has ancient roots but is embodied today in generally accepted
international protocols for the conduct of war. The war on drugs, while not the
necessarily the same type of war covered by these protocols, has become heavily
militarized in its conduct. Temes (2003) uses the expression ‘just war thinking’ as a way
to capture a kind of moral thinking about war that is less formalized than theory or
doctrine as laid out by various philosophers or the catholic church. I borrow his phrase
here to refer to trends among just war philosophers rather than using any single one of
their formulations. This less formal approach can be more easily applied to a pseudo-war
like the war on drugs than a declared war with similar rhetoric.
This study works on the premise that the use of force in the context of narcotics
control has caused collateral damage and negative unintended consequences. Michael
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Walzer (1977) argues that a Thucydides-style realism about war is “a denial of the
freedom that makes moral decision possible” (10). To do what one is capable of doing is
a choice and is not necessarily inevitable. Thus, the resort to force in the war on drugs is
a matter of choice, not fate, for policy makers. I argue that the reasons for waging a war
on drugs may be considered just, while the conduct of the war itself is not just and the
desired results are unattainable. I will begin here with a history of just war thought and a
discussion of the basic and most common principles within it, followed by an exploration
of how just war thought can be applied to the war on drugs. The discussion and
conclusions presented here will be further demonstrated by the empirical evidence
presented in subsequent chapters.

-- The Elements and History of Just War Theory -Amstutz (2005) identifies three main perspectives on the use of force: pacifism,
amoral realism, and principled realism. Pacifism is against any force while amoral
realism sees force as a perfectly utilitarian and legitimate means of achieving an end.
Just war falls into the third category, principled realism, where force is politically and
strategically necessary at times. Principled realism might also be called qualified realism,
where one recognizes certain situations in which a resort to the use of force is necessary,
but only within certain conditions. Just war tradition is based on the assumption that
coercive power is legitimate when it serves a morally legitimate purpose, and that war “is
not intrinsically evil but rather an instrument of statecraft” (Amstutz, 2005: 111). In
order for a war to be just it must meet certain criteria ad bellum – the decision to go to
war – and in bello – how a war is conducted once begun. Debate often centers on
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whether the guiding principles laid out by Roman law or the church, and thinkers such as
Cicero, St. Augustine, and Grotius, historically have served to restrain actions in a war, or
whether they have excused them instead (Kaufman, 2005; McMahan, 2005).
While just war thinking has a long history of association with the Catholic
Church, it is not solely a product of Christianity. Christopher (2004) shows evidence of
similar prescriptions among several ancient cultures, from Sun-Tzu in fifth-century China
to the Aztecs and others, even if some of the specifics do not resemble what has become
modern just war theory. In Hebrew scripture, for example, one finds the idea that holding
god’s favor is an asset in war. It also lists conditions for keeping god’s favor while
fighting a war. These include many prohibitions against destruction of the environment –
more so than against destruction of other human beings. Temes (2003), Walzer (1996),
Ravitzky (1996), Tibi (1996), and Hashmi (1996) have all written about Jewish and
Islamic perspectives on war. An in-depth analysis of this body of literature, especially
salient for wars in the Middle East or against terrorism, is beyond the scope of this
project. Instead, I focus on the development of the western tradition since my interest is
in the drug war in the Americas. Western and Catholic perspectives may also have
particular relevance within the Latin American and Spanish Caribbean contexts.
Aristotle was the first to use the phrase “just war” but the precursor of present-day
concept of just war ad bellum comes from Roman law and Cicero (Christopher, 2004).
Under Roman law, a war could be formally just as long as certain procedures were
followed in declaring it. Cicero articulated three conditions by which a war could be
considered just: It had to be declared by a proper authority, the antagonist had to be
notified, and the antagonist had to be given an opportunity to make a peaceful settlement
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before any attack could be made. Additionally, only those who were officially active
military professionals could participate.
Later, just war doctrine developed as a way to keep communal order and to
protect the Holy Roman Empire from invasion. It was a method for answering questions
about how a Christian empire, if pacifist, could still defend itself. The doctrine
represented a synthesis or compromise between Christian and Roman values. St.
Ambrose is an important name in the development of just war doctrine during this time.
He thought that wrong behavior was not just doing harm, but also the failure to prevent
another from inflicting harm. From this point of view, the use of force could extend from
self-defense to the defense of others, including intervention in another’s war or affairs.
With these developments “the Roman legal notion of Just War [was] gradually replaced
with a moral or religious notion where the forces of good combat the forces of evil”
(Christopher, 2004: 23). Christian scripture is often a source of pacifism for some, but
also contains justification of violence for others. The common example of this is the
Crusades, but the theme of good versus evil also appears in the war on drugs.
St. Augustine, a student of Ambrose, wrote about the political duties of man based
on his reading of Plato, Aristotle, and Cicero. In these writings he also achieved a
synthesis of Roman and Christian values and may be called the “father of the modern Just
War Tradition” (Christopher, 2004: 42). Augustine retained Roman principles of a just
cause for war, a war declared and carried out by a proper authority, and argued that the
final objective of any war is peace. He added that soldiers should never fight for fame or
glory, or with a spirit of vengeance.
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St. Thomas Aquinas is another contributor to just war thought, who drew upon
Aristotle and St. Augustine before him to develop the argument that right moral choices
are based on reason. He reiterated the ideas that a just cause, proper authority, and right
intention were all necessary for a war to be just. For him, just cause may or may not be
an aggressive action to defend oneself against, but could be a fault of the other, such as
not being Christian. An important element that Aquinas contributes is the notion of
proportionality in the conduct of war. The discussion of proportionality includes what is
called the double-effect. An action may have a good intended effect, such as saving
one’s own life, but also have a bad unintended effect, such as the death of the aggressor.
Aquinas saw the negative effect as permissible as long as it was not out of proportion to
the good effect. Fifteenth century Spanish philosopher Francisco de Vittoria expanded
double-effect to include collateral damage in war. While de Vittoria argued that not
providing protection for those not directly involved in the fighting would be contrary to
natural law, he nonetheless recognized that through the application of double-effect,
innocents often would be harmed during the conduct of a just war. He is credited as the
first to make a statement about “military necessity” to excuse foreseeable harm to
innocents (Christopher, 2004: 56). This notion of the double-effect could easily be
invoked to excuse a variety of NUCs in the war o n drugs.
The themes of legitimate authority, just cause, and proportion are all of particular
interest in relation to the war on drugs, all themes within international law surrounding
wars. Sixteenth-century philosopher Hugo Grotius is credited as the father of
international law (Christopher, 2004). He lived and wrote during a time of decline in
central church authority. This decline made the use of force the more “common medium
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of political discourse” (ibid.: 67). Grotius believed in the social nature of man and that
life in society was more important than individual self-preservation. For him “neither
persons nor states have an absolute right to self-defense” (ibid.: 69). At the same time,
Grotius argued that wrongdoers could be punished by force and that civil authorities had
an obligation to do so.
Grotius recognized six conditions for just war ad bellum: 1) just cause, 2)
proportionality, 3) reasonable chance of success, 4) public declaration, 5) legitimate
authority, and 6) war as a last resort. On number three, he said that fighting for freedom
was fine but suicidal resistance is wrong, because life is of more value than liberty.
Grotius omitted two conditions that others had included prior: right intention, and that
the war be fought justly. For him, the first was not an objective criterion about a relation
between states but an internal assessment of one. Each side can easily think it has the
right intention in war. The second applies to jus in bello, which Grotius treated as
distinct.
The main in bello principle for Grotius, as described by Christopher (2004) is that
the “prohibition against intentionally harming other human beings is set aside in warfare
only to the extent that combatants of opposing belligerent nations may rightfully attack
one another” (91). Large groups of people then have immunity from attack, but like de
Vittoria, Grotius recognized that they might still be harmed and adopted a version of
Aquinas’s double-effect “with precautions” (ibid.: 92). Gotius said that there must not
be intentional or foreseeable harm to innocents.
Grotius was interested in how to fight, expanding on Aquinas’s interest in when to
do so. Grotius’s innovations “gave a voice to the secular experience of moral thought”
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(Temes, 2003: 48). They have allowed statesmen to make policy decent without having
to follow the orthodoxy of any particular church or religion. During the period of
Enlightenment thinking more emphasis came to be placed on the individual. This
represented a major break with the church of the middle ages and the kind of just war
thought we saw from Augustine and Aquinas. The state comes to be thought of as the
representative of the individual and the defender of individual rights.
Temes (2003) suggests that just war thought in the transition from Grotius’s time
to the present has been taken up by many different philosophers from Rousseau to Locke,
Kant, and Jefferson, even if it was not called just war theory explicitly. Their ideas about
natural law differ from those of Cicero or Aquinas, and their writings tend to look at the
nature of man, society, and states more than warfare specifically. During the same period
the Catholic Church retained a philosophy about just wars. Later, the United Nations
created numerous documents that address war, the conduct of war, and the treatment of
people involved in war, including the U.N. Charter and the Geneva Conventions.
Temes lays out three basic principles for a just war which resemble many of the
principles embodied in the Geneva Conventions and the U.N. Declaration of Human
Rights: 1) a just war sanctifies human life and treats all life as equally precious, 2) a just
war is a war about the future, not the past, and 3) a just war preserves and strengthens the
principles of individual rights, based on the notion that the legitimacy of government
derives from the consent of the governed (193). The third principle also applies to jus
post bello, which is not discussed extensively here, nor in much of the early literature on
just wars. Thinking about how a state should act in the aftermath of a war is important if
peace is to be maintained. It also informs the way criminals or the prisoners of war are
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processed and treated in the war on drugs. Temes three principles can be used to measure
the justice and evaluate the conduct of the war on drugs in the Caribbean.

-- Just War in Global Context -Frequently, international agreements are based on expediency and consensus
rather than on moral principles. Realism is dominant in the study of International
Relations, it does not deny international ethics but it also does not allow much room for
moral reasoning. Amstutz (2005) argues that there is no need to separate moral reasoning
from policy as foreign policy making usually involves some kind of moral judgment.
The just war tradition is one example of the attempt to establish and clarify universal
morals or shared international ethics, especially questions about the ethics of the use of
force.
“Attempts to develop a system of international law to regulate the use of force
have largely been an effort to codify the tenets of Just War Tradition” (Christopher, 2004:
2). Ideally, the social setting of the international society of states means that all are
obligated to participate in agreements made among them, and no one can change
agreements without the consent of the others.1 The sets of norms, customs, codes,
principles, legal precepts, international agreements, and so on, form what Walzer (1977)
calls the war convention. It must be remembered, though, that this convention does not
rest on any central judicial system or authority. The common law of warfare may always
be changing, and punishment for supposed violations difficult to enforce.

1

Of course there are always exceptions allowed by international law, such as modifications or side
agreements between states.
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Temes argues that war is less about what is ultimately right and more about what
the best options are at hand. The ideals for which wars are now fought are different from
ancient and even slightly more recent wars fought for honor (of the individual or the
tribe) or for plunder and conquest (material gain). These motives for war are now seen as
wrong; wars of aggression and those fought for glory, revenge, or conquest are explicitly
condemned by just war doctrine and international law. And yet these reasons are
concrete. A soldier might find a more solid connection to fighting to prove his or her
own valor and strength, or to gain something of tangible value for the nation, than to
abstract ideals of justice or democracy.
Modern wars are frequently fought over abstract ideals. Amstutz (2005) claims
that just war theory “provides a framework for defining and assessing the use of force”
which in turn allows for limiting the possibility of war or the destructiveness of it in the
pursuit of these ideals (111). He continues, arguing that “the aim of the theory is not to
justify war but to bring international relations under the control of morality so that, if
moral norms were followed faithfully and consistently by the disputing parties, it would
reduce the risk of war” (ibid.). Similarly, Temes (2003) suggests that Kant placed an
emphasis on restraint and respect for enemies in war, and that his ideas were less about
making peace than about living with others. A state has a right to defend itself but all
states should be more concerned about maintaining an international community and a just
peace. Unfortunately, Kant is unable to say how such an ideal state of affairs can be
achieved, and gives “no real answers beyond the dream of world government” (Temes,
2003: 52). Some may even say the notion of a universal governing body or set of norms
is naïve and unrealistic. The world is comprised of nations and groups of people with
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some similar, but also widely different values. The solution to ending the war on drugs
by learning to respect and share the world community with transnational criminal
organizations is not likely to be adopted by the U.S. or any other state. Likewise, fighting
a war to create or support democracy appears contradictory as militaries are among the
least democratic entities within a state. At the same time, Temes argues that the value of
Kant’s philosophy is the similarity he sees between individuals and states. It is supposed
to make us remember to be humane when moving to the larger scale of modern warfare
between states and other group entities, as each is comprised of many individuals with
rights.
Given this context, the next section looks at how the principles of just war can be
applied to the war on drugs. The question is not an easy one for several reasons. In
addition to the international nature of the drug trade, the difficulty of coordinating efforts
to control it, and an absence of concrete universal attitudes toward it, there is the
difficulty of defining actions against drugs as actual war. I argue that calling it a war is
powerful – and may have serious consequences for the way law enforcement is handled.

-- Applying Just War Thought to the War on Drugs -“The morality of a nation will be revealed by how and when it fights wars,” and
yet the war on drugs is difficult to classify as a type of war (Temes, 2003: 4). It is not
aggressive but it could be seen as preemptive or a form of intervention. Just war theory
ad bellum considers the decision to go to war. In the case of the war on drugs the
required legitimate authority has made the decision, at least for the United States within
its own borders. For the most part, the Dominican government is also a legitimate
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authority that can choose to participate in the same war. The extent of drug traffic
through the Dominican Republic and pressures from the U.S. government to stop it mean
that the Dominican government’s choice was already made for it to some extent.
Legitimate authority or not, choosing to opt out of the war completely would be bad
policy for the Dominican Republic domestically as well as internationally.
One problem with applying just war thought ad bellum to the war on drugs is that
one side is a state and purports to follow legal and moral guidelines, while the other is an
amorphous entity or organization and does not adhere to any generally accepted protocols
or international agreements. The “other” can more easily be seen as cold-blooded killers
than as fellow soldiers or comrades at arms. It may be easier to move away from moral
considerations when not fighting another professional army, and to see them as less than
human and less deserving of humane treatment before the law. It is also easy to use St.
Thomas Aquinas’ assertion that a just cause for war may be a fault of the other – if it was
right to declare war on non-Christians to civilize them in his time then it is right to
declare war on those who have little regard for the law and cause harm to the extent that
drug traffickers do.
Just war theory tells us war must have a good purpose and a right intention.
There can be little doubt that eliminating the violence associated with the drug trade is a
worthy goal, and the intent behind counter-narcotics efforts is to eliminate the illicit
activity. But a good purpose and a right intention do not ensure a successful war. Many
counter-narcotics efforts to date have had little effect. Officials estimate that only about
10% of all the drugs coming into the U.S. are apprehended, and what does come in is
cheaper and stronger (Falco, 1996; Nordstrom, 2007; Youngers & Rosin, 2005).
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Dominican newspapers report the beatings and deaths of suspected drug dealers by police
(see for example Rodriguez, 2007). In a study of Puerto Rican housing projects, Beruff
(2000) found that five years after National Guard troops were brought in to control drug
violence the problem had actually gotten worse – and had spread to other neighborhoods
where it had not existed before.
In “Politics and the English Language”, George Orwell (1946) argues that
political speech and writing is particularly adept at defending the indefensible. Calling
the war on drugs a ‘war’ attempts to justify stronger actions and the use of more deadly
force than is tolerated for other law enforcement issues. Calling it a war is a
simplification and a kind of propaganda: “The act of representing the complexity of the
world in simple terms for the sake of a political end” (Temes, 2003: 151). Few have
backed away from the war on drugs since it was declared. The language of evil and
greed is powerful for garnering support for the policy, and few want to risk their
reputations in office by being thought of as on the side of the criminals.
Anti-drug policy is attractive in the form of a war. It fits neatly and conveniently
with many people’s conceptualization of drugs as foreign and bad, an external threat to
our internal order. Internal demand for drugs is produced by an external parasite beyond
our borders. Military protection is seen as a better answer to the threat than anything
more inward looking like treatment or decriminalization. As Falco (1996) pointed out,
“blaming foreigners for America’s recurring drug epidemics provides convenient if
distant targets for public anger that might otherwise be directed toward elected officials”
(121). The outward policy also fits neatly into the pattern of American exceptionalism
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and righteous benevolence that has characterized U.S. foreign policy for much of its
history, especially in Latin America.
Further, the notion of a just war also “hints at the tactical advantages of having
God on one’s side” (Temes, 2003: 4). This might seem less complicated in a war on
drugs and crime where right and wrong may be more clear-cut than against terror or
competing religious ideologies. Still, drug traffic has been conceptualized as an
embodiment of evil in much the same way other enemies have been, and the rhetoric of
righteousness reinforces that imagery, inflames sentiments, and reduces the criminal to
something less than human. “A Just War acknowledges the humanity of all parties,
including enemy combatants” (ibid.: 154). This statement, though, is the opposite of the
simplifications discussed above that reduce the other to something evil and less than
human, which makes it easier to fight with a spirit of vengeance in spite of St.
Augustine’s warning against such a practice. It may also expose a contradiction between
jus ad bello and jus in bello in the war on drugs. How can we effectively fight this evil,
and yet still treat it humanely?
Just war theory in bello deals with the conduct of the war once it is underway.
Proportion is a key principle. The means and costs of conducting the war should be
proportional to its end goal and purpose. Some may argue that the war on drugs should
be waged no matter what the cost; others will say the costs are too high considering the
results so far. In the early 1990s the annual pentagon budget for drug interdiction was
more than one billion dollars (Morrison, 1992). Between 1997 and 2002, U.S. military
and police aid to Latin America and the Caribbean for counterdrug programs totaled
2,737 million dollars. In 2006, the U.S. spent close to 430 million dollars on counter-

32

drug assistance in the Americas over and above money spent on interdiction efforts on
the home front (Isacson, 2005; Center for International Policy, 2007). The DEA made
just under domestic 30,000 arrests that same year (U.S. Department of Justice, 2007).
The U.S. government continues to spend money to fight drugs yet they continue to be
readily available.
Proportion does not apply only to the money spent on the war. When it comes to
utility and proportionality, “the rules of war rule out only purposeless or wanton
violence” (Walzer, 1977: 129). Actions that are conducive to victory can be justified
this way and frequently are. The problem then is that victory is more valued than
individuals or collective interests. Limits to behavior beyond mere utility should be
accepted not just because they are useful but because they are “morally plausible to large
numbers of men and women” (ibid.: 133). In other words, there is some kind of theory
of rights or a democratic norm for what is permissible in war, and thus “a legitimate act
of war is one that does not violate the rights of the people against whom it is directed”
(ibid.: 135). Even criminals and the worst drug traffickers have rights and should be
treated by the rule of law, especially in a democracy.
Following this logic, the war convention applies to aggressors as well as
defenders, yet the drug war is against those who are outside the law. At times it is
difficult to know who the aggressor is. Is the U.S. an aggressor by declaring the war in
the first place? If the U.S. and its allies in the war are the defenders, they may be putting
themselves at a disadvantage by adhering to the convention. When warriors within
governments and police or military forces are corrupted by drug money the problem is
worsened. One might wonder whether the war on drugs can only succeed as a dirty war,
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fighting fire with fire and lawlessness. The danger is that a temporary suspension of
norms in this war could become the usual state of affairs as it drags on. The safeguards
for distinguishing the guilty from the innocent are lost. The war convention prohibits
attacks on non-combatants, but who they are in the war on drugs is still not entirely clear.
Another principle of Just War in bello is that of necessity:
War is a world apart, where life itself is at stake, where human nature is reduced
to its elemental forms, where self-interest and necessity prevail. Here men and
women do what they must to save themselves and their communities, and
morality and law have no place (Walzer, 1977: 3).
Is or should the war on drugs be the same? The violence of drugs is certainly a threat to
life and community, but we must ask if all is fair in fighting it. The problem of drugs is
large and traffickers often have more money and better technology than those who are
trying to control them, at least as far as we can estimate (Griffith, 1997; Griffin, 2000;
Nordstrom, 2007). Is it necessary to escalate efforts to track down and stop drug traffic?
Is the problem so bad that individuals and our communities’ very existence are at stake
and we have to do anything to save ourselves? If morality and law have no place and
there is a loss to individuals, will it be a necessary but temporary sacrifice?
The caveats of military necessity make distinguishing between legal and illegal
actions in war and punishing war crimes difficult or even impossible. “Military necessity
amounts to a claim that certain blatantly immoral acts are justified on no other basis than
that they might contribute in some way to military objectives” (Christopher, 2004: 150).
Even when tactical, strategic, or political objectives are specified, generally no
distinctions are made for military necessity. If “almost any action imaginable might on
some occasion be lawful based on military necessity” then it is “virtually impossible for
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soldiers to know with any surety whether certain orders they might receive are lawful or
not” (ibid.: 150). Imagine then how much more ambiguous the distinction becomes
when one is involved in a pseudo-war. The confusion is even greater where the line
between military objectives and standard law enforcement is blurred.
“The moral equality of the battlefield distinguishes combat from domestic crimes”
and thus soldiers are not considered murderers when they kill one another (Walzer, 1977:
128). But the war on drugs does not take place on a battlefield. The drug trade is both
international and domestic crime. One must look at when or if police and military forces
are allowed to treat traffickers as enemy combatants. One could ask if the same methods
or rules apply to large- and small-scale dealers or drug users. Lastly, one must consider
how many people can be killed in the course of making arrests and still be justified in the
name of this war. By calling it a war, one wonders how much loss of due process is
expected to be tolerated, how much will be tolerated, and how much might never be
regained.
At the time that St. Augustine and Thomas Aquinas were writing about just wars,
war was conceived of as the pursuit of peace in the larger context of Christianity. Now
we are not necessarily looking for ways “to apply moral principles without having to
accept larger philosophical or religious systems” but “to see the wars of our time as
clearly as possible and with full advantage of all available moral perspectives on them”
(Temes, 2003: 14). This pursuit may be more difficult when individual leaders are
particularly devout, be it President George W. Bush or the officially Catholic government
and state of the Dominican Republic. Temes refers to the United States as “a nominally
non-sectarian world power with a mildly Christian bent” (16). Using the phrase “armed
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moralist” he talks about both presidents Wilson and GW Bush who use the language of
principles and philosophy to justify actions in war. Both emphasized freedom and
democracy – fighting to make the world safe for democracy, or fighting against evil to
spread democracy – which are abstract things to fight and die for. Stopping drug traffic
has become a higher priority than the commitment to the spread of democracy. One has
displaced the other while failing to recognize the links between the two.

-- Some Preliminary Conclusions -Just war theory is of a “presumptive conservative character” (Amstutz, 2005:
112). Jus ad bello principles tend to preserve the status quo, especially in relation to a
legitimate authority and just cause. The drug war is declared by the established state
authority and the ‘enemy’ is not really an entity vying to gain control of the government
or territory, other than to buy off that government so that its operations may continue.
Still, the current approach to fighting drugs rarely addresses new or radically different
approaches to the problem. Policy makers in the U.S. are more likely to impose U.S.style thinking about the drug war on its ‘allies’ in the war than to consider or adopt any of
their homegrown approaches, and defending U.S. borders from drugs does not get rid of
the drug problem as a whole. Extending the drug war beyond our borders and in to other
states might even be considered aggression and a violation of sovereignty.
“A just war is one that it is morally urgent to win” (Walzer, 1977: 110). Few
would deny that the threat from drugs is serious and must be addressed in some form and
with some measure of success. “What is essential in war is victory, not prolonged
operations” (Sun Tzu, as quoted in Christopher, 2004: 8). And yet “if it is sometimes
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urgent to win, it is not always clear what winning is” (Walzer, 1977: 110). Winning the
war on drugs could mean a total destruction of the enemy, destruction of all drug
production, traffic, and consumption; is that even possible? Unconditional surrender of
cartels is highly unlikely, as are compromises or settlements with them. This is where
other non-war approaches might help achieve the ends sought by the war. The theory of
justice implies responsibility and accountability. States are responsible for upholding the
rights of citizens even in the midst of the war on drugs. Officials are accountable to the
people in a democracy, even one facing a crisis and especially where democracy is not
long established.
“The absolute rejection of war means victory for forces that ought, on their
merits, to be fought against” (Temes, 2003: 12). The choice is not always between right
and wrong, but between wrong and more wrong. Jus ad bellum and jus in bello are
treated separately and a war might satisfy the requirements of one but not the other. This
is the case with the war on drugs. We can identify a just cause, where drugs cause harm
to those who use them and the violence and corruption associated with the drug trade are
rising. But for a war to be moral, it must fulfill both – and both the strategies and tactics
in the war on drugs do not appear to do so.

Changing Paradigms in IR and Definitions of Security
Just War Doctrine is compatible with other theories of international relations,
which also help to illuminate and explain the NUCs of certain policies. While this study
assumes states are the primary actors in the way that a Realist perspective looks at
external threats to state security and sovereignty, it also incorporates a Liberal
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perspective like that detailed by James Rosenau which assumes new actors and
phenomena are changing international relations, and actions from one issue or policy area
can have resonating or cascading effects elsewhere. The transnational drug trade has
created turbulence in the world system because non-state entities are threats, and the
definition of security has expanded to include more than the existence of the state itself.
Security in the war on drugs has implications for individual citizens as well as for
institutions within states.
It has become increasingly evident over time that threats from the drug war itself
may be made to citizens and their civil rights. Recent literature that has addressed this
issue has primarily focused on the main drug producing areas in the same way U.S.
policy does. Much of the scholarship on drugs in the Caribbean at the close of the 20th
century emphasizes security, changing definitions of security, and the role of states.
Security is expanded to include threats to the state from actors other than states in the
international system. These threats may be to the existence of the state, or even to the
environment, economy, social and cultural traditions, and particular institutions and
individuals within the state.
Griffith’s definition of security is based on Realist principles: Security means
“protection and preservation of a people’s freedom from external military attack and
coercion, from internal subversion, and from the erosion of cherished political, economic,
and social values” (1997: 5). He also recognizes that most states “exist with a certain
margin of insecurity” (ibid.). I would add that some states have a larger margin of
insecurity than others, and that some sectors within an individual state have a greater
degree of insecurity than others – women, for example, may be more vulnerable to
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certain kinds of threats than are men (see Tickner, 1997). Other vulnerable groups may
include the poor, ethnic or racial minority groups, and so on. For Rogers (1999) drugs
are clearly a security issue beyond traditional Realism. He identifies three types of
security: National defense, public security, and citizen security.
National defense or traditional security issues focus on the protection of
sovereign borders against external threats, as well as defending values and
interests. The threats need not come from another state. The Dominican
Republic and the greater Caribbean have long been entangled in U.S. national
defense issues. Public security involves the maintenance of public order and the
enforcement of a nation’s law. Drug trafficking and organized crime in the
Dominican Republic and the United States have led to increased state activities
to ‘enforce’ the law and stabilize public order. As a result, the missions of the
military and police become blurred and state security institutions have become
more repressive. Blurring the lines between national and public security also
threatens citizen security, defined as protecting civil and political rights (Rogers,
1999: 55).
By framing it this way, threats to one type of security can then cross over into the areas of
other kinds of security. As the definition of security broadens and threats become larger
in number and more amorphous, the forces used to control them can be used for just
about anything – or against anyone. As with just war theory, ever-changing definitions of
security can either be used to constrain or justify actions or abuses of power.
The turn of the 21st century marks a time where “changing paradigms…are
altering the structures of world politics and adding new issues to the global agenda”
(Aydinli and Rosenau, 2005: 1). The drug trade may not be entirely new but the context
in which it operates has changed. “Among the central tasks of governance at all levels of
community is that of achieving order over and across shifting, elusive, and often
unrecognizable boundaries” (Rosenau, 1997: 8). The frontier is the area where the
domestic and the international meet and interact. The frontier itself has grown – and
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grown in importance – for a variety of reasons, including a globalizing economy, the
mobility of people and ideas, the end of the Cold War, and the rapid development of
technology. The United States and the Dominican Republic are a good example of this
history with many years of cultural exchange, occupation, migration, economic relations,
and of course counter-drug policy and operations.
The difficulty of studying the interaction of international factors on domestic
processes represents “one of the most deeply rooted paradigm divides in political
science” – that is, the divide between international relations and comparative politics
(Schmitter, 1996: 28). Clearly, “the international context is a notoriously difficult
variable to pin down” and “its causal impact is often indirect” (ibid.). In a turbulent and
interdependent world events and processes at one level do have influence and
consequences at other levels. These are especially salient when goals are contradictory,
when the hierarchy or mechanisms of control are unclear, and when the locations of
authority overlap. In an interdependent world, “the need for control mechanisms
outstrips the capacity or readiness of national governments to provide them” (Rosenau,
1997: 172). More specifically, the need to control a transnational issue as widespread
and difficult as drug traffic outstrips the capacity of any one national government alone.
Rosenau also discusses macro-micro level interactions in world politics. Micro
generally refers to citizens, officials, and leaders. Macro generally refers to states,
transnational organizations, and collectivities such as national subgroups and ‘publics’.
Micro is not necessarily a particular unique individual but someone who is a part of “the
network of systems in which he or she is embedded” (Rosenau, 1990: 117). In other
words, it may make sense to examine specific leaders or actors but it can also be useful to
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include other individuals who make up the system or society, or at aggregate groups of
individuals that are a part of that system. This argument supports the use of the public
opinion data included in this dissertation. The effect of macro-level policy can be at midlevel, such as on a state judicial system, which in turn has effects at the micro level.
These cascades are the sequences of developments from and through one level to the
next, creating action, interaction, and alteration along the way. Public opinion data
allows us to access and evaluate individual assessments, in the aggregate, of macro-level
responses to the international and domestic effects of the drug problem.
Here is a brief illustration of cascading effects from one level to the next. At the
micro level, one scientist isolated the active ingredient in coca leaves and cocaine was
born. Over time individuals began using this substance and eventually a drug culture
grew. This subgroup of users begat another group of suppliers which eventually grew
into a macro-level business and transnational venture. Interaction continues between
macro-level supply and mid-level demand. Negative effects are seen on individuals at
the micro level. Demands for control come from all levels. Response in the form of laws
and policy is at the macro level.
Other macro factors keep the drug trade going in addition to demand from users.
Global economic conditions and markets make drugs profitable and attractive, yet macro
policies in practice rarely address these other factors. Instead the policy of interdiction at
the macro level is beginning to show other ramifications at the micro level. Individuals
are affected by policies that infringe on their rights. The next wave from micro to macro
may be a push for alternative policies, particularly from those in academic or
humanitarian circles.
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Micro-macro interaction is less problematic for analysis to Rosenau than it is for
some other scholars. Instead of seeing individual versus society or finding difficulty in
drawing macro conclusions from micro observations, he sees an opportunity to look at
“the ways in which large, impersonal forces at work in the world both derive from and
influence the actions of people in coping with challenges and conducting their affairs”
(Rosenau, 1990: 143). Analysis would be easier if one could treat micro and macro as
separate and constant, but an interactive approach is more realistic and reflective of the
way things actually work:
To proceed from the premise of interactive variability at both levels is to require
concerns with leadership, followership, authority relations, aggregation,
consensus formation, institution building, momentum, intergroup bargaining,
and the many other sociopolitical mechanisms through which micro actions are
converted into macro collectivities and policies (ibid.: 144).
In other words, the use of individual level data to evaluate state or international level
policies is not erroneous or disingenuous because all levels are connected and influenced
by one another in the real world. Macro-level policies affect citizens on an individual
basis but aggregate data can demonstrate trends in the effects created by such policies.
Rosenau’s assertion is echoed by some within the democratization literature, and their
contributions are also informative for this study.

-- Democracy and the International-Domestic Nexus -Whitehead (1996) notes that when one reads a list of all countries considered
democratic, nearly all of them became so because of some international factor such as
decolonization or the end of the Cold War. He divides international influences on
democratization into three categories: contagion, control, and consent. Contagion is
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more or less his term for the domino effect – if one country democratizes others are likely
to follow suit. While this may be a possible explanation for waves of democracy, it is
also a weak one, as many countries such as Cuba persist while others around them change
regimes.
Control instead signifies a stronger influence from an external source. “Twothirds of the democracies existing in 1990 owed their origins, at least in part, to deliberate
acts of imposition or intervention from without” (Whitehead, 1996: 9). Whitehead also
asserts “that in almost all the democratizations that have occurred between the Second
World War and the dismantling of the Warsaw Pact, the strategies of regulation and
control adopted by the dominant states in the system were of critical importance” (ibid.:
15). The dismantling of the Warsaw Pact in 1991 was after the initial transition to
democracy in the Dominican Republic in 1978 but prior to the complete transition in
1996, and so the critical importance of dominant states was probably still a key factor.
The influence of the United States likely became stronger in the post-Cold War period
and new era of globalization.
The third international dimension that Whitehead (1996) addresses is consent,
which adds an internal element to the external influence of control, where “the actions
and intentions of relevant domestic groupings, and the interactions between internal and
international processes” create the push for democratization (15). Consent is
Whitehead’s version of what Rosenau calls linkage politics. This approach introduces
much more complexity to the model, but again echoing Rosenau, it is a complexity that
Whitehead argues is closer to reality. For him “a genuine and securely implanted
democratic regime requires the positive support and involvement of a wide range of
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social and political groupings, support that must be sustained over a considerable period
and in the face of diverse uncertainties” (ibid.). This argument seems logical enough – a
change of regime, imposed from the outside or not, needs a certain amount of support
from the bottom up if is to be real and lasting. As noted, to address this idea data on
public opinion and support for the democratic government in the Dominican Republic
will be examined at in more depth in subsequent chapters.
Democratization proceeds through stages in most cases, and may be quick at the
beginning – the transition stage – and longer and more deliberate later on – the
consolidation stage.
“From this staged or phased notion of regime change comes one of the most
important hypotheses linking the international context to domestic political
outcomes: regardless of the form…that it takes, external intervention will have
a greater and more lasting effect upon the consolidation of democracy than on
the transition to it” (Schmitter, 1996: 40).
Thus, the global economy or relations with a dominant power may be part of the reason
the Dominican Republic ranks as low as it did within the IDD (Democratic Development
Index – Latin America) for 2007, and even lower than in previous years. External
priorities may not be allowing for improvements to internal factors most important to
consolidation. Whitehead wonders:
if the United States has generally favoured democracy promotion for so long,
and if US influence in the region has been so great, and if the underlying local
realities have been relatively favourable – why then have the results been so
slow, uneven, and modest? (ibid.: 62).
Dominican efforts to cope with the simultaneously internal and external strife caused by
the war on drugs has detracted from other elements of is democratization.
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Conclusions
Studies that attempt to separate international and domestic politics are frequently
artificial and less informative for the topics and issues they wish to address. The concept
of cascading effects in world politics helps to illustrate the ways that actions in one arena
can influence outcomes elsewhere. By this logic, it is not unreasonable to think U.S.
policy and its influence over nations in the Caribbean has changed the course of domestic
policies and bled into other areas of interest to scholars and leaders alike. The war on
drugs is meant to support states and democratic governance, but the realities of its
implementation are also not easily separated from the processes of consolidation.
The following chapters delve into the specifics of U.S. drug policy, Dominican
drug laws and policy, the structure of the Dominican judicial system from the police
force up, and the ways the military in both countries is being used to enforce the law. I
also look at the challenges faced by the government in reforming and professionalizing
these entities. This information is then analyzed alongside a variety of data from recent
surveys within the Dominican Republic as well as internal reports and studies dealing
with questions of institutional effectiveness and citizen rights and security to show how
the drug trade and influence of the U.S. have converged upon the Dominican Republic’s
unfolding democratic consolidation.
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IV: Modern Drug Policy in Historical Context
In this chapter, I begin with the history of coca in the western world, and the use
of drugs and efforts to control them, an impetus primarily originating in the United
States. This history provides a context for how coca has been perceived by people and
authorities over time, and how drug control regimes have developed. Next I examine the
International Narcotics Control Strategy Report issued by the U.S. State Department
evaluating the record and progress of the contemporary war on drugs. Understanding the
ways drugs have been treated historically allows us to see other possible ways of
approaching their control and to again ask whether war is a justifiable solution to the
problems associated with the illegal trade.

Drugs in the Americas – A brief history
-- History of Coca: The Colonial Period -The Spanish conquest of the Andes initiated a discovery of coca and the
transformation of its position and esteem within the region and eventually throughout the
world. The debate over the benefits or evils of coca began early and continues today. In
this section, I will show how the attitude of the early Spanish state and their subsequent
use and treatment of coca changed both the attitudes and habits of the native population.
These changes begun hundreds of years ago have contributed to the coca problem of the
last century. The origin and development of the controversy has in part caused a rigid
polarization in the current treatment of the plant and the perceptions of its use and
potential. The attitude and position of U.S. officials toward the plant and its derivatives
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has changed over time. This unknown or frequently forgotten history provides a broader
perspective on how just or balanced today’s policies and perceptions are.
The native peoples of the Andes have used coca leaves in various ways
throughout history. Evidence of this exists in the depiction of coca leaves and coca
chewing in temple decorations, pottery, and textiles found at archeological sites
(Gagliano, 1994; Mortimer, 1901). Cloth pouches and mummies containing leaves have
also been found. The effects of coca on hunger, its use to sustain energy, and its use in
medicine were what gave coca its position of importance among the Andeans. Coca was
not just a stimulant used by the Indians for sustenance during times of food shortages or
hard labor. Its many religious, social, cultural, political, and economic uses increased its
intrinsic value (Meruvia Balderrama, 2000). The Indians did not worship coca per se,
though it was revered and respected for all its powers. The best coca was offered to the
gods and the Incas, while the rest was distributed to and used by the general populace.
The value of coca to the Incas and the Andean people was obvious to the Spanish
upon their arrival in the New World. Accounts of the extent of coca use by the native
population vary amongst the Spaniards who wrote on the subject during the colonial
period, depending on their view of the 'habit.’ Pedro Cieza de León “attributed the
popularity of coca among the natives of Peru to be the result of an ill habit, as he put it,
‘and fit for such people as they are’” (Inciardi, 2008: 116). From early on, Europeans
associated coca with a lower class of people and lesser beings. In spite of this
association, the economic value of coca did not escape Spanish attention, and it soon
became evident that coca was not something they could ignore. Most noted the
significance of coca, which was held in higher esteem than any precious metals (Meruvia
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Balderrama, 2000; Sánchez, 1997). A lucrative coca commerce was begun by the
conquistadors in response to demand by the Indians (de la Peña Begué, 1971; Gagliano,
1994). "Their demand for the leaf became evident to the Spanish during the early years
of the conquest as the Inca agrarian economy collapsed and food scarcities spread"
(Gagliano, 1994: 165). The plant was soon regarded as a miracle "whose leaves would
enable the subjected natives to cope with their nutritional privations while providing them
with the stamina to work in the mines" (ibid.: 33). Without scientific knowledge of any
possible ill effects of long-term coca use, many believed the leaf to be an adequate
substitute for food and rest.
Soon coca use was inextricable from colonial mining production. This is a period
referred to by Gagliano as the institutionalization of coca use. Mine owners and
operators provided their work force with a daily ration of coca leaves, as the Indians
would refuse to work without it. Other entrepreneurs and landowners began to plant and
grow coca to sell in the mining towns, especially Potosí (Gagliano, 1994; Meruvia
Balderrama, 2000). The coca commerce proved to be highly profitable and grew as
mining expanded (Gagliano, 1994; Sánchez, 1997). Exact data from this period is
difficult to obtain according to these writers, yet they still find a correlation between the
consumption of coca and the growth of the mining industry, even as the native population
began to decline.
The view of coca as an exploitable commodity is an important departure from its
traditional usage among the natives during the time period. In purely economic terms,
coca had many allies among the Spanish, but it had just as many opponents. Some
officials from the church complained that the use of coca inhibited their efforts to
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Christianize the natives, calling it "the single most important cause for the persistence of
idolatry" (Gagliano, 1994: 48). Others felt that its presence in indigenous customs
proved its connection to the devil, and a lack of knowledge of the stimulants in coca led
many to believe the supposed effects felt by the chewers were superstition, both proof of
the devil's work and of coca’s danger (de la Peña Begué, 1971; Gagliano, 1994; Sánchez,
1997).
Other prohibitionists cited the cruel and harsh conditions Indian laborers were
subjected to on the coca plantations in the eastern territories (Gagliano, 1994). The best
coca growing regions were found in the lower altitudes of the east where the weather was
wetter and more humid. Indian mita labor forces were imported to the plantations to
pick, dry, and transport coca. Many became ill or died from strange tropical diseases,
collectively called el mal de los andes, which were exacerbated by the damp conditions
and the way the Indians were often forced to work long hours in the same wet clothes
(Gagliano, 1994; Mortimer, 1901). Mitas that had to travel long distances in their work
are said to have suffered from the effects of altitude sicknesses during transport because
of the severe altitudinal and climatic changes from the east to the sierra and mining
regions.
By the time of Toledo, enough opposition had been voiced to warrant the
implementation of regulations over all aspects of the coca commerce (Gagliano, 1994;
Sánchez, 1997). The official policy was one of toleration; the consumption of coca was
"un mal necesario" (Sánchez, 1997: 143). The 'habit' of coca chewing was associated
with the natives of the sierra and was therefore considered primitive and vulgar by the
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Spanish, especially in the coastal regions (Gagliano, 1994). "It was presumed there could
be no good custom followed by the Indians" (Mortimer, 1901: 149).
One effect of the policy of toleration, combined with scorn from the civilized
settlers, was that while workers in the mines could still have coca, its use was to be
dissociated from all religious, medicinal, or superstitious meaning or context (Gagliano,
1994; Sánchez, 1997). Documents from the Inquisition refer to the use of coca in nearly
every case (Gagliano, 1994). To chew coca outside of the mines, or to use it in any
ceremonial fashion, was to subject oneself to punishment under the law (Sánchez, 1997).
Essentially, the law was secularizing coca (Saignes, 1988). It was no longer valuable in
any function other than as relief from harsh labor. What had once been a support in times
of scarcity had become a requirement in a life of drudgery, doled out by an uncaring boss,
and completely devoid of a connection to the divine, metaphysical, or spiritual.
The contradictory attitude of the state, combined with its return of the leaf to the
reach of all, especially the humblest in society, is the source of the coca's loss of esteem
(Saignes, 1988). Saignes also argues that the rise in consumption of the leaf after the
conquest is evidence of a euphoria over something readily available that had long been
prohibited for the masses. This argument, combined with Meruvia Balderrama's
assessment that subsequent generations of coca chewers had different perceptions of the
leaf, should lead us to understand that the position of the leaf within Andean society was
indeed changing.
As early as the 1600s, there is evidence that in spite of a general attitude of
disdain for coca, some Spaniards and mestizos were trying it themselves (Gagliano, 1994;
Sánchez, 1997). The first non-Indians to use coca were in the sierra, but later others in
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the coastal region and in Lima were using it. The people in the sierra claimed it helped
them adjust to the altitude and the climate, while those in the city espoused its medicinal
applications for a wide variety of ailments (Gagliano, 1994). There came to be nearly as
many laws and writings on coca as there were for the mining industry – most against
consumption but very few against traffic (de la Peña Begué, 1971; Meruvia Balderrama,
2000). The result was punishment for the Indian who bought coca and few consequences
for the Spaniard in charge of its transport (Sánchez, 1997).
Little use for coca outside the New World was seen until the 19th century and the
isolation of cocaine from coca (Gagliano, 1994). Baldomero Caceres (1978) believes that
since then coca has been pigeonholed, just as Mortimer wrote more than 70 years before
him. The world's perception of coca is often the same as that of cocaine. Both authors,
and others like Gootenberg (2008), have argued and emphasize the point that the two are
different and separate entities. The "idea of a single active principle which should
represent the potency of the leaf" is a false assumption according to Mortimer, and "the
qualities of coca are not fully represented by any one of its alkaloids thus far isolated"
(1901: 183). He felt that much more research on the plant was needed before it should
be outlawed or discarded outright. Caceres feels the same way but supports his argument
from a cultural perspective as well as a scientific one. He says the whole of Andean
society and the whole of the plant are being condemned for what one substance in
isolation does to some people in some circumstances, and that research thus far has been
biased against finding positive effects.
In contrast to the colonial period, the anti-coca campaign of the 20th century has
been more successful, though many of the same arguments are used. References to the
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"vice" and "superstition" of coca use are common (de la Peña Begué, 1971; Gagliano,
1994). Caceres argues that the supposed bad effects, such as illiteracy, that come from
habitual coca use among Indians can be attributed to other socioeconomic factors.
Indeed, as early prohibitionists often argued, the use of coca would be reduced or even
unnecessary if the Indian had sufficient food and rest (Gagliano, 1994; de la Peña Begué,
1971). Coca alone cannot account for the continued marginalization and isolation of the
indigenous population within the Andean nations, or the poor and the addicted anywhere
in the global drug market. Caceres also finds a lack of correlation between the scourge of
cocaine addiction in the developed world and the tradition of coca usage among the
natives of the Andes. To equate the tradition with a sickness, as some in the counternarcotics movement have done, implies that the culture that would contain such a
tradition is flawed. This same argument can be used to justify eradication efforts abroad
as opposed to domestic efforts to reduce consumption.
The association of coca with the native and its subsequent loss of esteem other
than as an economic entity have affected the way that the world views coca. The
disposition of the scientific explorer of the 19th century further skewed the definition of
coca by isolating its stimulative elements in a laboratory. One may argue that the gods
never intended coca to be used in anything other than its natural state and those who use
its extracts are doomed, but it is those who have the most power on earth who make the
decisions. The European conquerors set a precedent that has been followed ever since.
The native use of the leaf has been subjugated and it now exists as an organic source for a
chemical evil. As in the 1500s coca is far too profitable in its illicit context to think that
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its cultivation in South America will ever be totally eliminated. "It will never cease to be
valuable" (Cieza de León, quoted in Mortimer, 1901: 151).

-- Coca in the 19th & 20th Centuries: Miracle Drug and National Commodity -The history of cocaine is most frequently told from the U.S. or European
perspective, as a tale of the discovery, wonder, and danger associated with the drug. But
its 19th and 20th century history is also a time of rebirth for Peru, with cocaine as a classic
export commodity and mass consumption good that brought remote tropical areas into the
world economy. Indeed, “Peruvians celebrated cocaine as a national fusion of timehonored Andean traditions (Indian coca) with modern elite science, industrialization, and
profit” (Gootenberg, 2008: 56).
Drugs, along with petroleum, arms, and tourism, have modern histories as the
most global and profitable of trades. Unlike other new colonial stimulants such as
tobacco, coffee, rum, chocolate, or opium, coca was not immediately or as easily
assimilated and consumed by Europeans, medically or otherwise. Coca became a
regional commodity, and was linked to the success of silver mining, but it was not until
much later as an illicit commodity that it gained the same level as a major consumption
good. While there was some debate over its use by the natives during the late colonial
period, there were few European supporters overall. Coca was not creolized or mestizoized in the way cacao had been, and it soon became a “marker of a degraded subaltern
‘Indian’ caste” (Gootenberg, 2008: 20). On a more practical side, coca leaf simply did
not travel well in the way that tobacco, chocolate, and opium did. Most coca leaf that
was shipped to Europe for refining arrived in an unusable state.
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The Enlightenment scientists of the 18th and 19th centuries brought about a
renewed interest in coca, and made efforts to find the active principle of the leaf. The
pace of industrialization and modernization of Western culture in the mid-19th century
made for a “ready arena for the arrival of a new, miraculous energy-enhancing stimulant.
Coffee, tea, sugar, and tobacco were already domesticated and too tame” (Gootenberg,
2008: 22). Most of cocaine’s researchers were Germans, who were already dominant in
the fields of chemistry, pharmacology, and so on, but there many others, including some
Peruvians and perhaps most famously the Austrian Sigmund Freud. During the mid1880s, these same scientists were testing possible uses for cocaine, often on themselves.
Their applications included treatment for labor pains, hysteria, cholera, asthma, syphilis,
and addictions to alcohol or morphine. A colleague of Freud’s, Karl Köller, is most often
credited as the first to recognize cocaine’s value as an anesthetic. These various
applications of cocaine in medicine fueled demand for the drug and for its use in
research, thereby increasing its value and creating “an essential high-value commodity”
(ibid.: 24). Franco-Peruvian pharmacist Alfredo Bignon, also a contemporary of Freud,
created a simple method for making cocaine at home; that is, in the same place as coca’s
cultivation. This was one of many experiments designed to help Peru meet rising world
demand for cocaine in the late 19th century.
The wealth of cocaine and coca related research done in Peru during the same era
is frequently left out of history, in spite of its “nationalist and commercial overtones”
(Gootenberg, 2008: 37). In other words, coca was being re-imagined as a Peruvian
product like quinine or guano before it. Its potential and association with the indigenous
were both being reconsidered. Bignon’s new faster and cheaper extraction method using
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kerosene and soda ash produced crude cocaine that was then exported and refined into
cocaine hydrochloride by pharmaceutical companies primarily in Germany. Crude
cocaine was considered a national product and part of an effort to produce more in order
to satisfy world demand. By the last decades of the 19th century, coca (and crude
cocaine) was also seen as “an ideal good for a national conquest of the vast Peruvian
Amazon” (ibid.: 53). Efforts to expand formal cultivation into the east were a sort of
manifest destiny for coastal elites, as well as the “great white hope of government export
policy” (ibid.).
In the 1880s, European pharmaceuticals such as Merck that were trying to meet
demand for medicinal cocaine found Peru’s crude cocaine a solution to scarcity. It was
easier and better to import than coca leaf itself because it retained its full potency during
shipping. By 1900 the U.S. was importing both crude cocaine and coca leaf for medical
use and the manufacture of patent medicines. The U.S. became the number one
consumer of cocaine and coca leaf products during that era, and one-third of all cocaine,
approximately five to nine tons per year between 1900 and 1910, was made in the U.S.
(Gootenberg, 2008). These booms in the U.S. and Europe would not have been possible
without “a dynamic response by Andeans” (ibid.: 63). From the work of planters and
peasants to pharmacy and factory entrepreneurs alike, “crude cocaine was Peru’s fastestgrowing quantum export of the 1890s” rising 600% from 1890 to 10,700 kilos in 1901
(ibid.). While coca and cocaine did not represent a major portion of Peru’s exports
overall, it was vital to certain regions within the country, the town of Huánuco in the
Huallaga valley in particular. Peru also became an important part of global drug
production as crude cocaine processing centers were established in Lima.

55

Competition in Peru’s cocaine business increased as more pharmacists and
pharmacies, Germans and other foreign nationals included, began to use Bignon’s
technique. Smaller batches were thought to retain more active alkaloids and a cottage
industry expanded into other areas, especially to territories deeper in the Andes and
nearer the supply of leaf. These are many of the same areas where production reemerged
in the 1960s and 1970s and continues today.
Processing also grew outside of Peru – U.S. and European pharmaceuticals used
Bignon’s technique – and the U.S. and others explored the possibility of creating their
own coca cultivation. Most remained in Peru through the early 1900s, but coca leaf was
grown as far away as Japan and India. Huánuco remained the “world capital of Peru’s
legal cocaine industry” (Gootenberg, 2008: 83). Drug production remained viable in the
Amazonian region, but political developments as well as the loss of cocaine’s prestige
soon left Huánuco vulnerable. The year 1915 was truly the end of “Peru’s boom in legal
cocaine” which left “a struggling regional culture” (ibid.: 100). By the 1920s, crude
cocaine was fully prohibited by U.S. law. Cocaine’s use and production was subject to
debate within Peru and was the subject of rising controversy internationally from the
1920s through the 1940s. Despite prohibitions, cocaine chains did not disappear but
became more tightly controlled within the U.S.-Andean link by corporate (i.e., Coca
Cola) and government entities, though Peru maintained some ties to both Dutch and
Japanese chains.
World wide prices for coca and cocaine began to drop, and the crop became
significant only in regional terms. National hopes for global profits from a national
product were lost in Peru, and the market then was re-concentrated on traditional local
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users. At the same time, international anti-cocaine sentiment began to revive the idea of
coca as backward and detrimental to national development, and to reassert racism
directed toward its indigenous users. Ironically, cocaine was still considered by many to
be a modern Western good and “Peruvian officials ignored pressures from the United
States and the League [of Nations] to restrict cocaine and coca after 1920” (Gootenberg,
2008: 136). Peruvian officials thought global anti-drug efforts were discriminatory,
especially as coca was still central to Huánuco’s economy. They saw that coca supply
did not cause a rise in the number of so-called fiends in the West; rather, restrictions on
coca hurt national interests in Peru, causing surplus leaf and increasing the maligned
Indian coca habit. Quotas on exports oppressed natives and others in the producing areas.
As coca’s prestige continued to decline during the interwar era, several scientists,
agronomists, and coca specialists maintained their faith in the crop and worked to find
ways to produce higher yields and better technology for drying and processing the leaf in
order to compete with Asian producers. German pharmaceuticals maintained a monopoly
on the refining of crude cocaine into cocaine hydrochloride, while the U.S. prohibited
imports of all cocaine through the 1922 Jones-Miller Act. Despite smaller levels of
production, cocaine remained somewhat profitable. The problem for Peruvian producers
was there were no new markets in which to sell. “The size of the consuming market was
governed by encircling restrictions rather than by relative prices or cost factors in making
cocaine” (Gootenberg, 2008: 161). Some of Peru’s cocaine industry supporters saw
world drug regimes and conventions as “forums for industrial nations to protect their own
national manufacturing interests” at a cost to those nations who wished to develop their
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own (ibid.: 169). The signing of drug treaties by Andean officials would imperil a
national crop.
In the 1920s, Peruvian reports framed cocaine not as an abusable or contraband
drug (in spite of its reputation as such in places outside of Peru) and advocated drug
education over policing or punitive approaches. All controls were decided and
implemented at the local level, despite the preferences of the U.S. or the League. While
there was no overarching state control of the Peruvian coca and cocaine industry,
authorities did begin some regulation of it related to sanitation or in the form of taxation
after 1920. They had some concern with contraband in remote areas of the territory a
decade later, though still not in a criminal or policing sense.
World War II expanded and militarized Peruvian state functions and increased the
U.S. presence in its operations. This brought with it a rising concern with contraband,
especially as Peru appeared to be tempted to sell cocaine to the Axis powers, formerly
their best markets. Both Peru and the U.S. began to monitor these “suspicious” sales to
Europe or South America within the still-legal cocaine industry. Licenses for refining
cocaine, previously issued by the state and the Bureau of Public Health (BPH) in Peru,
were suspended in 1939, and in 1941 the state issued its first anti-narcotics policing
decree (Gootenberg, 2008). This meant the police and the BPH were “mandated to
investigate all instances of illegal drug use or sale” (ibid.: 180). Legal cocaine did still
exist, though Gootenberg suggests WWII was its point of no return. The war cut off
access to the last markets in Germany and Japan, and competing circuits were effectively
destroyed and later occupied by the U.S. The war itself had stimulated demand for the
drug, but afterward the U.S. antidrug agenda and new U.N. antidrug bodies,
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commissions, and regulations directly challenged Andean coca. Thus, “Peru’s relic legal
industry was doomed” (ibid.: 181).
World War II and beyond tipped the balance against Peruvian cocaine. The
country’s legal factories became criminalized with the new world drug regime, and
“Peru’s last options for cultivating alternative markets were shattered on 7 December,
1941” (Gootenberg, 2008: 227). Further, “only the United States came out with postwar
cocaine capacity and this capacity was geared to lower world use” (ibid.). The U.S.
occupied both Germany and Japan – two major producers – and refused to absorb
Peruvian cocaine, which had done well during the war. “No room was left for cocaine
commodity chains autonomous of U.S. control” (ibid.: 22).

-- Coca in the 19th and 20th Centuries: Drug Use & Laws in the United States -“Dramatic shifts in attitude have characterized Americans’ relationship to drugs”
over many years (Musto, 1997: 21). From beneficial opiates and cocaine products in the
19th century to fear of their dangers in the early 20th century, and from tolerance of
recreational drug use in the 1960s and 1970s, to intolerance beyond, recurring cycles of
enthusiasm and abstinence are problematic for policy makers and the public, both of
whom often do not remember the previous eras. This lack of knowledge of the past can
make the formulation of a realistic policy difficult. In this section, I will briefly recount
the history of drug use and drug control laws in the United States during the last 200
years. This history can provide a framework for understanding the state of drug control
in the country today and resistance to it elsewhere.
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As previously demonstrated, “drugs are both physical substances with
pharmacological effects and cultural icons with values and behaviors linked to them by
the society in which they are found” (Gaines and Kraska, 1997: 5). James A. Inciardi
(2008) suggests that the use of drugs and alcohol is both ancient and universal in human
history. Generally, before modern times the drugs used by people in various societies
were those derived from or found in local plants. With the 16th century and exploration,
trade began to move drugs throughout the world. Prior to the 1800s drugs were used in
their natural forms, but the advent of organic chemistry made the isolation of morphine
from poppies and cocaine from coca leaves possible by 1860. The production of these
substances coincided with the invention and newly widespread use of hypodermic
syringes as well as a growing pharmaceutical industry.
Opium containing medicines were popular during the 1800s and their over-thecounter and prescription use was pervasive. Diacetylmorphine was synthesized in 1874
and sold over the counter as Bayer heroin beginning in 1898 (Inciardi, 2008; Musto,
1997). In 1884 purified cocaine became commercially available in the United States
(Musto, 1997). Some officials even promoted increased trade in these new resources:
“By the 1890s, consuls and attachés on the ground assumed an active stance
helping Peruvians upgrade coca cultivation and packing, as well as gathering
commercial intelligence about the new local cocaine industry. These were the
first visible articulations of Americans to coca in the Andes in attempts to
promote its expansion and linkages to North America” (Gootenberg, 2008: 30).
Cocaine also eventually found its way into popular medicines. Some extracts from coca
were used in wines and other beverages, the most recognizable being Coca Cola, first
bottled in 1886 (Inciardi, 2008; Musto, 1997). Another one called Vin Coca Mariani
received a medal of appreciation from Pope Leo XIII (Inciardi, 2008). Parke-Davis
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Company sold fifteen different forms of coca and cocaine products, including cigarettes
and a kit containing hypodermic syringes (Musto, 1997). Some medical experts called
cocaine a remarkable drug, harmless, and no more addictive than coffee or tea, while
other medical professionals noted a number of ill-effects from cocaine, especially with
long-term use.
Popular medicinal products containing opium and cocaine are collectively known
as patent medicines. The production and sale of these tonics, syrups, and powders was
unregulated. They were called patent drugs but none were actually patented since doing
so would have required the disclosure of their ingredients. During this period in the U.S.,
health issues were generally regulated at the state level and most states had few controls
(Boyum and Reuter, Inciardi, 2008; Musto, 1997). Medicine was thought to be best
regulated by free enterprise and the federal government only intervened in matters of
communicable disease or where government employees were concerned. Some changes
in state laws were made near the end of the 19th century in an effort to curb drug use, but
the lack of a federal law or uniformity across state laws meant these efforts had little
effect. At the same time, a growing public concern with mood altering substances,
including alcohol, led to the formation of a variety of temperance movements. The Antisaloon League, for example, was founded in 1893. Musto (1997) claims that some drop
in the use of patent medicines by the 1890s was more likely the result of social stigma
and fears of addiction than of any legal action.
The patent medicine industry eventually came to be criticized publicly by some
doctors and others in medical journals and the press, but it was the publication of Upton
Sinclair’s The Jungle in 1906 that shocked the public and spurred Congress to action.
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That year, the Pure Food and Drug Act was passed (Inciardi, 2008; Musto, 1997). The
new legislation meant that all ingredients and their proportions had to be indicated on the
packaging of all food and drug products, but it did not outlaw the use of particular
substances such as cocaine or opium per se. The popularity of patent medicines
continued to decline soon thereafter.
The greatest effort to bring public control over opium and cocaine came in 1914
with the passage of The Harrison Act (Gaines and Kraska, 1997; Inciardi, 2008; Musto,
1997). Musto says the problem with creating a federal anti-drug law was how to avoid
infringing upon states’ rights and overextending the reach the federal government had
into medical practices as part of free enterprise. The administration went the tax route
instead. The Harrison Act “required a strict accounting of opium and coca and their
derivatives from entry to the United States to dispensing to a patient” with taxes paid at
each transfer and permits obtained from the Treasury Department by all but the patient
(Musto, 1997: 26). The Act required all “who imported, manufactured, produced,
compounded, sold, dispensed, or otherwise distributed cocaine and opiate drugs to
register with the Treasury Department, pay special taxes, and keep records of all
transactions” (Inciardi, 2008: 28). The Act allowed doctors to prescribe, dispense, or
administer narcotics to patients for “legitimate medical purposes” and “in the course of
professional practice” (ibid.). The interpretation of the act, though, made other use of
these drugs a crime. Many doctors wanted to prescribe opiates or cocaine to addicts in
order to alleviate the symptoms of withdrawal, but the Treasury Department did not agree
that addiction was the same as other diseases or conditions that these drugs might
legitimately be used to treat (Boyum and Reuter, 2005; Inciardi, 2008; Musto 1997).
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Subsequent Supreme Court cases upheld this interpretation. In 1919 Webb v. the
United States found that it was not legal for a medical doctor to prescribe narcotics to an
addict for the purpose of maintaining use and comfort. In 1922, the United States v.
Behrman held that narcotic prescriptions for an addict are unlawful even as part of a cure
program. The Jones-Miller Act of 1922 closed U.S. borders to all cocaine, though raw
coca leaf was still imported for use in making drinks and manufacturing cocaine
domestically at a limited and decreasing number of firms. In 1925, Linder v. the United
States reversed the Berhman decision and said that addicts have a right to treatment and
care like all other patients, but this ruling had almost no effect. By then doctors had
become unwilling to treat addicts or take them on as patients (Gaines and Kraska, 1997;
Inciardi, 2008). Instead, “a well-developed, illegal drug marketplace had emerged to
cater to the needs of the narcotics-using population” (Inciardi, 2008: 28). One could
argue that the law transformed addicts into criminals, and that these addicts had long
been members of legitimate society, many of whom were led into addiction by their own
doctors in the first place. Legal precedent and fear of prosecution among medical
professionals helped construct addition as a crime rather than a health issue, a position
represented by much of policy and enforcement guidelines at present.
The passage of the Harrison Act “ushered in a half-century of increasingly
punitive anti-drug laws” and mandatory sentences for drug offenses up to and including
life imprisonment and the death penalty (Boyum and Reuter, 2005: 5). It was the first
example of the way that addiction has become equated with criminal behavior. The
attitudes embodied in the Harrison Act were not confined to the domestic sphere. The
international war on drugs began around the same time as domestic efforts for drug
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control. Musto (1997) says the impetus for a real international narcotics control strategy
came in 1898 when the United States acquired responsibility for the Philippines. In 1905
Congress and President Roosevelt passed a mandate prohibiting any non-medical use of
opium in the Philippines. By 1906, China had also begun its own anti-opium efforts. In
part to appease Chinese anti-American sentiment, and in part to help control regional
smuggling, the U.S. convened a meeting with regional powers to discuss the opium issue.
The International Opium Commission met in 1909 in Shanghai. The thirteen nations
present passed a resolution addressing the problem but did not sign an official treaty.
Stronger restrictions would require an international conference. Twelve nations met in
The Hague at the end of 1911 and signed a convention in January 1912 which required
each country to enact domestic legislation controlling narcotics.
Opium use diminished in the U.S. during the 1920s and 1930s. After World War
II, the United States and Britain proposed adding The Hague Convention to the Versailles
Treaty so that ratifying the treaty also meant ratifying the convention and enacting a
domestic drug control law, even if there was no drug problem to speak of for the parties
involved. These early meetings were good for international cooperation on the drug issue
but were also examples of “the belief, strongly held by the federal government today, that
controlling crops and traffic in producing countries could most efficiently stop U.S. nonmedical consumption of drugs” (Musto, 1997: 26). Musto also notes they are early
examples of the way that “the desperate need to solve the drug problem in the United
States tends to create misperceptions of a foreign drug situation” (27). Both of these
attitudes informing U.S. policy will be further demonstrated below.
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During the 1940s, World War II was more important in the public eye and drug
problems became mostly invisible, though not entirely. The top firms, such as Maywood
Chemical for Coca Cola, were influential in government decisions regarding coca
imports, quotas, and regulations, as well as politics in the Andes. Merchandise #5, an
ingredient made from decocainized coca leaves and used in the flavoring of Coca Cola,
was (and is) exempted from the Harrison Act, for example. The validity of the
decocainization process was closely overseen by the Federal Bureau of Narcotics (FBN).
Maywood, Coca Cola, and the FBN worked closely together between 1920 and 1960, and
with the Peruvian government and clients, often sharing intelligence. Lawyers for Coca
Cola frequently went to drug conferences and on missions along with government agents.
Government regulation of coca limited Coca-Cola’s competition within the U.S. and
abroad, but also sent mixed messages. “For decades, the FBN did its best to protect and
promote Coca-Cola’s global market conquests, along the way muddying U.S. drug
diplomacy” (Gootenberg, 2008: 204).
In spite of this bending to accommodate commercial interests, the U.S. position
on drugs was absolutist whereas other countries had chemical interests (i.e., domestic
companies involved in processing), or drug-producing colonies to act as lobbyists against
nascent global drug regimes during the interwar period. The previously mentioned world
conferences that were held on regulation and control had few real results. After WWII,
with the break-up of colonial spheres and the downfall of Germany and Japan, the U.S.
capitalized on both its position within the U.N. and a unifying antidrug consensus with
the U.S.S.R. and China as allies (cold war tensions seemingly notwithstanding). The
U.N. was willing to do whatever was necessary to avoid a post-war drug resurgence,
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especially of opium, and was fast to adopt the raw material eradication programs the U.S.
had been pushing for since 1910.
The League of Nations, and League members later, had been more concerned
with opiates than with cocaine. Gootenberg (2008) suggests cocaine was included in the
same category for regulation because of its status as a pet concern of the U.S., the
resulting exaggeration of its dangers, and for the fears associated with the class and race
of those who were the primary users of the drug. Peru and Bolivia generally ignored or
defied early conventions, and Peru even withdrew from the League at one point. “In
Latin America, ironically, only passionately anticoca Colombia (which had scant coca)
and a few Caribbean colonial outposts joined on any regular basis in League antidrug
deliberations” (Gootenberg, 2008: 216). But the League mattered, and it put drug
control on the world agenda where it remains, associated cocaine with narcotics, and
legitimized the U.S. anticocaine stance over time.
The global prohibition on cocaine came about more clearly only after WWII and
the complete destruction of its other production and distribution chains (the Dutch,
German, and Japanese), and the entry of Peru, and later Bolivia, into U.S. Cold War
interests. During the interwar era, coca was still imported to the U.S., but only through
one port of entry and to be used by Coca Cola. Elsewhere in the world, the “tolerant
circumstances” of the interwar era “gave no incentive to illicit trade” (Gootenberg, 2008:
139). The year 1949 marked the world’s first international cocaine bust. Peruvian
Eduardo Balarezo was arrested in New York City as the head of a smuggling operation.
Harry Anslinger of the FBN, and of Reefer Madness fame, assured the U.S. public that
this bust, an example of the suppression of drug traffic to the country, had prevented an
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epidemic and more serious crime from happening in the future. But by the 1970s it
would be clear his assurances were for naught.
By the 1960s, the popularity of drugs reemerged among the youth as a type of
rebellion. All kinds of people were using drugs, not just the poor in the ghettos or the
psychologically drug-prone, as had been the conventional wisdom. This was also a time
of a new chemical age with increasing technology in drug production, both legal and
illicit. There is little reliable data from the 1950s and 1960s about the links between
drugs and crime; nonetheless, politicians have from that time on frequently claimed that
50 to 90% of crime in the U.S. is drug-related (Inciardi, 2008). Thus, President Johnson
proclaimed a war on crime, and by extension a war on drugs. Nixon talked both about a
war on drugs and a war on heroin specifically. The Nixon administration established the
Special Action Office for Drug Abuse Prevention and two new agencies, the Office of
Drug Abuse Law Enforcement and the Office of National Narcotics Intelligence. In
declaring his war on drugs, Nixon sought to establish international controls and believed
that if the source of drugs was overseas, then the solution should be, too (Boyum and
Reuter, 2005). As a result of this stance, he put tremendous pressure on Turkey to ban
the cultivation of opium poppies, for example.
Nixon began his war on heroin in the 1970s but the drug war really began to build
momentum during the Reagan administration. Inciardi (2008) and Musto (1997) both
cite public opinion surveys that indicate a trend toward conservatism among the general
public from 1977 through 1987, showing more support for increased efforts at drug and
crime control and less concern about the rights of criminals. During this same period, the
RICO and CCE Statutes came into existence, and the Posse Comitatus Act was amended
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within the Department of Defense Authorization Act of 1982. These amendments
allowed the Department of Justice to provide logistical support to civilian police
(Inciardi, 2008; Kraska, 1997; Mabry, 1994). While there was still a prohibition on
military personnel in law enforcement:
The entire war chest of U.S. military power did become available to law
enforcement – for training, intelligence gathering, and detection. Moreover,
members of the U.S. Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines could operate
military equipment for civilian agencies charged with the enforcement of drug
laws (Inciardi, 2008: 258).
Thus, the drug war truly gained military technology and fire-power.
In 1988, the Reagan era began its zero-tolerance policy, extending the drug war to
users, and included the idea that addicts can recover, though this attitude did not reflect
sympathy. Addiction was still synonymous with crime. The idea was that addicts were
not powerless, had started using drugs willfully, and therefore should be held
accountable. Shortly thereafter, the position of drug czar was created by the Bush
administration, and later the Clinton administration raised the status of the drug czar to
the Cabinet level. Clinton’s second czar, Barry McCaffrey, was an actual military
general with experience in interdiction and many feared he would bring more
militarization into U.S. drug policy in action. Today, U.S. consumers spend about $38
billion annually on cocaine, roughly two thirds of all illegal drug expenditures, and
money is the main reason cocaine is the primary target in the war on drugs (Gootenberg,
2008).
The rise of anti-cocaine sentiment coincided with the growth of illicit use in the
early twentieth century, and illicit trafficking rose as global prohibition was consolidated
in the mid-twentieth century, which in turn raises questions about which came first. The
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“elevation of cocaine into a world menace…was a predominantly American quest” as
differing ideas about it existed in Europe and Asia during the first half of the 20th century
(Gootenberg, 2008: 190). Up through 1945, the U.S. “proved adept at containing
cocaine within its own borders and among its own citizens, with few objections, but the
U.S. policing regime failed when diplomats tried to foist its ideals on the rest of the
world” (ibid.). Instead, “a ‘multipolar’ cocaine world prevailed” (ibid.). Even so, from
1945 through 1965, the U.S. instituted “global anticocaine hegemony” and yet that is
precisely when illicit cocaine grew and spread and “quickly spiraled into today’s global
economy of cocaine” (ibid.).

-- The Rise of the Illicit Cocaine -The growth of commodity chain circuits in the early 20th century, which broke apart
during WWII, were “a prelude to the illicit cocaine circuits that were to reintegrate the
eastern Andes to the outside world by the 1970s” (Gootenberg, 2008: 107). The decades
1910 to 1950 were an “era of mounting political and market constraints on coca and
cocaine, related in part to rising international narcotics control” (ibid.). In 1915, the U.S.
was a “lone crusader in world anticocainism” and Germany was often portrayed as an
“evil drug empire” for its continued imports and use of coca and cocaine (ibid.: 122).
The late 1940s brought swift and sweeping changes to Peruvian cocaine policies,
which established a state monopoly, revoked all existing licenses for legal cocaine
manufacture, and “radically revised” the penal code on production and traffic to agree
with international norms (Gootenberg, 2008: 232). Illicit cocaine was an almost
immediate response to the loss of legitimate markets postwar, popping up first on a small
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scale to Havana and New York. Prohibitions within Peru displaced the drug to other
parts of South America, thus requiring broader hemispheric controls, but U.S. officials
still thought wiping out cocaine entirely was fully possible.
Between 1920 and 1950, little organized illicit cocaine activity existed. The few
users in the U.S. were mostly supplied by local pharmacies under the counter or through
small-scale, individual smugglers, neither of which were on the U.S. radar until after the
war. An increasing number of smuggling incidents involving sailors from Peru and Chile
who were caught bringing cocaine into U.S. ports were recorded in the late 1940s. These
were mostly individual, isolated cases involving relatively small amounts of the drug,
often no more than 250 grams. Cocaine use, though small, had survived among various
sectors of the population in the U.S. and Europe. It was particularly associated with
artists, musicians, and prostitutes. Little information is available about the origin of the
cocaine in these few recorded incidents, but U.S. authorities often blamed corrupt
officials in Peru and other parts of South America for failing to prevent its export, an
early example of the policy of stopping drugs at their supposed source.
From 1949 through 1950 Peruvian authorities carried out a large scale crackdown
on cocaine and closed all remaining legal cocaine factories, uncovering several
clandestine ones in the process. The Peruvian suppression of cocaine effectively moved
smuggling operations outside its borders to Bolivia, Chile, and Cuba during the 1950s,
though the crude cocaine or pasta básica that was refined into cocaine remained
primarily a Peruvian product. As one of the postwar “global sin capitals” Havana, and
Cuba in general, was best known for its growing role in the cocaine trade of the midtwentieth century. Cocaine fit neatly with its gambling and prostitution for pleasure-
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seeking American tourists. By the mid-1950s “Interpol regarded Cuba as the main
staging point for Bolivian 2 cocaine entering the United States” (Gootenberg, 2008: 265).
The 1959 Castro revolution changed this climate. Traffickers fled the island and
dispersed to other parts of the Caribbean and Latin America. This migration essentially
created a “new professional international cocaine trafficking class…composed of Cuban
exiles” (Gootenberg, 2008: 266). By 1962, Miami had become the second port of choice
for cocaine entering the U.S. partly because of the large population of Cuban exiles there.
Cocaine was also smuggled cross-border into and through Brazil where it was
popular in the cities, and Argentina had links to Miami and Europe as part of this new
illicit cocaine trade. Both countries’ roles were reduced after military regimes came to
power in the mid-1960s. Similarly, the 1973 coup in Chile also ended its role in cocaine
traffic, pushing it into Colombian circuits. Prior to the 1970s Colombia was left “entirely
off official mapping of cocaine routes and trouble spots” (Gootenberg, 2008: 273).
Mexico, with its U.S. border and history of smuggling traditions, was a “portentous”
route for developing cocaine traffic, and those in the country had connections to Bolivian
producers and Cuban exiles already there.
Three main things fueled the continuation of the illicit drug boom of the 1960s
and 1970s: 1) the collapse of postwar development schemes in Peru’s Huallaga valley, 2)
the linkage of Andean cocaine capitalism, via cold war events in Chile, to a newly and
2

During the first half of the 20th century, Bolivia had not industrialized its cocaine in the way Peru had.
After the crackdowns of 1949-1950 in Peru, “Bolivia rapidly transformed over the next decade and a half
into the major incubating site for illicit cocaine” (Gootenberg, 2008: 276). The political climate and social
programs that changed the character of land ownership in many rural areas of the country are part of what
made this transformation possible. Unlike the opium and heroin organizations of previous decades, the
cocaine trade was not run by a mafia or a hierarchical transnational criminal class, but instead by “a loose,
diverse, and independent diaspora of Latin American ethnic traders, elite gadflies, political refugees, and
petty criminals blazing the new corridors to the north” (ibid.: 287). It was cooperative, entrepreneurial,
and initially non-violent, especially prior to cartelization in the 1970s.
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quickly developing class of Colombian traffickers and entrepreneurs, and 3) the Nixonera revolution of culture and politics that underlay new drug demand in North America.
These three shifts transformed “the legacy of Peru’s historical crude cocaine and the
modest smuggling of early narcos into the massive and socially destructive South
American drug bonanza of the 1970s and beyond” (Gootenberg, 2008: 291).
During the Truman era, Peruvian and U.S. officials became interested in
connecting the eastern region, the Huallaga valley in particular, to the rest of Peru and
rediscovering or incorporating forgotten lands and their riches into the interests of the
state. A research center and a new university were set up in the town of Tingo María,
about 135 km from Huánuco. This imagined conquest of Peru for Peruvians, and the
recovery of supposedly underutilized lands, became a goal of the president during the
1960s, and brought a large number of new settlers and migrants into the region, both
officially and unofficially. In 1968 the military regime instituted an agrarian reform
program and promised greater integration of the peasantry into the state. But by 1973, an
overextended and failing regime left many poor people in the Huallaga valley without
services or attachments. For example, the state lumber enterprise collapsed and most of
the workers who had been left to fend for themselves turned to growing coca to make a
living. The province had gone from “labor-starved to overflowing with impoverished
workers” in a matter of years (Gootenberg, 2008: 296). It was “amid the regional power
vacuum, [that] a stampede to coca ensued” (ibid.).
The 1970s brought increasing panic and emergency to the tone of U.S. reports
about the return of coca growing and pasta making. The method used was similar to that
for crude cocaine that had been brought to the region by Bignon back in the 1890s. This
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technique was “easily transferred to and eagerly adopted by even the illiterate working
peasants” – the great secret of the Huallaga trade (Gootenberg, 2008: 299). The area of
Tingo María became cocaine’s Wild West. The state recognized the problem but lacked
capacity to contain it because of its own continuing crisis of governance. Similar
conditions had prevailed in Bolivia a decade earlier. “Socially entrenched in this popular
illicit sphere…Peruvian cocaine capitalism was essentially unstoppable” (ibid.).
The 1973 coup in Chile cut off cocaine’s central corridor to the north. A DEA
official convinced Pinochet to jail or exile known traffickers arguing that drug money
could be used by the left to plot against the regime, an early example of drug’s links to
terrorism and state security. Colombian smugglers, primarily of marijuana, cigarettes,
and contraband appliances, seemed primed to put their existing routes along the coast to
use for cocaine. But the city of Medellín, isolated in north central Colombia and away
from the coast, was also “ready for a newly ambitious economic activity” as its textile
sectors declined (Gootenberg, 2008: 302). Again, the economic health of a country or
region is always a principle factor in the growth and sustainability of the drug trade.
Colombians began to import pasta básica from Peru and Bolivia for refining into
cocaine hydrochloride and export to the U.S. and Europe. Multiple routes and more
family and clan organizations began to develop, increasing competition as the size of
operations grew. By 1980, Colombians were exporting more than 100 tons of cocaine to
the U.S. Demand was not necessarily created by this increased supply; Gootenberg
(2008) instead suggests that demand can be politically constructed and the Nixon years
were a “decisive turning point” for cocaine use in the U.S. (307). Heroin had been the
official foe in Nixon’s declared war on drugs, but by the 1970s, cocaine use surpassed
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heroin in the United States. During the 1960s, cocaine culture crossed over from its
location within racial categories. Music from the 1920s, some of it racially characterized
and celebrating cocaine, was being revived by white rock musicians thereby
mainstreaming something that had been an underground phenomenon. The first survey
data of the early 1970s on drug use showed that young people were experimenting, and
about 10% of college students had tried cocaine.
In 1973 the DEA was launched; Gootenberg calls it an “outsized new drug
agency” and “an internationalized bureaucracy with domestic powers that have been
associated with Nixon’s project of fostering a larger repressive state” (307). The U.S.
cracked down on marijuana, a drug closely associated with the antiwar movement of the
1960s, which may have opened an opportunity for increased cocaine imports in order to
fill the void. A similar explanation for rising use of cocaine comes from the dismantling
of the French Connection and the Turkish poppy ban that limited heroin supplies around
the same time.
The renewed popularity of cocaine was troubling to those who thought it had
vanished in the 1920s and that it rarely crossed borders. Even so, the White House
deemed it a low priority in 1975. The drug was still considered an elite, soft drug.
Reports noted little demand for treatment of cocaine addicts and many divergent opinions
about its dangers. Unlike the rebellious counter-culture drug use of the 1960s, cocaine
use in the 1970s can be characterized more as a part of mainstream capitalism and a call
to consumer rights. It fit the model of conspicuous consumption and was associated
particularly with the visible indulgences of the disco culture.
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During the 1980s, the Medellín-Miami corridor had become heavily policed and
traffic shifted to a North Mexican route. By the 2000 election in Mexico, where the PRI
lost its stronghold on national politics for the first time in decades, the route had shifted
back to the Caribbean, especially through Hispaniola. Gootenberg notes the porous
nature of Haiti as key to this traffic, though the Dominican Republic is just as permeable.
While the U.S. claims some success in Colombia, such as increasing prices for wholesale
cocaine and decreased production, evidence now points to the replanting of areas in Peru
and Bolivia “where eradication policies left a deep scar in peasant unrest and antiAmerican politics” (Gootenberg, 2008: 315). Cocaine traffic now moves through Africa
into Europe, supplying new users in the former Soviet states, and through the vast
unpoliced slums in Brazilian cities. The drug appears to be replicating itself as the global
commodity it was 100 years ago.
“The modern and progressive image of early-twentieth-century cocaine is now
long extinct due to the drug’s associations with hyperviolent drug lords, atavistically clad
in a veritably medieval (i.e., premarket) discourse about crusades of good against evil”
(Gootenberg, 2008: 320). Policy has combined a “militant ideology of cutting off drugs
at their source” with an “export of prohibitions” and Gootenberg suggests that had the
U.S. appropriated or co-opted Peru’s production into a U.S. commodity chain, it may
have mitigated surplus drain into the illicit (ibid.: 321). Instead, the drug war can easily
be dated all the way back to 1906-1914 which means it has lasted for a century, with little
to show for it. Drug control is a contradiction in terms. The balloon effect is not just
geographical. Drug policy contributes to the increasing wealth and tactical sophistication
of the traffickers over time, and to the “moral and political decay of Andean states”
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(ibid.: 324). I would add it contributes to similar decay in many states elsewhere in the
region and the world since the balloon effect has spread drug operations so widely.

-- Conclusions -Scholarship on narcotics control is prevalent and prolific especially as “the
campaign to ban menacing drugs was one of the first models of internationalized norms
and policing institutions” (Gootenburg, 2008: 189). But this scholarship fails to separate
cocaine from other “genuine narcotics” with which it is frequently “conflated and
confused” (ibid.). Few studies are “genuinely transnational or constructionist, connecting
the political and legal aims and ideas of would be drug controllers in metropolitan sites
like Washington and Geneva with the realities and reactions at the other end of the drug
commodity spectrum” (ibid.). The one-sidedness of international drug policies fostered
resistance to global prohibition early on. Consideration of the objections from the
producing side helps “illustrate possible historical alternatives to prohibition or to the
illicit drug trade that followed it” (ibid.). This argument may seem counterfactual and the
connection to the modern-day situation is not entirely clear. Instead we must ask if there
is a possible starting point for new alternatives or if the drug trade is too entrenched.
It is ironic given its history of exports that “cocaine is among Latin America’s
most successful and indigenous export industries. It remains an ‘American’ industry and
is still running strong despite heavy pressures against it” (Gootenberg, 2008: 287-288).
It demonstrates “bottom-up local agency” combined with “a stubbornly entrenched
regional peasant economy” (ibid.: 288). The grassroots nature of the trade combined
with both the economic vulnerability and the tenacity of the people involved in keeping
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production going should make it harder to characterize as purely evil, and is also a part of
the industry’s staying power. A lucrative and once legitimate enterprise has suffered
from a “politics-driven shift underground” (ibid.: 291).
In the 1930s “the political establishment believed that drug dependence could be
legislated out of existence simply by passing enough comprehensive laws” (Inciardi,
2008: 35). At the same time, doctors saw drug dependence as a disease to be treated
while police saw it as a crime in need of harsh punishments for the sake of society as a
whole. These three trends still seem to be with us today in the war on drugs and in the
debates over the supposed merits of legalization, decriminalization, and harm reduction
programs.
In the U.S. “patterns of drug abuse are continually shifting and changing. Fads
and fashions in the drugs of abuse seem to come and go” (Inciardi, 2008: 65). Which
drugs are the most popular and profitable change, yet none – nor the demand for some
kind of drug – disappears forever. Alcohol has been the number one intoxicant for
thousands of years. Opium and other narcotics have been popular in the United States for
nearly 200 years, and other drugs, especially synthetics like methamphetamine and
ecstasy, “just seem to keep coming and going and reinventing themselves” (ibid.). The
laws and policy shift and change much less often. The overarching prohibition on
controlled substances remains, and most people would probably agree that is how it
should be. What is less certain is how well the strategies and tactics used to enforce the
law actually work.
U.S. prison populations grew threefold between 1980 and 1994, the result of
severe drug laws, especially those pertaining to crack. “By 1995, more young black men
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were in prison than in college” (Gootenberg, 2008: 313). Meanwhile, coca production
doubled from 1982 to 1986 alone, and prices dropped in response to interdiction efforts.
Political developments in Peru further isolated and marginalized coca producing
peasants, in some cases aligning them with the terrorist or anti-state group Sendero
Luminoso, while those in Bolivia unionized and campaigned for integration into national
politics. Both of these divergent paths seem to support continued production for export
and profit. Ritual, legal use of coca leaf now constitutes only about 10% of the total crop.
Coca growing in Colombia, cultivation that has increased in response both to growing
demand and to repressive measures in Peru and Bolivia, is “divorced from indigenous
coca traditions” (ibid.: 315). Colombian crops are grown purely for the enterprise, and
are stronger and more efficient. The narrow focus of policy in the 20th and 21st centuries
brings full circle the trend begun with the conquest of the New World. Medical uses of
its extracts and their commercial success and potential notwithstanding, the coca leaf is
still considered the source of degraded, backward, uncivilized, and even evil practices.

U.S. Drug Policy – The Baseline
-- The Anatomy of 10 Years of Policy -In this section, I examine the U.S. State Department’s International Narcotics
Control Strategy Report (INCSR), published annually, from 1996 through 2007. 3 I will
show that the language of the reports consistently demonstrates an adherence to the same
narrow principles year after year, with few adjustments. Targets are always external drug
supplies – especially for cocaine and heroin – and demand reduction comes last on the
3

On a technical note, in 2001 the method for numbering the INCSRs shifted so that the report published in
March of 2002 covering the year 2001 is labeled 2002 and there is no 2001 report.
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list of goals in the drug war. Similar language and the rhetoric of the drug war carry
through the reports during the time period studied here and provide justification for
continuing with the same strategy. Only a major security crisis for the U.S. has had any
impact on the focus or the method, and this has only served to bend the drug war to fit
into the new strategic mold of the war on terror. The INCSR includes six main areas of
focus, which cover the external production and transport of drugs, the drug trade’s links
to terrorism, the training of personnel and institution building abroad, extradition and
prosecution of foreign drug criminals, the adaptive ability of the drug trade, and some
discussion of alternative development programs and strategies. Throughout, democracy
is the ideal by which and for which the drug war is fought.
Beginning with the 1996 report, emphasis is placed on stopping the entry of
cocaine and heroin into the United States. Training, strengthening political will, and
judicial reform abroad all work toward the goal of “promoting the creation of host
government systems which are compatible with and serve the same broad goals as ours”
(INCSR, 1996). The arrests, extradition, or deaths of key cartel figures are frequently
cited as evidence that “syndicates are highly vulnerable to coordinated international
pressure sustained over time,” while the report also notes the level of change and
adaptation by drug markets in response to these same efforts (INCSR, 1997). After
September 11, 2001, the war on terror became an integral part of the INCSR, often
overshadowing other kinds of programs and efforts to reduce the appeal of the drug trade
in poor countries.
The tone of the reports repeatedly asserts that the drug trade is adaptable but not
invincible. At the same time, the drug war is not seen as something that occupies most
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people’s attention on a regular basis, but is something important that slowly and steadily
works toward fulfilling its objectives:
Viewed out of context, the many achievements of individual countries may seem
insignificant. Small steps do not grab headlines; many never come to the
attention of the media. The countless routine drug seizures, the jungle drug labs
or airstrips destroyed every day, the arrests of corrupt officials, or the improved
performance of police and judicial authorities benefiting from USG assistance
receive at best only fragmentary coverage in the world media. But these small
steps add up to important and lasting gains at the expense of the drug trade. As
we have seen, cumulative achievement pays off. Over the long term, such
steady progress offers the best hope for transforming a potential threat to the
stability of nations into a manageable nuisance (INCSR, 1996).
The drug war is not a losing battle, but neither is it one that seems to have a clear end in
sight. The idea of a manageable nuisance implies that this war could be never-ending,
that it is not possible to eliminate the drug trade entirely, and that it is different from other
wars that end with a winner and a loser.

-- Outward-Looking Strategy and Links to Terror -In the mid-1990s “all cocaine and heroin…[were] produced outside the United
States,” and cocaine remained the number one priority (INCSR, 1997; emphasis added).
More than 8000 people were trained by the U.S. to facilitate “foreign law enforcement
self-sufficiency through infrastructure development” to achieve the “establishment of
effective host country enforcement institutions, thereby taking drugs out of circulation
before they begin their journey toward the US” (ibid., emphasis added). International
organizations and multi-lateral efforts attempted to “decrease the perception that drugs
are exclusively a U.S. problem” (INCSR, 1998). Both the OAS and CICAD, for
example, have worked with the USG in confronting drugs. “The need for demand
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reduction is obvious” but it is usually talked about in a general sense in these reports.
Demand is everywhere, not just in the U.S., but demand reduction cannot be undertaken
anywhere except in conjunction with supply control. Instead, it is addressed in terms of
support for efforts in producing countries. Only the 2002 report recognizes that demand
reduction is “a fundamental and critical part of controlling the illicit drug trade” (INCSR,
2002).
In 1998, the drug war saw a year of “solid gains at the drug trade’s expense”
(INCSR, 1998). The numbers reflected the lowest level of coca crops in ten years,
though Colombian cultivation had risen. The emphasis in the 1999 report remained on
supply control, but there was some recognition of other areas where a change in policy
might be affective:
In the real world of counternarcotics programs…crop control has enormous
political and economic implications for the producing country, for it inevitably
means attacking the livelihood of an important sector of the population (INCSR,
1999).
In Peru and Bolivia, the right combination of law enforcement and alternative
development programs in place of eradication were thought to have shown promise. At
the same time, a coca field is a large stationary target and eradication is much more cost
effective than interdiction, where a large number of man-hours are required to search
boats and trucks.
Even so, interdiction continued to be central to U.S. policy. In 2002 there were
several new Port Security Initiatives. The first, Container Security Initiative (CSI), is a
security regime created to identify and inspect containers. Sixteen of the world’s twenty
high-volume ‘megaports’ agreed to participate. “We intend to expand CSI to all ports
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that ship substantial amounts of cargo to the U.S., and that have the infrastructure and
technology in place to participate” (INCSR, 2003). In response, we should expect illegal
trade to shift to smaller, less-developed locations, as noted by Nordstrom (2007). One
might expect several Dominican ports to be included in this initiative since an estimated
8% of cocaine arriving in the U.S. comes through Hispaniola, with half of that coming
through the Dominican Republic (INCSR, 2003). That is not the case as only one port in
the Dominican Republic, one just east of the capital (Caucedo, Distrito Nacional) is listed
as participating as of December 2007 (for a complete listing see
http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/trade/cargo_security/csi/, 2007). Four years prior, no ports
for the country had been listed at all.
Plan Colombia was approved in 2000 for $1.3 billion to support the Colombian
government in the fight against drugs, and for broad social reforms. By 2001, cocaine
was still considered the number one threat to the United States. As in previous years’
reports, the decreasing numbers for coca cultivation in Peru and Bolivia do not seem to
count for much when compared to the amount in Colombia, especially cultivation in
FARC controlled areas. The 2002 report is the first one to link drugs with terror directly,
and a new term is introduced: narco-terrorism. “What began as a marriage of
convenience has now become a partnership dominated by the insurgents” (INCSR, 2002).
This conceptualization strengthens the argument that drugs are antithetical to democracy.
In the post-September 11th mentality, nearly everything is linked to terror. The
impact of the events of September 11, 2001 created an “added urgency and intensity to a
robust process already underway” in the war on drugs (INCSR, 2002). Drug “revenues
fuel terrorism and the decades-old civil war in Colombia” and yet it is only starting with
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in the 2002 and 2003 reports that this link is made explicit and discussed as such
(INCSR, 2003). The report further says that “all the insurgent and paramilitary groups
depend on [drug money]” (ibid., emphasis added). The drugs-terror link is a given and is
treated as a long-standing fact. It can also be seen as justification for escalation of the
drug war, providing more fuel for the fire.
The drugs-terror link means that “as the single greatest source of illegal revenue,
the drug trade has long been the mainstay of violent political insurgencies, rogue regimes,
international criminal organizations, and terrorists of every stripe” (INCSR, 2003).
Supply control remained an important strategy along with “efforts aimed at reducing
worldwide drug consumption” which “took on increased importance and served the
national interest due to its potential for reducing the income that criminal and terrorist
organizations derive from narcotics trafficking” (INCSR, 2004). All aspects of the illicit
drug trade, from producer to consumer, therefore contribute to worldwide terrorist
organizations. “The illicit drug trade is a threat to national security and international
stability. It is inextricably linked with transnational organized crime and many terrorist
groups” (INCSR, 2005, emphasis added). The war can be against people at all levels;
dealers and users alike are enemy combatants.
The language of the report indicates that many individual battles have been won,
but whether we are winning or are even able to win the war on drugs is uncertain.
Demand is treated equally in all nations as “rising global demand for illicit drugs [is] the
principle narcotics-related threat to the U.S.” (INCSR, 2004). Once again, this implies
that the source of the problem for the U.S. is an external one: Global demand for drugs.
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The report noted “remarkable progress” during 2003 “despite a ‘perfect storm’ of
conditions potentially favoring international criminal activity” worldwide (INCSR,
2004). These conditions included various wars and insurgencies, political problems
around the globe, and economic problems, indicating some recognition of the various
structural and other factors that may abet criminal activities. “Our goal is to…reduce the
drug trade from serious threat to our people and global security – to a common nuisance,
controlled through an international network of legal cooperation” (INCSR, 2007). In ten
years of reports, what had been a major threat to the stability of nations and was hoped to
become a manageable nuisance, has become a threat to global security and the goal is still
to make it a common nuisance. The war on drugs is treated as something that is ongoing
by 2007, and perhaps not 100% winnable. In spite of the recognition that drugs may have
to come to be seen as a common nuisance and a regular law enforcement issue, it is still
characterized in grand terms. This similar language and approach, in spite of the years of
effort, indicates that little has changed or been accomplished.

-- Training, Institution Building, and Extradition -The illegality of drugs drives their profitability and “stemming their flow requires
a coordinated international effort” (INCSR, 2005). The U.S. needs others to enforce its
own policies and those of the United Nations. Cooperative measures between
governments are required to face the challenge of wealthy international drug syndicates –
and to reduce the attraction of new recruits to the drug trade. “Increasing numbers of
bilateral agreements between the U.S. and Caribbean nations is moving us toward our
goal of a ‘seamless’ territorial airspace” (INCSR, 2003). At the time of publication of the
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2004 report, twenty-three bilateral agreements were in force between the United States
and Caribbean or South American governments, working toward continuing this goal of
creating seamless airspace throughout the entire western hemisphere. By June of 2005,
the U.S. had 30 bilateral agreements in force in South and Central America and the
Caribbean, again “moving toward our goal of eliminating safe havens for smugglers”
(INCSR, 2006). These efforts appear to be bringing all drug control in the hemisphere
under the purview of U.S. policy and operations.
The drug trade may be “far from omnipotent” and “vulnerable on many fronts”
but “above all, it needs the protection of a reliable core of corrupt officials in all the
countries along its distribution chain” (INCSR, 1997). By this account, the drug war is
not supported and continued by the laws of supply and demand alone. It requires – and
receives – complicity at the highest levels of government. This may be true to an extent,
although even if no officials were corrupt, there likely would still not be enough of them
to stop the flow of drugs around the world. Eliminating corruption at every stage does
not necessarily create the manpower needed to search everywhere and every way that
drugs are produced and moved, nor is eliminating corruption an easy task or one that can
be accomplished in the short term.
Political will is necessary to fight the drug war, a point emphasized routinely in
these reports. The 2002 report specifically mentions low government salaries that
facilitate bribes and kickbacks. Political will is thus closely related to the economic
health of a state. The drug trade needs people and it can pay them well, often much better
than the legitimate economy can, and the report acknowledges that the profit margin on
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drugs is enormous. Likewise, demand for drugs has remained steady, so profits and
benefits from drug money are also somewhat steady.
On the issue of strengthening institutions, the 2003 report again points out the
problem of low salaries for judges and other judicial or police employees, as well as the
importance of the fact that most of these individuals receive little or no protection from
criminal retaliation. Many of these public servants have been targets of violence in
Colombia, as well as in the Dominican Republic, where there is widespread insecurity
from a combination of low salaries, low institutionalization of law enforcement, and the
influence of large drug syndicates. This combination of factors creates an environment
where illegal practices can thrive at all levels.

The reports frequently speak of

political will and cooperation from foreign governments as the key to combating drugs.
“The drug trade draws strength from the conditions of economic, social, and moral decay
that corruption fosters” (INCSR, 1998). The question of whether the drugs or the
corruption came first is never explicitly addressed, nor are many of the economic and
structural problems that are foundational to the link between drugs and corruption, except
briefly in the specific country sections of the report.
Beyond the logistical problems of stopping drug traffic, the outward looking
nature of the U.S. strategy to limit or stop the flow of illegal drugs to the U.S. “depends
on how effectively we attack drug supply beyond the country’s borders” (INCSR, 1997).
I see two problems with this. The first is that it places blame on other governments.
Certainly corruption and weak government are a problem and allow for more illicit
activity to occur. At the same time, many governments, corrupt or not, simply do not
have the capacity and resources to deal with the drug trade as it has grown over the years.
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The U.S. position seems to say that if there were no supply from abroad, we would have
no demand for drugs. But as the preceding sections of this chapter clearly show, demand
is not a new phenomenon and it was not always illegal. That legal cultivation has been
continuous further confuses the absolutism of U.S. policy. The second problem is that
the U.S. may be expanding its jurisdiction beyond its borders. There may be a fine line
between cooperating with other governments who are a party to the same U.N.
agreements on drugs and exercising a policy of extra-territoriality. The extra-territorial
policies of the U.S. often lead to the extradition of drug criminals to the U.S. to face
charges there.
In answer to the criticism that the extradition of those suspected of drug crimes to
the U.S. is a “derogation of national sovereignty,” the 2003 report claims that a
“willingness to extradite” by other national governments is “a key indicator of political
will and mutual trust” in the war on drugs (INCSR, 2003). The mutual nature of this
relationship is not obvious since the USG does not trust other governments to prosecute
within their own judicial systems, therefore raising extradition to such a high level of
importance within U.S. policy. “Governments fighting the drug trade realize that
extradition is a boon to their own law enforcement effectiveness,” but what is not clear is
how extraditing and sending criminals to face charges elsewhere can strengthen one’s
own domestic institutions (INCSR, 2005). In addition, the extradition system is not
perfect, especially in cases where there is a clash of values between domestic systems.
For example, a 2001 decision by the Mexican Supreme Court prohibits extradition for
cases that carry potential life sentences, which are illegal by Mexican standards, and the
Mexican government cannot extradite citizens somewhere they will receive harsher
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punishments than if they were tried at home. Life sentences and the death penalty have
become points of contention between the USG and Mexico on this issue.
The USG prides itself on its ability to arrest and convict foreign nationals in the
war on drugs and holds each success up as an example to the rest of the world about what
should be done and what will happen to others who follow the same path into
international organized crime:
The host of notorious foreign drug criminals serving long prison terms in the
U.S is a sober reminder to the most powerful international criminals of what can
happen when they can no longer use bribes and intimidation to manipulate the
local judicial process. Governments are increasingly willing to risk domestic
political repercussions to extradite drug king-pins to the United States, and
international public acceptance of this measure has steadily increased (INCSR,
2007).
There are several things about this statement that are troubling and worth addressing.
First, should international drug crimes be prosecuted in the domestic courts of the United
States? Even if the domestic procedures of a particular state are inadequate for pursuing
criminals, an international crime needs an international venue for prosecution rather than
another domestic court. When do the courts of the U.S. gain jurisdiction over crimes
committed in other countries or in international air and waters? Second, why should U.S.
taxpayers have to pay to keep foreign criminals in prison in the United States? To some
extent, it might be fair for the U.S., as the largest consumer of drugs, to take on the cost
and effort of trying the bulk of drug crimes or to share responsibility with other drugconsuming states in Europe, though Brazil is now the second biggest consumer of
cocaine (Bagley, 2009). Nevertheless, one is not likely to convince the tax-paying public
to take on this responsibility, nor is the distinction between producing and consuming
countries so clear cut. Third, are programs designed to improve the institutions of police
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and courts elsewhere meant to make it so that eventually these criminals will not have to
be extradited at all but can be processed, tried, and jailed in their own countries where
many of their alleged crimes take place? This question is never addressed in the INCSR;
rather, improved systems point to better processes for extradition in the future and not to
reliable, autonomous court systems able to handle these cases on their own. As we shall
see in the following chapters, efforts to reform domestic procedures may not be achieving
any of these goals in the short term either.
Training by the U.S. also works toward “promoting the creation of host
government systems which are compatible with and serve the same broad goals as ours”
(INCSR, 1997). This suggests some imposition of values and goals within national
systems from the outside. One might object to the intervention and interference in the
internal affairs of another state as a violation of sovereignty even if there are positive and
cascading effects later. Or one might ask whether or not it is better have the same kinds
of law enforcement institutions everywhere than to have as many different practices as
there are states. The idea is to create better coordinated efforts through similar practices,
but at the same time, there needs to be room for incorporating best local practices into the
development of new institutions by outside sources.

-- Linking the War on Drugs to Democracy and Political Will -The INCSR frequently touts its own noble mission of combating drugs and the
problems associated with them in society in order to preserve democracy:
Our joint efforts are keeping the drug trade at bay – no easy feat in the post
Cold War era when drug trafficking, terrorism, and international organized
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crime promise to become three of the dominant forces threatening democratic
order and international stability in the next few years (INCSR 1996).
Even so, the methods used and efforts made to stop drug traffic often come into conflict
with the goals of a free and democratic society:
The most powerful weapon in fighting the drug trade is an intangible: political
will. The best-trained counternarcotics force, equipped with state-of-the-art
police and military hardware, cannot succeed without the full commitment of the
country’s political leadership. When political leaders have had the courage to
sacrifice short-term economic and political considerations in favor of the longterm national interest, we have seen the drug trade weaken” (INCSR, 2003,
emphasis added).
These words signal a danger zone: that area where civil rights become subordinate to
security and democratic practices are suspended or endangered in the name of fighting
crime. In all of the INCSRs reviewed here, there is an ongoing concern about the threat
of drugs to democracy, and how the war on drugs is fought through cooperative efforts
among democratic nations. “In democracies, the drug trade flourishes only when it can
divide the population and corrupt institutions. It cannot withstand a concerted, sustained
attack by a coalition of democratic nations individually committed to its annihilation”
(INCSR, 2002). Drugs then are antithetical to democracy, an idea that was particularly
striking to me as a reader, and begs the question of whether there are no allies in the war
on drugs with other forms of government. We might also ask just how democratic all the
so-called democracies in the international anti-drug coalition are, and how democratic
their methods for fighting the drug trade and drug crimes are as well. The drugsdemocracy link may not be as implicit as these reports indicate. Throughout the reports
because drugs are assumed to be incompatible with democracy, any kind of alternative
policy option that would include toleration or legalization is not possible within a
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democratic society by definition. This stance is limiting to policy and creates rigidity
where some flexibility may be warranted.
The “drug trade’s wealth makes it as great a threat to democratic government
[as] an armed insurgency” (INCSR, 2002). While this may indeed be true, something is
missing in the point, which demonstrates the U.S. government’s tendency to emphasize
democracy – though not explicitly defined – as all-important. It might be better to frame
the drug trade as a threat to society as a whole, whether fully democratic or not, since
corruption and violence undermine other aspects of the political culture and civil society.
Administrations that are fixated on democracy alone may tend to overlook other elements
that are conducive to its development, particularly civilian control of government and
military forces.
What is also not clear is how democracy itself is a good weapon for fighting the
drug trade. In theory perhaps it is the will of the people to keep the resistance to drugs
going, or to legalize, regulate, and keep the profits generated by drugs. The report
instead refers to “the vicissitudes of domestic politics” as part of the obstacles and
setbacks experienced by the drug war (INCSR, 2003). Peru and Bolivia “face growing
domestic political challenges from cocalero groups that link coca cultivation with
national identity and sovereignty” (INCSR, 2004). The report claims that these groups
are abetted by traffickers to “promote coca cultivation and consumption as an ancient,
indigenous rite that must be protected” and implies that this is not the case (ibid.). As I
have shown, the use of coca is indeed an ancient practice, and historically its use and
meaning have frequently been misappropriated and changed, so while it may be plausible
that the drug syndicates have artificially created a link between indigenous identity and
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coca for their own gain, that is not the whole truth. The assertion forgets the agency of
the indigenous population and their role in reviving coca growing during the 1960s and
1970s. It is also important to remember that coca and cocaine are not the same and
should not be conflated as this argument seems to do.
“Radical movements have seized upon the historical tradition of coca cultivation
as a rallying cry for indigenous rights against the dominant urban culture” and “by
equating coca eradication with an attack upon both the poor in general and the indigenous
poor in particular, a burgeoning anti-establishment political front has coalesced around
the cocaleros (coca growers) movement” (INCSR, 2003). Instead of viewing it as the
will of the people, this language again implies that the connection between coca growers
and indigenous rights is tenuous and disingenuous. The report also mentions that the
government cannot ignore the cocaleros entirely either, considering the number of votes
for Evo Morales in the 2002 presidential election in Bolivia. One wonders if the same
report writers would recommend ignoring this group if it were a smaller minority unable
to exercise electoral power.
Increased indigenous activity in politics is just one example of increasing
resistance to eradication, especially as a policy pushed by foreigners and others outside
the state. The question of indigenous rights as members of a democratic society
complicates and further raises the costs of eradication. Resistance to existing interdiction
and eradication policies by citizens seems both reasonable and democratic, but appears to
be something of a nuisance to the USG which is accustomed to being a dominant power
in counter-drug policy or to working with a majority of foreign governments that
supposedly share its stance. An alternative cultural view of coca is thus difficult to
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incorporate into the existing orthodoxy of U.S. policy and international law, though as
earlier sections of this chapter have shown it is not an entirely new perspective. It also
exposes the rigidity of U.S. policy as something rather undemocratic if the only definition
of security and law enforcement is beyond review or redress by the citizens.
Even when law and policy are agreed upon, their enforcement assumes the
existence of organizations that are democratic, honest, and uncorrupted. This of course is
not always the case in newly democratic systems and especially where levels of human
security and civic engagement are low. Once “corruption has become deeply entrenched,
it is difficult to eliminate without damaging many of the healthy institutions of an already
weak democracy” (INCSR, 2003). Although the overall plan supports the creation and
strengthening of institutions like the courts, police, and due process, this language implies
that their destruction may be an inevitable, necessary – and possibly tolerable – part of
the process, as long as the goal of weakening the drug trade is achieved. The emphasis
now is still on stopping supply and cutting off the flow of money through a concerted
effort by a democratic coalition, but neither truly seems to have been achieved: users
keep buying, and drugs flow from, through and to countries of all regime types.

-- The Drug Trade’s Adaptability: Obstacles & Results -“As one of the countries most affected by illegal drugs, we cannot afford to give
up any of the ground gained in the last decade” and yet what ground has been gained
does not appear to be permanent (INCSR, 1998). With every counternarcotics success,
the drug trade learns. Destruction of some cartels means those that survive become
stronger, smarter, and more astute. The future of international efforts will rely on
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adaptability, flexibility, close coordination among governments, and “significant
resources” (INCSR, 2003). This may mean larger budgets approved by the U.S.
Congress or the military, and more cooperation and flexibility from other governments to
follow U.S. funded policies and efforts.
Meanwhile, “the drug trade had little to celebrate at the end of the twentieth
century” (INCSR, 1999). Previously, the 1997 report noted that intensified operations in
Mexico and Central America moved more traffic to the Caribbean. Coca cultivation also
shifted, but was not decreased or stopped just two years later; cultivation in the Andean
region was down, but Colombia’s was up by 20%. This phenomenon, or balloon effect
as it is frequently called, should not be surprising as a consequence of the eradication
efforts in Peru and Bolivia. Colombian production increased and moved to areas beyond
the control of similar efforts. At the same time, technological developments made it
possible for more cocaine to be extracted from smaller amounts of coca.
The year 2000 was a year of “important accomplishments and serious challenges”
for drug control (INCSR, 2000). Cultivation remained stable: down 70% in Bolivia and
Peru but up 11% in Colombia. The total amount cultivated remained the same; in spite of
efforts and shifts in focus, there was effectively no change from the previous year. In
fact, cultivation continued to move into more remote, guerilla-controlled areas, certain to
make future efforts at eradication increasingly difficult. And yet that same year it was
declared that:
The coca crop has been contained: most of the big drug cartels have been
fragmented, and the most violent of the drug bosses of the 1980s and 90s are
either dead or in jail. The mechanisms for long-term international cooperation
are in place and working effectively. The international drug control community
can take pride in this progress (ibid.).

94

If drug control measures have been so successful, why do drugs continue to be readily
available? The answer appears not far behind these glowing reviews, but is still
incredibly optimistic:
There is still, however, a long way to go. The drug trade has too much to lose
not to exploit every opportunity to expand production and try to divide the
international coalition threatening it. Yet it knows that it cannot survive a
concerted, sustained campaign by a coalition of democracies individually
determined to crush it” (ibid., emphasis added).
The 2005 report frequently mentions traffic in and through Mexico, indicating a
shift from the Caribbean back to Mexican and Central American routes. A year later in
the 2006 INCSR, Venezuela joined the list of countries failing to meet their counter-drug
obligations. The failure of drug enforcement in Venezuela goes hand in hand with the
continuing importance and use of trans-shipment points in the Caribbean. The report
claims that the number of suspected drug flights from Venezuela to Hispaniola and other
parts of the Caribbean more than doubled in 2005 and continued rising in 2006 (INCSR,
2007). The report also claims that the rate of U.S. cocaine consumption declined over the
last ten years. It does not offer concrete numbers on this point and one wonders how true
that might be since cocaine is still a major domestic drug concern and interagency data
from 2006 (within the same report) shows that between 517 and 732 metric tons of
cocaine left South America for the United States that year.
Controlling supply remains the number one strategy, but there is some indication
that the tactics in use are not always universally accepted, especially eradication. The
report suggests that longer term crop control should be developed along with alternative
crop programs. It also recommends more attention to the processing and distribution
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stages through lab destruction and interdiction, only occasionally mentioning how poor
people involved at these stages might also be affected:
Destroying a lucrative crop, even an illegal one, carries enormous political,
economic, and social ramifications for the producing country. It inevitably
means attacking the livelihood of a large – and often the poorest – sector of the
population. Democratic governments that take away vital income without any
quid pro quo seldom survive for long (INCSR, 2003).
By extension then, an authoritarian government might have a better chance or be a better
ally in the war on drugs. The suspension of civil liberties and democratic practices might
be necessary for a government to maintain its control on drug policy. The report almost
appears to contradict itself – drugs are antithetical to democracy, and yet it seems
democracy may justifiably be put aside in order to control them.

-- The Future of Interdiction in the Americas?-The September 11th attacks and the ensuing war on terror have left most military
efforts in the war on drugs in Latin America and the Caribbean far behind. The shift of
emphasis to terror and the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have left Washington’s focus
“muddled and disjointed” and “U.S. efforts have had no lasting impacts on the flow of
illegal drugs into the country” (Bagley, 2007: 1). At the end of the time period under
investigation here, there appears to have been no progress at all by this account. Indeed,
even the budget proposed for the next phase “raises major questions regarding the future
direction of U.S. drug control policies” (ibid.: 2). Once again, most money is directed
toward interdiction of supply rather than “a comprehensive and balanced approach
among interdiction, law enforcement, overseas programs and prevention/treatment
programs” (ibid.). Equally troubling is the proposed reduction to the Andean Counter
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Drug Initiative to the complete exclusion of Venezuela – the source country of hundreds,
if not thousands, of drug flights to the Dominican Republic and other parts of the
Caribbean each year.
Bagley (2007) reports major decreases in U.S. military involvement in the drug
war in Latin America and the Caribbean since 2001. These reductions leave significant
gaps and undercut foreign efforts to control drugs. The U.S. has reduced the programs it
introduced in the first place – cutting surveillance of Caribbean and Pacific cocaine
smuggling routes by as much as 62% and reducing patrol boats by a third (ibid.). Bagley
is correct when he says that this leaves places like the Dominican Republic, already faced
with disproportionate traffic to enforcement capabilities, highly vulnerable. The Bush
administration left drug policies in “disarray” which in turn offers “little hope of reducing
the flow of illicit drugs into the United States in the foreseeable future” (ibid.: 4). This is
ironic considering the outward looking policy the U.S. has always adhered to. Little
money is allocated to demand reduction efforts yet the allocation for interdiction on the
supply side is dwindling as well.
The FY2008 budget for Foreign Military Financing in the Dominican Republic
was reduced by 100% – that is, eliminated entirely. At the same time, the USG thinks
that demand for drugs in the Dominican Republic is increasing, especially since drugs are
often used as payment. Demand reduction has strong support within the government and
the public sector in the Dominican Republic. Survey data cited in the INCSR showed
that only about 50,000 Dominicans used cocaine or marijuana in 1999. This accounts for
less than one percent of the country’s total population (approximately eight million that
year) and shows a lower rate of use than in the United States. Unfortunately, the 2007
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INCSR also notes that there is little evidence to back up this assertion as few official
surveys about domestic drug use have ever been undertaken in the country due to a lack
of resources. Surveys have been carried out in the United States for years, though how
reliable the data collected is and how accurately it reflects real rates of drug consumption
is questionable. The surveys may grossly under estimate rates of use in the U.S. and the
same is likely to occur elsewhere. Still, it is probably useful and necessary to undertake
this sort of work especially as trafficking so obviously continues to affect local and
international communities.

Evaluation & Conclusions
Cooperation abroad requires political will and the commitment of leaders, but this
is a limited view: Leadership cannot work without structure and a culture of support.
For this a country needs a populace without a need for drug revenue. The INCSR again
and again acknowledges that there is “no commodity more lucrative than drugs.” Money
lost by traffickers in busts, even large ones, is but a small fraction of their total profits.
The FY01 budget for the USG international drug control was $18.8 billion, the
equivalent value of approximately nineteen metric tons of cocaine.

The money made

from drugs far exceeds the amount budgeted for their control. Yet the report has claimed
that “the balance sheet…shows that we are on the right track. Sustained cooperation with
our partners over the past decade has kept the drug syndicates constantly on the
defensive” (INCSR, 2000). The following year, the total State Department budget for
international drug control was $348 million, or roughly the equivalent value of 3.5 metric
tons of cocaine. Again, the amount of money used to fight drugs pales in comparison to

98

the amount the drug trade has at its disposal, but we are repeatedly told these small
expenditures are enough to make real progress.
At the same time:
Western industrialized nations, and particularly the United States, have had
paramount influence in the creation and operation of the international drug
control regime. The system reflects Western cultural, social, economic, and
religious biases about which drugs require control and how stringent those
controls should be (McAllister, 1994: 523).
These stringent controls in recent years have required the use of the military for
enforcement. There are certain advantages to having the Department of Defense (DoD)
in charge of anti-drug efforts. The DoD has experience working with foreign militaries,
it has the ability to create coordinated and unified communications and intelligence
systems, and it has all the related technology, especially after years of monitoring the
skies and waters for Soviet vessels. The DoD can also use all of its existing personnel
and equipment at a lower cost.
The ability to make use of local police and military personnel in the drug war
outside the United States rests on the will of the local government. The U.S. can pressure
but not direct all activities by governments abroad. Even so, “the United States, by
insisting that the civilian police forces in these nations are incompetent to destroy what
the United States itself terms criminal organizations, has telegraphed the message that
militaries are more important than civilian institutions” (Mabry, 1994: 51). This kind of
attitude is particularly troubling in a younger democracy like the Dominican Republic
and one where the military and police have operated apart from civilian control in the
past. Contrary to Mabry’s assertion, civilian institutions have been the focus of reform
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efforts in the Dominican Republic, though more as a residual or cascading result of the
drug war.
In U.S. circles “policy makers and negotiators have consistently not dealt with
the problem in its entirety” (McAllister, 1994: 527). Regional approaches ignore the
global nature of the problem, favoring supply control ignores the role of demand, and
both contribute to balloon effects. The drug control regime carries the potential for
success in international cooperation, but also has the potential for abuse and damage to
national and international norms of jurisprudence and democratic governance. Extrastate forces could violate sovereignty, human rights, and fundamental liberties in the
name of drug control.
The drug war is justified as another chapter in the U.S.’s book of anti-drug
rhetoric, and is one more chapter in the history of a demonized “other.” The outwardlooking strategy and characterization of the problem supports the idea of fighting and
using the at-hand power of the military. Yet the full history of the coca leaf, its changing
esteem and use among natives and settlers, and the growth and change in drug use and
control regimes in the United States’ own history should convince us that this war falls
short of its own goals and real justice.
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V: The Dominican Republic as Case Study
This chapter brings our focus on the question of justice in the war on drugs to a
case study of the Dominican Republic. By using the case study method, one can begin to
see how the general questions regarding legitimate authority, just cause, proportion,
necessity, and reasonable chance of success in the war on drugs manifest in a specific
real-world setting. The case study also provides the opportunity to analyze the
intersection of the international war on drugs and domestic processes of democratization.
The details of one particular case study may prove informative for the broader discussion
of law enforcement and democratic society elsewhere.
Scholarly attention, and much of U.S. policy, has focused on the primary drug
producing areas such as Colombia, or producing and transshipment places like Jamaica
(Jones, 2002). The Dominican Republic is now also regarded as a primary transshipment
locale and has seen the growth of local drug gangs and violence, as well as increased
domestic drug consumption (Griffith, 1997, 2000a, 2000b; Klein, et al, 2004; Rogers,
1999). In addition, the country has a close economic relationship with the United States
and is a party to several bilateral and regional drug control agreements.
In writing about drugs in Colombia, Francisco Thoumi (1995) has found that a
lack of regional integration, widespread inequality, and weak institutions within the
country all contributed to the growth and profundity of the illicit drug trade there. A
weak and delegitimized state and a general disregard for the rule of law made Colombia a
low-risk location for drug production. All of these factors bear a striking similarity to
conditions within the Dominican Republic:
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Several features of the Dominican Republic…make that country a prime
trafficking candidate: proximity to Colombia, the Bahamas, Puerto Rico, and
the southern United States; a long, often desolate border with Haiti; and poorly
equipped police and military authorities (Griffith, 1997: 73).
In addition to geographical location, the expanse of forested or other less-inhabited land
areas and the willingness of the migrant community to participate in the distribution
network also make it more or less ideal for the drug trade. As I shall demonstrate in this
chapter, there are even more conditions within the Dominican Republic that make it an
optimal location for transshipment and that make control of drug traffic difficult or
impossible. The collusion of government, police, and military officers in drug trafficking
organizations has allowed them to flourish. At the same time, certain conditions within
the Dominican Republic that are different from other countries in the region make the
survival of the democratic state a possibility even in the face of rising crime.
The Dominican Republic appears on the list of major drug producing or transit
countries, as well as the list of money laundering countries, in each of the International
Narcotics Control Strategy Reports (INCSRs) between 1996 and 2007 examined here.
“Intelligence and seizure throughout the region indicate that Dominican, Puerto Rican,
and Colombian traffickers have made the Dominican Republic a major command and
control center” (INCSR, 2000). The country’s own National Drug Plan explains that its
position as a command center is a result of its geographic location, but also notes the
important role of the structured criminal organizations that operate in Santo Domingo,
New York City, Boston, Providence, and elsewhere in the United States. Dominicans are
the transporters of drugs to and from other locations, and only about 20% of the drugs
that enter the country remain there. The Government of the Dominican Republic
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(GODR) also claims the drugs that do stay are frequently payment in-kind for transport
services and contribute to increasing drug abuse and related crimes domestically. “Drugs
is one of the main reasons for the rise in crime” over the last ten to 15 years in the
Dominican Republic (Morgan et al., 2006: xii). The level of drug dealing in the
Dominican Republic is high compared to other countries in the region while the capacity
to deal with drugs and drug crime has been low.
Capacity is low because of the economic context in part, which has allowed drugs
to infiltrate society at all levels. A study published by the Banco Central of the
Dominican Republic in 1999 found that 15 to 20% of government and public workers fell
below the poverty level. Poverty and inequality are, of course, not unknown in the
Dominican Republic in general. The 1999 Banco Central study also showed that more
than 2 million Dominicans were living below the poverty level (RD$894 per person per
month, currently about $25 US), and that in 1998 the top ten percent of the population
earned 37% of the national total, while the bottom half accounted for just under 20% of
that total. The Dominican Republic is now a country of 9.5 million people, 15.6% of
whom are unemployed and 42% of whom live below the poverty line (CIA, 2008).
Large numbers of Dominicans living abroad with weak loyalty to their host
country make for an ideal drug distribution network. Income generated and sent as
remittances back to the home country is also an incentive. Rogers (1999) has argued that
dependence on these remittances from abroad has caused a number of people to abandon
other forms of income generation within the Dominican Republic. That, combined with
the loss of opportunity for jobs that pay well, particularly in connection with the growth
of free-trade zones and export-processing zones (EPZs), creates an environment in which
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illegal practices can thrive. It is even worse when members of the enforcement bodies
themselves become involved in many of these same illegal practices.
Indeed, data like that above reinforces the assertion that public employees are
susceptible to bribes and corruption in its many forms. Additionally, Dominican
nationals – especially fisherman recruited from local docks for small amounts of money –
are part of “go-fast” boat crews transporting drugs. Thus, transshipment is truly a
transnational enterprise with economic benefits and risks for all those involved. What are
small amounts of money for trafficking organizations are large amounts for the workers
who accept them, which further underscores the economic appeal of trafficking and the
inability of force alone to counteract it.
Rogers (1999) discusses several court cases which he says raise questions about
the ability of Dominican institutions to combat drug traffic. There have been many
offenders who escaped prosecution in the United States by returning to the Dominican
Republic and avoiding extradition, or were not prosecuted in the Dominican Republic
itself because they had economic and political clout. Cases like these provide
justification for the widespread judicial and police reforms that have been taking place
within the Dominican system since Rogers undertook his study. These reform programs
have been implemented with the support of experts in the U.S. and will be the focus of
the next chapter. In this chapter, I look first at Dominican history and experience with
democracy, then at U.S. and Dominican cooperation and efforts to enforce drug policy at
the international and domestic levels, and finally at some of the institutions charged with
enforcing policy while preserving democracy in the domestic sphere.
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A Brief History of Democracy in the Dominican Republic
The Dominican Republic is one of the least studied countries in the Western
Hemisphere even though it is one that has the longest history of European settlement
(Moya Pons, 1995). The country’s history is extensive and the politics varied – as a
colony, an occupied territory, an independent nation under authoritarian rule, and finally
an independent democracy. It is this heritage, its influence on current dynamics, and the
most recent experience of democracy especially that interest us in the present study.
The Dominican Republic has been independent since 1844, before slavery was
abolished in the New World, and a century before the period of widespread
decolonization in the Caribbean region. It is an example, along with Haiti, of “early
national communities whose autonomous political history set them apart from the
colonial societies of the surrounding islands” (Moya Pons, 1995: 10). Hartlyn (1998)
argues that the pattern of politics in the Dominican Republic cannot be explained by
Spanish Colonial Heritage alone, as many scholars like Howard Wiarda have done. He
looks instead at the specifics of the post-colonial experience and shows a contrast to other
cases such as Costa Rica where the path has been different. War, regionalism, lack of
central authoritative elites, geography, ethnic factors, and militarization of the country all
contribute to its struggle – and its “willingness to trade sovereignty for protection” on
more than one occasion (Hartlyn, 1998: 55).
Frank Moya Pons (1995) has written a book that discusses the continuities, both
economic and political, between the U.S. military government in the D.R. during the
1916-1924 occupation, and the governments that came after it. Trujillo and those who
came after him are the most obvious examples of military involvement or militaristic
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elements in Dominican government, but even today we can find a certain acceptance of
militarized governance within Dominican society. Even so, during the 1916 occupation
“Dominicans did not like being governed by U.S. soldiers, as they had not liked it when
they were ruled by Spanish soldiers at the time of annexation, by Haitian soldiers during
Boyer’s rule, or by French soldiers under the control of Ferrand” (Moya Pons, 1995:
327-328). Indeed, Dominican history is full of eras where rule came from foreigners.
Dominicans often talk about their multiple dates of independence from these rulers, and
resistance to external dictates has been imprinted upon many a Dominican mind when
learning about their national history. In contrast to Hartlyn’s analysis, Moya Pons asserts
that over time, “Dominican politicians and intellectuals let it be known that they preferred
a free country with rebellions to an occupied country living an imposed peace” (Moya
Pons, 1995: 328). This may be echoed now where the country is free but dealing with
the ‘rebellion’ of growing drug violence and with pressure from the outside from the U.S.
and its increasingly militarized efforts to combat drug traffic.

-- Occupation to Democratization -The Dominican Republic has experienced what Hartlyn (1998) calls
neosultanistic or neopatrimonial rule, which is not directly related to Spanish colonial
heritage. It is characterized by a history of initial poverty in the newly free state with
weak economic elites, periods of war and economic devastation often establishing
admiration for military strongmen, and U.S. occupation. The type of regime that results
cannot legitimize or institutionalize itself in the long-run. These regimes are personalistic
and tied to a specific leader. Rafael Trujillo, ruler of the Dominican Republic from 1930
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until his assassination in 1961, for example, lacked the kind of ideology based on religion
or Marxism that other types of totalitarian regimes may have. Still, the respect for order,
strong government, and economic nationalism produced by these regimes can engender
public acceptance of authoritarian rule, making a transition to democracy for this type of
regime “extraordinarily difficult” (Hartlyn, 1998: 59).
The U.S. occupation of the Dominican Republic during the early 20th century
(1916-1930) “helped establish a relatively effective national military institution where
one had previously not existed and in which traditionally powerholders were weak”
(Hartlyn, 1998: 38). This in part helped bring Trujillo to power. Support from the newly
professional armed forces protected him against corrupt ruling elites and became a means
for putting down rebellion later on. Trujillo came to power with 2,000 security forces.
By 1955 the number had grown to 20,000. By 1965 it was 31,000 (ibid.). In this and
other cases of neopatrimonial regimes, the military is established as a political player and
a “personal instrument of the particular ruler, rather than…a national institution” (ibid.:
61). Civilian control of the military was non-existent and, again, difficult to establish
with the transition to democracy.
The occupation did have some positive effects. The highway system was
completed in 1924, creating links between the capital and the three major regions which
helped “initiate the political unification of the country” (Moya Pons, 1995: 336). There
was also an emphasis on education and sanitation within the military government. “From
then on, to govern became synonymous with construction so that a good government was
measured in terms of the construction of public works that it accomplished” (ibid.: 337).
This is an interesting point in light of the controversy that surrounds President Fernández
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and the metro construction project in Santo Domingo. Many areas of the capital
underwent renovation while the new train system was built, but there have been
numerous complaints about the costs and potential benefits from such a project (see
Lacey, 2007). The main complaint has been that money could provide for other more
basic needs, such as water and electricity. In the summer of 2007 while I visited the
capital city, several urban neighborhoods were without water for the duration of my twoweek trip. While the metro project is likely to have positive effects in the long run by
alleviating traffic and providing an inexpensive means to bring people to and from work,
the sentiment equating good government with construction does not appear as clear-cut as
Moya Pons suggests. Measures of good government can also be based on public opinion
surrounding institutions, such as the military and police, especially where civilian control
has been limited.
The occupation in the early 20th century also had its downsides. The general
population was completely disarmed, giving advantage to the national police who were
specially trained in repressive measures and not necessarily under the control of others in
the population (Moya Pons, 1995). By 1924, the government was administered by
civilians but the country was still a U.S. protectorate:
The Dominicans had learned that the center of political power in the Caribbean
was in Washington and that the Dominican Republic was in the orbit of U.S.
interests. From this time on, the exercise of sovereignty would be understood by
Dominican leaders as always conditioned by U.S. foreign policy (ibid.: 339).
The post-occupation era was marked by prosperity and freedom, as well as rapid
modernization, but it was also a time of regression to caudillo-style politics where party
politics were a vehicle for personal ambitions (ibid.). Congress passed an extension on
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terms, and parties found other ways to share the spoils of government among themselves,
while the U.S. was beginning to move away from direct occupation as a policy.
“For the first time in Dominican history there appeared to be a government
capable of both keeping order and of maintaining civil liberties” but re-election
campaigns and party divisions began to erode the government (Moya Pons, 1995: 350).
The Chief of the army – Rafael Trujillo – took an interest in politics and was encouraged
to have a political role as rival to the successor of President Vasquez. Vasquez was in illhealth and trusted Trujillo. Trujillo used this trust, and his power and influence within
the army, to make his way into the presidency.
With Trujillo in office, Santo Domingo began a transformation into Ciudad
Trujillo, which made it the center of administration as well as industry and commerce
during the post-WWII era. Immigration from the interior increased significantly as well.
In 1920, 84% of the Dominican population was rural. In 1960 it had decreased to 60%
(Moya Pons, 1995: 376). Trujillo’s legacy was “a dualist economy with a very poor,
large working and peasant class, and a total lack of democratic institutions” (ibid.: 379).
Poverty levels continued to rise after Trujillo, especially during the 1980s under
Balaguer. In 1984, 1 million Dominicans lived below the poverty level. Just five years
later in 1989, the number was more than 2 million, or 57% of households in the country
(ibid.: 434).
In the post-Trujillo era since the 1960s, pluralism has increased in the society
through unions, political parties, schools, news media, and various other types of
organizations, and yet caudillismo still characterized the country’s institutional life.
“Dominican political culture continues to be dominated by caudillismo and personalism,”
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which would appear to be a difficult context for a new democracy to emerge (Moya Pons,
1995: 436). According to Hartlyn, the necessary conditions for a transition to
democracy, as laid out in the academic literature, were virtually non-existent after
Trujillo (see Haggard and Kaufman, 1995; Linz, 1978; O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986).
There was no clear path for succession within the outgoing government, and no truly
organized opposition with a single popular leader. The election of Juan Bosch in 1962
was remarkable but the subsequent overthrow of his government and breakdown of the
system was not surprising (Hartlyn, 1998; see also Lowenthal, 1972; Palmer, 1989).
Hartlyn refers to this period as the first failed transition.
The coup overthrowing Bosch, followed by civil war and U.S. intervention in
1965, was then followed by “extrication elections” in 1966 (Hartlyn, 1998). This
represents the second failed transition. Joaquin Balaguer was elected democratically,
though how free and fair the elections actually were is a matter of debate, more so than
for the Bosch election in 1962. The United States had a preferred candidate this time,
and a policy where supporting democratization was secondary to other concerns like
preventing the spread of communism in the region (Chester, 2001; Hartlyn, 1998).
Hartlyn (1998) condemns the U.S. intervention as “truncate[ing] a popular
rebellion and help[ing] polarize the country politically, flaming disbelief in democratic
procedures and ultimately ushering to power a close collaborator of Trujillo” (97). The
U.S. previously did not stop the overthrow of Bosch in 1963 to preserve democracy but
inhibited consolidation by not allowing the Dominican Republic to follow its own path –
even if it were a messy and violent one – through 1966. Balaguer was elected but led the
country in an authoritarian manner from 1966 through 1978. He curtailed civil and
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political liberties, and most of the political opposition was harassed by the military into
abstaining from participation in elections. The neopatrimonial character of Dominican
government had been altered by the constitution adopted under Bosch in 1963, but was
again altered in 1966 so as to allow enhanced powers and unlimited reelection for the
president. The military never became Balaguer’s personal instrument as it had been for
Trujillo. After the military overthrow of Bosch, Balaguer had reason to fear a threat from
the armed forces, which were clearly a political entity and not under the direct control of
the civilian government. He was able to court their favor by remaining anti-communist
and by largely ignoring repression and corruption within the ranks. At the same time, he
was able to dismantle some military conspiracies against him.
A successful transition to democracy did not occur in the Dominican Republic
until 1978. It came about based on a number of converging factors: an economic
slowdown, the growth of an organized opposition (in contrast to the Trujillo years where
none had been allowed to exist at all), international and U.S. interest in democracy and
human rights, and Balaguer’s physical decline, particularly his failing eyesight (Hartlyn,
1998). Bosch had left his party, the PRD, which was the largest and most organized of
the opposition parties. In his place was Gúzman, his former vice-president, an antiTrujillista and a moderate alternative candidate.
The PRD ran a successful mobilization campaign and won the election
“convincingly” which led to a cautious transition from above – Balaguer was able to
maintain a majority in the senate through some manipulation of congressional votes while
handing over the presidency to Gúzman (Hartlyn, 1998: 120). In spite of this
compromise, some effort toward a coup was made by the military, though it was mostly
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uncoordinated. It was uncertain whether Balaguer actually would step down and if the
military would hand over power to the new leader. The time between the election and the
inauguration was tense, but international pressure and attention from watchdogs helped
the transition succeed.
The period after 1978 was a time of optimism for consolidation, but also one
marked by additional “missed opportunities.” It was a period of “juxtaposition of
socioeconomic change and political blockage” (Hartlyn, 1998: 134-5). Hartlyn argues
that neopatrimonialism is path dependent and reinforced by high inequality and low
levels of political or civic organization. Where there has been a lack of independent
organization and civil society, there will be little experience with democracy for new
associations and organizations to draw upon. A similar situation will exist for the
opposition – they will have little experience with moderation as opposed to revolutionary
tactics. The practice of democratic power sharing and compromise in policy making after
a transition to democracy occurs will have to be learned and may create the potential for
instability and breakdown. From 1960 to 1990 the Dominican Republic experienced
increasing urbanization, a move away from agriculture to tourism and EPZs as the main
sources of income, and increasing migration and remittances, especially during and after
the debt crisis of the 1980s. This period saw an increase of women in the work force,
especially in the EPZs. But poverty persisted even in the midst of this growth.
The continuities of inequality and low organization allow for “continued
vulnerability to neopatrimonial claims” (Hartlyn, 1998: 145). Survey data from the
1990s show “sufficient attitudinal support for authoritarian and neopatrimonial practices”
in government (ibid.). On the plus side, the state has been less able to abuse its resources
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since international factors have become as influential as state economic policy because
tourism and EPZs connect state interests to those of international actors.
During the same period the role of the military in politics decreased as the climate
of violence and support for intervention also decreased, although this was not achieved
through professionalization or democratic control over the armed forces. The military
instead became top-heavy as leaders promoted those who were loyal to them. At the
same time, low wages meant high rates of corruption, especially during the mid-1990s
(Hartlyn, 1998).
Factionalism within the leading opposition party (PRD) and traditional opposition
to presidential reelection in part allowed for Balaguer’s return to office in 1986, where he
stayed until 1996. The years 1978 to 1996 then were not a sharp break with the political
past. Elections between 1982 and 1994 were “crisis ridden” and symptomatic of the
relative newness and problematic nature of Dominican democracy, but they also
“generated increasing pressure from a variety of actors for changes” (Hartlyn, 1998:
223). Electoral reform came in 1990, and constitutional and legal changes in 1994, all of
which influenced the election in 1996, “whose outcome marked a sharp contrast with
previous electoral processes and represented a new opportunity to break with the
country’s neopatrimonial patterns” (ibid.).
Specifically, in 1996 Balaguer was not a presidential candidate for the first time in
30 years. Two important measures had also been introduced (or reintroduced) into the
electoral process: a prohibition on immediate reelection, and a second round vote should
no candidate receive more than 50% of the votes in the first round. The 1996 elections
thus marked a new transition “rais[ing] hopes in the Dominican Republic for a more
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regularized and formally institutionalized regime and...a more democratic regime as
well” (Hartlyn, 1998: 273). Subsequent chapters are devoted to showing whether these
hopes have been realized in the face of a growing drug and crime problem.
The Dominican Republic has made progress towards a citizenship democracy but
has farther to go. The system is less personalistic and more institutionalized than
previously but still may not be totally characterized by a respect for constitutional and
legal norms. We may not be seeing a personalistic or charismatic leader taking on a
patrimonial role as in other nations in Latin America, but there is still the potential for
corruption and abuse of power by the military, police, and others within the government,
and for a return to authoritarian measures if deemed necessary.

Dominican Democracy & Institutions
If drugs are affecting democracy and democratic institutions in the Dominican
Republic, it is important to understand what those institutions are and how they function
in order to gauge the extent of the problem. This section offers a brief overview of some
of the history and structure of the Dominican constitution and various institutions within
the system of justice. The final section of the chapter will return to this topic and discuss
some recent research on attitudes toward democracy and institutions among the
Dominican population.

-- Dominican Institutions -From the time of Rome, there have been primarily two kinds of penal systems at
work in the western world: accusatory and inquisitive. In the first, a judge serves as an
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arbiter between the parties, each of whom argues a case. In the second, the judge acts as
an investigator and makes a ruling in the matter based on his findings. Until the
enactment of recent reforms and changes, the Dominican system was a mixed one similar
to those in France, Haiti, and Costa Rica. The constitution of 1844 established the state
as the only authority able to punish crimes, with the Ministerio Público (public ministry
or public prosecution department) and Poder Ejecutivo (executive power) closely related.
The president has the power to appoint most posts within the government, including those
within the administration of justice and the judicial police (FINJUS, 1998).
The Procuraduría General de la República (Attorney General) also has roots that
go all the way back to the constitution of 1844 (ONAP, 2004). Its purpose is to represent
and defend the public interest as well as the interests of the state. Under the president, it
is its own large branch that includes the courts and prisons in the country. The Dirección
General de Prisiones even has the same web address.
The Consejo Nacional de Drogas (Nacional Drug Council or CND) was
established by law in May 1988. Its primary function is to design and implement national
policy against the consumption, distribution, and trafficking of drugs. The CND is under
the power of the executive. The Dirección Nacional de Control de Drogas (Office of
National Drug Control or DNCD) was first established in 1959 and then reestablished in
1988 by the same laws that gave us the CND. Its objective is to prevent and punish the
consumption, distribution, and illicit traffic of drugs and controlled substances in the
national territory. Essentially, the CND designs policy while the DNCD carries it out.
The Policía Nacional (National Police or PN) are under the Secretary of State of
the Interior and Police, which is part of the Presidential cabinet. The National Police has
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existed, in one form or another, since colonial times (though at one point it was
technically the Guardia Nacional Haitiana). The name has changed several times during
the 20th century, and the security system was partially dismantled during times of U.S.
occupation (ONAP, 2004). For example, in 1917 the national police force was renamed
the Dominican National Guard, taking the place of the army, marine forces, and
Republican Guard. In 1921 the name changed again to Policía Nacional Dominicana.
During the Trujillo years, all police bodies were united into one national police force and
placed under the direction of the Secretary of State for the Interior and Police. By 1959
new regulations established the police force’s internal organization and set sanctions for
lack of discipline or wrongs committed by members.
In 1965, Law 574 placed the PN under the control of the armed forces, even
though Law 22 maintained it under the Secretary of State for the Interior and Police.
During this period of civil unrest, Decree 111-90 created a subgroup of military electoral
police for preserving and maintaining order during elections. Much later, Decree 906-00
in the year 2000 declared that it was in the national interest to reform and modernize the
PN and created an executive commission (ONAP, 2004). Since then, the National Police
Museum, Social Security Institute for the PN, and the Human Dignity Institute of the PN
have been created. All are efforts to bring the police and community closer together and
to show the police as an institution under civilian control. The museum covers the
history of the police and serves to inform the public about the police and their role,
thereby generating a better public perception. The Human Dignity Institute is especially
concerned with professionalizing the police force and creating officers that respect
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human rights, civil rights, and due process. These police reforms come at a time of
extensive change and reform in the system overall.
Returning to the court system in the Dominican Republic, accusatory systems put
accuser and accused on equal footing before the law and are open to public oral
arguments. Inquisitive systems are secretive, written, and uncontradictory, meaning a
judge’s word is final. The Dominican mixed system, derived from Napoleonic code, was
complicated and did not necessarily judge the merits of an accusation impartially. One
might argue that an accusatory system is far from perfect because it rewards the best
argument but does not necessarily find the truth. One could also argue that while the
inquisitive system appears to place emphasis on fact-finding, it relies on the integrity of a
single judge to follow through and act impartially, which leaves much space and potential
for unscrupulous behavior. Indeed, the public prosecution department could often be
seen as an extension of the executive with no limits on the qualifications for appointment.
The system could easily be used as an effective way of preserving the status quo and
offering rewards and favors within it. As FINJUS argued in its 1998 report on the
system, defense of the accused needed to become an integral part of the process from the
beginning of every case. In a system like the one in the United States, one may obtain
legal representation as soon as one is detained, which requires a fully compliant and welltrained police force as the first step in the judicial process. This type of system is in line
with international standards for human rights. Reform efforts focused on creating this
kind of system within the administration of justice in the Dominican Republic are some
of many important changes that have been occurring in the country since the full
transition to democracy in 1996.
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-- Democracy: Rights and the Constitution -The Dominican constitution, reformed in 1994 and recently the subject of
additional newly proposed reforms, contains what are known as derechos absolutos –
mankind’s superior inalienable rights which are merely reaffirmed and made precise
within a written constitution. Often called the rights of man, individual rights,
fundamental rights, or human rights, they are contained within the Dominican
Declaración de los Derechos del Hombre y del Cuidadano, which is similar to the Magna
Carta or the Preamble to the U.S. Constitution. These rights “are expressly recognized, in
one form or another, and with few fundamental differences, by all democratic
constitutions” (Amiama, 1995: 61). Most of the fundamental rights discussed within the
Dominican constitution are the same as those contained within the United Nations
Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 as recognized by “modern” nations
(ibid.). One major difference among some democratic states is the existence of a death
penalty, which in many states – including the Dominican Republic – is considered
contrary to one’s inviolable right to life. The death penalty has not been a part of the
Dominican constitution since 1966.
The Dominican constitution provides that one’s home and correspondence are
private and inviolable, though this is a right that is not 100% absolute. The law sets out
the procedures authorities must follow in order to intervene, such as obtaining warrants to
search homes or confiscate correspondence. The constitution also allows freedom of
assembly for peaceful purposes and licit ends. This is particularly important for the
development of civic and community organization. As mentioned above, these rights are
similar to those found in the constitutions of other democratic states. Of course the
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theory is often different from the practice, especially in places where the procedures are
new or not well institutionalized. As more than one Dominican citizen has said to me in
conversation, what is written in the books is not what is practiced by those in power.
Police reform programs in the Dominican Republic are meant to address the gap between
the ideals and the actual institutional practices that have been built over the years.
The constitution contains a right to individual security, which means freedom of
movement, freedom from being detained or jailed without legal cause, and freedom from
being tried twice for the same crime. The constitution also provides that no one can be
punished for a crime without a public trial. Similar to habeus corpus laws, many would
consider them important and fundamental rights. At the same time, when crime is
rampant, there may be a tendency to overlook violations of these principles. Indeed,
when the rhetoric of war is invoked to confront particular kinds of crime, protections
contained within the constitution may then be suspended or even ignored. The next
chapter will explore this further. I turn now to U.S. evaluations of the Dominican
Republic and the implementation of drug policy there.

U.S. Assessment of the Dominican Republic – The INCSR
-- International Cooperative Efforts -“The Dominican Republic has historically been the primary beneficiary of U.S.
military aid and training programs in the region” (Beruff and Cordero, 2005: 318).
There is a strong relationship between the Dominican military and Southcom, and the
Dominican Republic was the only Caribbean state to send troops to Iraq (ibid.). With
24,500 troops total, the Dominican military is one of the largest in the Caribbean – but it
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is still quite small compared to U.S. forces. The joint operations described below involve
many U.S. troops and equipment. The Dominican government oversees the DNCD
which has been viewed by some U.S. officials as “the model counter-narcotics force in all
of Latin America” (Rogers, 1999: 198). This praise comes in spite of evidence of
nepotism in assigning individuals to certain posts and that members often receive kickbacks. The majority of the DNCD’s members come from the armed forces, police, and
justice system and work closely with the DEA and U.S. Coast guard.
A variety of Coast Guard operations take place in the Caribbean each year. For
example, Caribe Venture is a recurring series of operations in which the Dominican
Republic is a party. Caribe Venture “extend[s] legal authority to law enforcement
officials of other nations that permit entry and pursuit of suspects through sovereign sea
and air space” (INCSR, 1997). Operation Halcon is a counterdrug and alien migration
operation conducted by the U.S. and Dominican Coast Guards. The DEA Caribbean
Field Division has set up the Unified Caribbean On-line Regional Network (UNICORN)
which includes the Dominican Republic (INCSR, 1998). It is a computer and internet
program for information sharing among participating countries.
The United States Coast Guard (USCG) conducted Operation Genesis in Port-auPrince and Santo Domingo to foster cooperation between Haitian and Dominican law
enforcement. This operation led to the arrests of 126 people (INCSR, 1998). In 1998,
Operation Frontier Lance, a surge operation south of Hispaniola, was conducted by the
USCG with shipriders from Haiti and the Dominican Republic. This marked the first
time that the USCG conducted counterdrug operations from a foreign base in the
Dominican Republic.
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Coast Guard operations Caribe Venture, Genesis, Frontier Lance, and Halcon
continued during 1999, and a number of U.S. Coast Guard officers were posted at the
embassy in the Dominican Republic. The maritime law enforcement training team
visited the country twice during the year, and two patrol boats and a buoy tender were
transferred. The Coast Guard operation Caribe Venture continued in 2001, but the
second of two planned operations was cancelled once U.S. maritime focus turned to
homeland security in the wake of the September 11, 2001 attacks.
The USCG continued Operation Caribe Venture in 2002. A military and law
enforcement exercise known as Sorpresa Nocturna took place in June of 2002. The
largest operation of its kind ever conducted in the history of Dominican law enforcement,
it included cooperation with the U.S. and Haitian police. In March of 2002 a proposal to
establish four regional Centers for Drug Information (CDIs) was approved, with one to be
located in Santo Domingo. These centers are to promote information sharing among law
enforcement personnel across forty-one countries. In 2003 the CDI in Santo Domingo
became fully operational. The CDIs “provide the law enforcement personnel of 41
participating nations with the capability to share drug-related tactical and investigative
information in a timely manner” (INCSR, 2004). This sharing is made possible through
131 computers.
The USCG conducted Operation Steel Web in 2005, covering transit lines in and
around Caribbean waters, and in 2006 the operation was “continually evolving to reflect
changes in drug trafficking trends” (INCSR, 2007). Operations continued with an
emphasis on the north coast and the border with Haiti, though some efforts were made to
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stop airdrops and boats in other remote areas. All operations clearly show a constant U.S.
presence in the region and influence over Dominican drug control.
The DNCD and DEA broke up two large smuggling rings – one of them
connected to a man with large land holdings along the Haitian border. “Gang violence
and settling of drug-related scores, especially in northern cities, were subjects of frequent
headlines in the Dominican Republic press” (INCSR, 2005). Prior to 2005 this new topic
had not been mentioned in the reports during the time period covered here and it may be
an indication of things growing worse before they get better, as stricter enforcement of
drug laws creates fear and uncertainty for those involved in drug traffic, producing
territoriality and competition between them. At the same time, increased enforcement
came while the economy was still attempting to recover, all types of crime were on the
rise, and drug syndicates had more control over certain parts of the country than did the
state itself. Government efforts to address the surging rates in crime and reassert control
at the local level are discussed in more detail in the next chapter.

-- Customs and Border Controls -Continuing with the theme of U.S. involvement in Dominican drug control
matters, two U.S. customs officials came to the Dominican Republic in October of 1998
for training and exercises in land border interdiction through the newly created and
funded Dominican Anti-Crime/Counter Narcotics Border Unit. Another U.S. Customs
training team visited in 1999 for land border interdiction. According to the report, the
training resulted in creating a sense of teamwork, an improved understanding of the
mission and its scope, and greater professionalism and ability to perform searches and
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data collection among Dominican personnel. A fourth border control unit was opened
along the Haitian border. With USG assistance, GODR planned to increase the number
of dogs and handlers at the border for the following year.
In November 2000, the GODR signed a four-year agreement with the USG to
allow US aircraft to fly in Dominican airspace in pursuit of smugglers. The GODR in
2000 also added three land control units to the four already operating on the Haitian
border. In 2001, the Dominican Republic initiated bilateral intelligence sharing and
interdiction efforts with Haiti. The DNCD and CND also began an initiative to
computerize and track all seizures of assets in drug cases. The Dominican Senate passed
new anti-money laundering legislation, which U.S.-funded programs helped draft and
promote. The economic climate during 2003 was precarious with the collapse of
BANINTER, the third largest Dominican bank, which increased the difficulty of
implementing the new anti-money laundering laws.
The DNCD saw an increased number of seizures during 2001, including almost
daily body-carried drugs in mules, indicating a large number of mule operations. The
DNCD continued to focus its efforts on the north coast and the border with Haiti. Also in
2001, a U.S.-funded readable passport system was installed and immigration computers
purchased for the airport in Punta Cana. Counternarcotics and explosives detection
canine units were expanded to all international airports and seaports in the Dominican
Republic, with U.S., Dutch, and other international assistance (INCSR, 2005). The
DNCD was reported to be upgrading its equipment, training more personnel, and
developing software as part of a multi-year, USG-supported effort to share data and
information among Dominican law enforcement agencies.
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The 2003 INCSR noted that about 8% of the cocaine destined for the U.S. comes
through Hispaniola, but that there had been a decrease in drug smuggling via ferries to
Puerto Rico thanks to the newly established counternarcotics canine units placed at the
Santo Domingo terminal. However, the report also notes an increase in the use of jolas,
or illegal migrant boats, for transport of drugs between the islands. In spite of all the
operations and programs described above, drugs continued to move through the region.
The next section briefly presents some numbers related to interdiction efforts in order to
illustrate some of the effects of the programs, as well as the resilience of the trade.

-- Numbers -As noted previously, the amount of money allocated to interdiction often pales in
comparison to the value of the drugs intercepted. Between 1988 and 1997 the USG gave
about $3.9 million in counterdrug assistance to the Dominican government. The number
of arrests for drug-related offenses in 1997 was 1481 (INCSR, 1997). Two years later the
GODR allocated $3.5 million toward counternarcotics and an additional $646,000 was
allocated from the USG (INCSR, 1999). Through December 2000, the DNCD seized
1,270 kilos of cocaine and made 4,625 drug-related arrests (INCSR, 2000). In 2000 the
USG and GODR signed letters of agreement totaling $1.5 million for narcotics affairs.
The DEA in the Dominican Republic seized 186 kilos of cocaine and arrested two
Dominican nationals in 2001(compared to 1237 kilos seized in Jamaica the same year).
In 2001, the DNCD made 3708 drug arrests, 3496 of which were Dominican nationals -fewer than in the previous year. The increase in heroin seizures again showed a large
number of mules bringing bodily-carried drugs through the nation’s airports.
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The DNCD seized 1.1 metric tons of cocaine in 2002 (INCSR, 2003). The USG
claimed that significant seizures were made on land and in the big cities, while seizures at
the border were limited during 2002. The number made at airports was high even though
the amounts seized were small. The report also discusses the growing local market and
drug consumption by tourists as important factors driving the trade. There were 3929
drug-related arrests (3692 of which were Dominican nationals) during 2003, with fewer
foreign arrests than in previous years. Local law enforcement was either acknowledging
the problem is local as well as international, or they were reluctant to arrest tourists who
bring significant income to the island nation.
The DNCD reported 3305 arrests in 2004; 3150 of these were Dominican
nationals, with 82 fewer foreign nationals arrested than the previous year. Of all heroin
seized for the year, 85% was taken in airports, but only 12% of all cocaine seizures were
made in airports. The DNCD increased seizures and set records for the amount of heroin
(39kg) and ecstasy (259,627 units) confiscated during 2005, the latter of which was found
in bags abandoned at the airport. This may not necessarily have been the result of
intelligence but could be the result of better and more consistent screening procedures.
The largest seizures of cocaine were made from cargo containers destined for New York.
In 2005, 3330 drug-related arrests were made, 3206 of which were Dominican
nationals. There were two joint DNCD/Dominican Navy/USG operations during 2005,
one of which resulted in the interdiction of 2,000 kg of cocaine. Five metric tons of
cocaine were seized, and a new record for a single seizure was set in September 2006
when 2.5 metric tons were taken (INCSR, 2007). The DNCD made 8,809 arrests, 8,563
of which were Dominican nationals. These numbers show a huge increase over previous
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years, more than double in fact. This is not necessarily in indication of more individuals
involved in drug traffic, but may instead be the fruits of better intelligence, interagency
cooperation, and law enforcement capacity. If these programs are indeed working, we
should expect to see similar results in future reports. The next chapter explores whether
or not other reports and surveys corroborate the short-term success of capacity
improvement efforts that support the numbers seen here. Success from the U.S. point of
view places more emphasis on the technical aspects of interdiction and the resulting
statistics, while the Dominican approach has been more all-encompassing of other
structural factors.

-- Extradition and Prosecution -The USG sees improving local justice systems as central to bringing drug
criminals to face charges in the U.S. courts. Extradition agreements have been important
elements of U.S. drug policy and enforcement plans elsewhere. In the Dominican
Republic, a 1969 law prohibits extradition but executive decree allows for exceptions. It
may also leave the executive open to criticism, particularly from those who believe
extradition should be part of a judicial process. At the beginning of the time period under
investigation here, the USG still hoped to sign a bilateral treaty with the GODR for
extraditions. In spite of this prohibition and lack of a treaty agreement, several
Dominicans are extradited to the U.S. on drug charges every year.
In 1997, two extraditions were authorized through the executive authority of
President Leonel Fernández. Nine people were extradited to the U.S. in 1999, though the
process was still not regularized and was subject to political influence. In 2000, the
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INCSR notes how the DNCD electronic surveillance unit became advanced enough that
evidence gathered could be used in U.S. courts, which is likely to support increased
extraditions and stronger cases against offenders in the U.S. but not the idea of a stronger
domestic court system capable of handling similar cases with the same kind of evidence.
For that same year, there were four Dominican nationals extradited to the U.S., and
fourteen U.S. citizens and other foreign nationals deported or expelled from the country.
The government of President Hipólito Mejía pledged its cooperation with the
USG and published the National Drug Plan 2000-2005 in August of 2000. Fifteen
Dominican individuals were extradited to the U.S. from the time Mejía took office in
August of 2000. In 2002, the DNCD extradited seventeen more people to the U.S., and
made twelve arrests in response to requests. The National Police also located fourteen
other individuals for extradition. The USG even provided partial funds to construct new
cells at Najayo prison in order to house fugitives awaiting extradition. In other words,
U.S. taxpayers paid to build more prisons abroad.
During 2003, seventeen Dominicans were extradited to the United States. In
2005 there were 33 extraditions of Dominican nationals, and 22 arrests and deportations
to the U.S. of U.S. and third-party nationals. Of these 55 cases, 42 were drug related. At
this time, judicial review was added to the process for extradition, making it “more
objective and transparent” (INCSR, 2006). In 2006, 26 Dominican nationals were
extradited to the United States. There were 21 arrests and deportations of U.S. and other
third-party nationals. Of these 47 cases, 38 were drug related.
The number of Dominican nationals extradited to the U.S. indicates the extent of
U.S. official belief in the inability of the Dominican system to adequately prosecute drug
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cases. The question of jurisdiction remains and one might wonder what sovereign
authority the U.S. has to try Dominican offenders in Federal courts. We could ask if
justice might better be served in an international court instead, or a neutral third-party
court for these kinds of cases, particularly when one remembers the emotion and rhetoric
that has been used to justify the war on drugs. A fair trial is not necessarily ensured on
either side.

-- Domestic Institutions: Reform and Evaluation of the Police and Justice Systems In the case of the Dominican Republic, “endemic corruption among judges,
prosecutors and law enforcement” is a major concern for the time period covered by this
study (INCSR, 1996). In 1996, the incoming Fernández administration had no “master
plan” and many “unresolved, long term narcotics related issues” to deal with (ibid.). The
country’s long coastline has frequently allowed small vessels to depart and reenter freely
without reporting to Dominican authorities, and the drug traffic problem has been
exacerbated by a “lack of consistent and honest customs and police controls” (ibid.). The
country had both a problem of permeability to crime and a lack of adequate regulation
and enforcement overall.
The Dominican border with Haiti has always been an issue for law enforcement.
It is patrolled by the army which is “not effective in combating crossborder narcotics
traffic” (INCSR, 1997). While many seizures are made at airports, there is inadequate
counternarcotics coverage of the coastline and interior of the country. The focus of
interdiction efforts has remained on drug transit routes in the waters of the north coast
and along the border with Haiti. Some research indicates and Dominican news reports
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confirm that large quantities of drugs move through the eastern and southern coast areas
instead, and yet little attention to these areas is mentioned in the U.S.’s own evaluations.
Recent news reports in the Dominican Republic have shown drug traffic and official
collusion are heavily entrenched in Baní, the capital of the Peravia province in the region
to the south and west of the capital city (DR1 Daily News, August 8, 2008). This is
another example of the balloon effect and how the drug trade can find a way around any
successful counternarcotics strategy.
The Dominican Republic was reported to have a weak judicial system, but one
that had begun “promising reforms” in 1997 (INCSR, 1997). A Memorandum of
Understanding was signed by the DNCD and the Dominican Attorney General so that
prosecutors would become a part of all initial investigations in drug cases. The intention
was to create continuity in the prosecutors’ involvement from the beginning to the end of
each case, thus helping to ensure that prosecutors had knowledge of all aspects of the
cases to which they were assigned. The increased involvement of prosecutors at all
stages may also have had the effect of creating a certain level of oversight between the
two institutions.
Still, “corruption and inefficient administration of justice let more than 100 people
off the hook in 1997” (INCSR, 1997). A new supreme court convened in August of 1997
and began the dismissal of corrupt and incompetent judges from the lower courts. The
USG began to help the GODR to “design and fund a pilot program to modernize and
improve criminal and civil courts in the city of Santo Domingo” which was to be used as
the basis and model for future reforms elsewhere in the country (ibid.). Funds from the
U.S. were also used for the creation of an anti-corruption unit to investigate high officials
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and end the impunity many had enjoyed for years. These statements in the report about
the impunity traditionally enjoyed by high ranking officials seem to contradict other
statements that no evidence existed to link government officials to drug traffic or money
laundering. Drugs and drug money were not accepted by the government as a matter of
policy and no officials were indicted for drug corruption during 1997, but a lack of
evidence of drug corruption does not necessarily mean it did not exist. At that point in
time there seemed to be no proof one way or the other.
Two years later the Dominican Republic still lacked a coordinated national
strategy although the CND had drafted an official National Drug Strategy (INCSR,
1999). The corrupt and inefficient judicial system allowed for the dismissal of “a
significant number” of drug offenders (ibid.). The CND held seized assets worth over
$40 million but had no mechanism to manage divestment. The DNCD worked closely
with the DEA but could have benefited from “greater inter-agency cooperation,
especially within the Dominican military” (ibid.). The GODR was in the process of
developing an anti-corruption bill, and the DNCD implemented drug testing for new
employees and random tests every six months. The GODR also created two new units
for “sensitive investigations of prominent international narcotics organizations” within
the country and submitted personnel to vetting by the USG (ibid.).
Institutional corruption and the reform of prosecutorial and judicial systems
remained the primary concerns of the USG, after cocaine traffic and money laundering.
Unfortunately, “the Department of Justice put a hold on its…program to enhance
criminal investigation techniques until the National Police implement adequate
safeguards for protecting human rights and due process” indicating not only that the
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National Police did not uphold the democratic processes the USG finds so integral to the
war on drugs, but that the efforts to improve investigations and bring offenders to justice
were not achieved because of these shortcomings (INCSR, 2000). The Dominican
government worked during 2000 to strengthen a 1979 law requiring all senior appointed
officials, civil service employees, and elected officials to file financial disclosure
statements. Those from all judges were published online. This online financial
disclosure for justices continued but in 2001 no system to verify the information had been
put in place, nor were there any official sanctions for false statements.
The United States’ goal is to help institutionalize judicial reform and good
governance in the future for the Dominican Republic. With U.S. support, the GODR
revised criminal procedures and began a change in the Dominican judicial system from
the Napoleonic inquisitorial system to an accusatory system more like the one used in the
United States where oral arguments are made before a judge and jury, rather than the
presentation of a set of evidence for review by a judge alone (INCSR, 2003). The GODR
began training in 2003 for the implementation of this newly revised criminal procedures
code (INCSR, 2004). The U.S. provided training to prosecutors and investigators with
the hope of creating professionalism and sufficient preparation for when the new criminal
procedures code became effective in 2004. How much time might truly be needed to
meet the demands of these changes remains to be seen and is part of the short-term
evaluations presented in the next chapter.
In 2005, the Dominican Attorney General pursued some anti-corruption cases,
and implemented competitive civil service recruitment of prosecutors. The latter is of
particular interest since these positions were previously political appointees. The USAID
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criminal justice and transparency program claimed results in the form of “faster case
processing, decreased pre-trial detention, availability of public defenders and prosecutors
24 hours per day, and positive change in the justice sector’s attitudes toward presumption
of innocence of the accused” (INCSR, 2006). USAID also assisted the Public
Prosecutors office with the development and implementation of policies and procedures
for evidence preservation, and asset seizure and maintenance.
It is too early to evaluate the results of this particular program completely. My
observations of the police conference in June 2007 are that some positive steps have been
taken, in addition to the number of young new police recruits graduating from training
academies. It is likely there are still remnants of the ‘old’ police culture that will take
time to be replaced by the ‘new’ one. The police institution still maintains many career
officers whose influence over the rank and file is just as strong as any new indoctrination
will be.
“Deaths as a result of police involved shootings have declined considerably due to
a new training curriculum for basic police training development and implementation in
2006” (INCSR, 2006). Details about this new training curriculum are not provided. At
the same time, new training goes along with efforts to eliminate impunity, and other
reforms to the institution as a whole. New training and teaching may eventually re-create
the institutional culture of the Dominican National Police as more and more new officers
come into the system. Whether there are any lasting effects will depend on how long
their training will hold up to the old practices and attitudes of seasoned officers.
The GODR made efforts to reduce the influence of the drug trade within the
judicial system through the removal from office of at least 24 judges during 2006 “for
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improperly handing out favorable sentences to known narcotics traffickers” (INCSR,
2007). But corruption and the influence of drugs were still a problem, especially as
“favoritism among the Dominican Republic’s law enforcement elite leads to frequent
changes in office among its command-level officers, retarding any progress made with
prior officials” (ibid.). The culture of the institution again appears stronger than its new
regulations.
During 2006, 100 newly hired prosecutors graduated from the National School of
Public Ministry. The United States FBI also taught basic Crime Scene Investigation to a
mere 30 National Police officers. The Law Enforcement Development Program,
implemented by NAS, restructured the National Police’s Internal Affairs by the end of
2006 and terminated approximately 60 police officers who tested positive for drug use
(INCSR, 2007). This may seem a simple and logical method but it is often these basic
procedures that have been neglected within an institution whose history has made it a tool
of a particular leader rather than one under civilian control with respect for the rule of
law.

Democracy and Public Opinion
This study is interested in the connection of drug traffic, drug use, and related
violence and enforcement concerns to the functioning of the democratic system. For the
last 30 years, the Dominican Republic has been a relatively stable democracy in spite of
its “institutional deficiencies and socioeconomic problems” (Morgan et al., 2006: ix).
But how well it functions and what the quality of that democracy is also depends on the
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population’s own sense of what democracy is or should be. This section delves into a
recent assessment of public opinion and evaluations of Dominican democracy.
The DEMOS survey data (compiled by the London-based think tank) used in the
2006 study by Morgan et al. is comparable across time, and the surveys, from 1994,
1997, 2001, and 2004, plus the authors’ own Latin American Public Opinion Project
(LAPOP) survey in 2006, make their results applicable to this dissertation. The DEMOS
survey of political culture is the only one that has been systematically carried out over
more than ten years that is available to researchers, and it is comparable to the LAPOP
study used by Morgan et al. (2006). These surveys were performed in a variety of Latin
American countries.
“In the last 15 years, the Dominican Republic went from being a country in
which very few public opinion surveys were conducted, to one in which surveys are
constantly being conducted” (Morgan et al., 2006: 10). Thanks to this new proliferation
of surveys, a number of which are analyzed in the next chapter, we can begin to see a
clearer picture of Dominican civic life. Survey data cited by Morgan et al. reveals that
“the Dominican people are attached to democracy as a political system, on the one hand,
and points to the problems ailing the system, on the other” (ix). Consistently from 1994
through 2006, most Dominicans think that corruption within the system is a serious or
very serious problem. Many believe it is widespread throughout the country, though it
tends to be more widespread in urban areas, especially Santo Domingo. The study claims
that in spite of this belief, people have limited first-hand experience with corruption, and
according to the LAPOP data, the Dominican Republic is among the five countries with
the fewest people victimized by corruption.
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In spite of the perception of corruption, among the countries surveyed Morgan et
al. (2006) “the Dominican Republic has the highest level of satisfaction with the efficacy
of the current administration” (xii). At the same time, the survey data has to be
understood in the socioeconomic context in which it was gathered. High support for and
the popularity of the Fernández administration in 2006, compared to the previous Mejía
administration, is in part the result of economic growth and low unemployment between
2004 and 2006 and after the banking crisis of 2003. Equitable distribution of this
economic growth continues to be a challenge, as are other things such as the “electric
energy problem, the giant stone in the government’s shoe” (ibid.: 8). Government
subsidies to energy are almost equal to the amounts spent on education and health care
combined.
The survey shows a positive perception of the economic situation in the
Dominican Republic during 2006, although criticism of government spending has risen
by 2008 as evidenced by numerous opinion pieces and articles published in the
Dominican press. Perceptions of personal finances were less positive. “Favorable
opinions regarding how well the economy is doing and the provision of services are very
important for the maintenance of institutional stability” (Morgan et al., 2006: 11). Police
and security can be seen as a part of this provision of services, as is the administration of
justice. Thus, the burden of the Dominican state to improve its institutions depends both
on the economic feasibility of providing services through these institutions and the
services themselves. In an environment where the institutions are seen as corrupt, and
where the economy is failing for many, the expectations held for the institutions and their
integrity can suffer.
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Most important for this dissertation is that the authors find positive attitudes
toward democracy survive even during periods of incredible disorder or heavy reforms.
The study claims that while one-third of the Dominican population could not define
democracy in any specific way, two-thirds still said democracy is preferable to any other
form of government. The public’s understanding of democracy is often different from
conventional meanings for the term in political theory, especially in the Latin American
context where democracies may entail political rights but few social protections (Morgan
et al., 2006). The LAPOP survey asked open-ended questions in order to capture these
various conceptions of democracy. The answers were then grouped in to four categories.
These are: Instrumental-utilitarian definitions with an emphasis on performance and
benefits, and the association of democracy with well-being, opportunity, and growth;
Normative-axiomatic definitions whose aspects are not tied to immediate and personal
benefit and are more abstract such as freedom and free elections; Negative definitions
which focus on the problems of democracy like disorder, crime, or corruption; and Empty
definitions, all of which lacked any specific meaning of democracy at all.
The most popular conception of democracy given by those surveyed in the
Dominican Republic falls into the Normative category, with 52% of the answers,
followed by the Empty category at 37%. Only 6% gave Instrumental/utilitarian answers,
and only 4% were Negative. This result might be considered surprising taking into
account the level of corruption within the country. One might expect to see more
Negative answers, but perhaps the relative youth of the democratic system explains the
higher number of Empty responses instead, as corruption within the system clearly predates democracy.
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More troubling is the fact that the most popular answer given to the question
“what does democracy mean to you?” was that it does not mean anything (33%). This
might simply be an indication of generalized apathy toward the political system, or a
reflection of the short length of time democracy in the Dominican Republic has had to
provide any kind of benefit to most of its citizens, the older generations in particular.
These numbers might also run parallel to the Newlink surveys covered in the next chapter
where high levels of respondents did not give answers at all or said they do not know.
The survey shows a positive correlation between wealth and normative
conceptions of democracy, and a negative correlation between wealth and empty
conceptions. The same tendencies hold for education and age, though to a lesser degree
after age 45. In other words, the younger, poorer, and less educated a person, the more
likely they are to disregard democratic norms. We might extend this to respect for the
rule of law, including rights of criminals on one hand, or even perhaps a willingness to be
involved in drug traffic and criminal activity on the other.
Morgan et al. (2006) propose a possible link between legitimacy and tolerance in
the system, and the prevailing concept of democracy in a given society. They argue that
“it can be assumed that if political legitimacy and tolerance do not have a normative
basis, then attitudes might be very fragile and ephemeral, especially in the face of the
economic and political difficulties of democratic systems” (25). At the same time, the
study suggests that since the majority has normative or no specific conceptions of
democracy, versus negative or instrumental, this is a reason democracy has been
maintained despite economic and institutional problems. Whether we accept the time
frame used by Morgan et al. of three decades of democracy or Hartlyn’s for only the last
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12 years, the expectation of tangible benefits within an institutional/utilitarian conception
is not there and thus the public is not as readily disappointed by the system, nor is there a
significant proportion of the population expecting the most from it but seeing the worst in
it.
On the normative conception, the Dominican Republic ranks lower when
compared to other parts of Latin America, but the authors suggest that:
The problem is that so many people do not know what democracy means. This
suggests that greater civic education is needed for the public to develop a
concrete idea of what democracy is, to identify when it exists or when it does
not, and to be able to support it with knowledge and conscience (Morgan et al.,
2006: 33).
In other words, the people who support extra-legal measures for dealing with criminals
(see next chapter) likely do not have a real conception of democracy nor an
understanding of their basic rights in the first place.
The Dominican Republic shows one of the highest levels of political tolerance
and highest levels of support for the system, which are both necessary for stability. “The
level of political and social tolerance is a good indicator of the level of the public’s
normative commitment to democracy” (Morgan et al., 2006: 35). These authors measure
the acceptance of the rights of people who constantly criticize or disagree with the
government. We could extend that to acceptance of the rights of people who are
suspected of crimes and argue that normative democratic values also include the rights of
the accused.
Morgan et al. suggest that public opinion is not the most reliable nor sole
indicator of future stability, pointing out other factors that also have an influence, such as
elites and the international context. In this case the international context of the drug war
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could be a de-stabilizing factor. According to the authors, the Dominican Republic has
not had a crisis of stability since 1978, but U.S. policy would have us believe that the
international drug trade is a serious threat to democracy in the country and elsewhere.
The third wave of democratization roughly coincides with the growth of the international
cocaine trade, and yet the governments of both Colombia and the Dominican Republic
have survived so far. Survival of the state, though, does not necessarily mean security for
all within it. In the next chapter we will look at the ways the Dominican Republic has
attempted to improve security, public perceptions of security, and the influence of
organized crime, corruption, and reform efforts on democracy and civil society.

Conclusions
The road to democracy in the Dominican Republic has been a long one, and
recent literature and surveys suggest that a certain apathy toward democracy exists, as
well as a resignation toward or even a preference for authoritarian rule. An intervening
variable – quite literally – is the U.S. presence and influence over drug policies and the
institutions charged with their implementation, which takes away from the GODR as the
proper authority, by just war theory, in declaring or engaging in the war on drugs. The
increases in crime and continuing drug traffic provide a just cause for continued drug
control efforts of some kind, though whether the money one country can put toward these
efforts is in proportion to the size of the problem is questionable and further raises doubts
about the probability of success in the war on drugs. Last, drug control is necessary
considering the levels of violence and crime, but structural efforts to improve economic
opportunities and quality of life for Dominican citizens may be equally necessary. What
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is not clear is whether stronger policies that come at a cost to already weak or vulnerable
institutions are an absolute necessity.
The newness of democracy in the country makes conditions within the Dominican
Republic somewhat favorable for its preservation in spite of the surge in crime and
violence. The lack of specific expectations perhaps means a lower likelihood of
destabilization. But again, apathy, a scarcity of concern for and awareness of citizen
rights, and the number of people without a definition for democracy may allow
corruption to continue at the top level or where power is concentrated within the system.
Efforts to strengthen the existing structure may be good for reducing traffic to the U.S.
but not necessarily for the health of the system overall in the Dominican Republic. This
kind of harm to democracy should not be considered justice in the war on drugs.
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VI. The Dominican Case on the Ground
The co-operative efforts of the USG and GODR only address part of the drug
traffic problem, and do so primarily at the international level. As drugs transiting the
Dominican Republic have increased, so has awareness of the limited capacity of domestic
institutions to confront them. The late development of drug enforcement policies in the
country suggests the lack of a domestic drug consumption problem and market until
recently. Some have argued that drug consumption has been seen as a foreign issue by
Dominicans, primarily a U.S or European problem. Increasing demand elsewhere has
created more traffic through the Caribbean, which then gave rise to domestic
consumption and increased violence caused by addicts and dealers alike. Efforts to
control this new local demand have only come about in recent years but have also
uncovered the need to address the deficiencies of the institutions charged with
preventing, controlling, and prosecuting crimes and the fact that they themselves are not
immune from the influence of drugs. The central pillar of these efforts is the Plan de
Seguridad Democrática and its police reform program Barrio Seguro. This chapter looks
at recent research intended to evaluate and assess the results of these programs thus far on
levels of drug crime and citizen security. By doing so we may again see how the war on
drugs is affecting democracy, and whether the effects fulfill the requirements of a just
war.

--About the Plan de Seguridad Democrática and Barrio Seguro-The Plan de Seguridad Democrática (PSD) was written in 2004. By that year,
insecurity had become one of the most pressing concerns for citizens of the Dominican
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Republic (Newlink, June 2008). The PN had become deprestigiada – the police had little
credibility, a very poor reputation, and the public had little confidence in the institution.
At the same time, the prison system was on the verge of collapse, and jails had essentially
been converted into universities of crime (ibid.). This situation in many ways was the
result of extreme poverty in some sectors, as well as other social, cultural, and political
factors, as previously discussed.
The solution to these problems was the PSD, with the central working concept of
addressing the multiple causes of crime by bringing the presence of the state back to all
parts of the national territory. The two fundamental principles within the PSD are to
reestablish state authority through police reform, and to guarantee the basic rights of all
citizens. PSD programs were first begun in February of 2005 and represented the first
integrated effort to design and implement a policy of citizen security in the Dominican
Republic (Newlink, June 2008). The pilot program of Barrio Seguro (Safe
Neighborhood) began in August 2005 in the Capotillo section of Santo Domingo. This
program was then extended to other areas in the capital as well as to the northern city of
Santiago. The basic principle behind the program is to recuperate the public space
through the coordinated efforts of various state institutions while creating an increased
police presence in the neighborhoods.
As laid out in a government evaluation of the PSD (2006), the premise of the plan
is to make fighting violence and crime a priority of the state, as growth, equity, and
equality of opportunity are not possible without democratic security. The PSD
recognizes that violence and crime have multiple causes that must be addressed in an
integral manner. The participation of the community, the institutions of the state, and
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civil society constitute a central axis of the plan. The multi-pronged approach means
attention has been given to improving education and health, the creation of local public
offices and victim centers, as well as sports and cultural programs.
The PSD contains provisions for improving the criminal police within the
country. Efforts toward institutional strengthening include the creation of a
communitarian police force trained by the PN and the armed forces (PGR, 2005). This
training was to include a strategy of communication in an effort to improve the negative
perceptions the general public has of the police overall. The plan’s dual goal is to
confront crime while preserving democracy.
One problem in creating such a plan was a lack of accurate information about the
extent of crime in the country (PGR, 2005). The complexity of crime in the Dominican
Republic, as anywhere, lies in the multiplicity of areas in which crimes occur and the
number of actors involved. The PSD speaks about the importance of community
involvement in fighting crime, as well as the decentralization of efforts. Both of these
can be a challenge, especially where the community itself is run by criminal
organizations or people have little sense of civic engagement or duty.
Upon his election to a second term in 2004, President Fernández came back into
office in the middle of a period of very high citizen insecurity. Daily accounts in the
press documented the level of crime in the country. The number of homicides more than
doubled between 1996 and 2005, rising from 1,032 to 2,236, with the largest escalations
beginning in 2002 (Informe, June 2007). Worse was the impunity the perpetrators of
these crimes appeared to have, and the lack of a coherent and viable plan for the police
and judicial authorities to confront crime.
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After 6 p.m. most people just wanted to go home; home had become a refuge and
the level of crime made the population antisocial. This tendency to return home and stay
there meant little sense of community and low levels of civil society development.
During this same time period, citizens had lost the ability to enjoy public spaces; the
parks were dangerous and every street corner was a drug post. Gangs were more likely to
be in charge of the neighborhoods than were the police. The woman I stayed with during
my trip to Santo Domingo in June of 2007 told me the same. Members of the household
rarely went out after sundown. According to the police report, all of this affected the
normal operation of society by altering recreation and social activities as well as
commercial operations.
The PSD was put forth as the remedy and recognition that Dominican society
could not continue in this manner. The plan was to make a diagnosis of the underlying
problems, formulate a strategy, and execute a plan to carry out the strategy, with the
ultimate goal of returning peace and tranquility to the Dominican family. The first step
was to identify the areas within Santo Domingo and Santiago most affected by crime.
These were Capotillo, Gualey, 24 de Abril, y Villas Agricolas in Santo Domingo; and La
Joya, La Otra Banda, La Yaquita del Pastor, and Cienfuegos in Santiago. Most of these
same neighborhoods appear in the studies done by Newlink discussed below.
The diagnostic process found that people thought the police were corrupt and
citizens would rather take matters into their own hands. At the same time, police felt the
people were colluding with the criminals. Fear was high – no one dared challenge the
criminal organizations which had taken over community space. Neighborhoods had
become battlegrounds and innocents caught in the middle had been injured or killed.
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Police capacity to deal with the problem was low because of few resources and high
corruption, as well as inconsistent police work, erratic and coercive practices, or a
complete lack of action at all.
The plan formulated between August 2004 and August 2005 became known as
Barrio Seguro, which was then put into practice beginning in August 2005 under the
direction of Major General Bernardo Santana Paez. The plan was guided by the idea that
the most important charge of the government is to fight crime without compromising
human rights: “El más grande de los retos de este gobierno fue enfrentar la
delinquencia, sin que se produjera una degradación del disfrute de los derechos
humanos” (Informe, June 2007: 4). The following sections will explore how well the
government and these programs have been able to live up to that standard.

Internal Evaluations of the PSD
The police’s own evaluation of their efforts can be divined from some internal
reports on the implementation of the Barrio Seguro program. In one such evaluation, the
Barrio Seguro program is called the most important reform process for the police
institution in 70 years (Informe, June 2007). The report claims that never before had the
police been credited with such levels of respect, support, and consideration by the
citizens. The plan has created a new alliance between the police and the community, and
for the first time, neighborhood and community leadership joined forces with the police
to confront criminal activity. The public perception of the police changed; they were no
longer seen as the old repressive force but a model institution of public order. These
assertions sound good but there is little hard data presented in the report from which this
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conclusion was drawn. The only explanation offered for how such a change of opinion
could come about so quickly is simply the success of the Barrio Seguro program.
Barrio Seguro contains six main areas of action, each with short, medium, and
long range goals. These areas are: to create an efficient preventive police force, to
deepen academic reforms for police training, to develop and implement a modern system
of criminal investigation, to bring the PN closer to civil society through community
police, to design and organize management of the police force so that each area is
administered and equipped to fulfill its functions, and to develop an effective internal
affairs division.
In the first area of action, the number of patrol officers was increased from about
800-1000 to approximately 9000-11,000 backed by the military (Informe, June 2007).
Where all these new officers came from is not specified, nor is there any mention of what
training they received. According to the report, this increase in officers resulted in a
decrease in crime. Barrio Seguro has allowed the police to achieve in a few months what
they were not able to do in the previous 70 years. The report again claims that there has
been a positive change in police action throughout the neighborhoods, which corresponds
to an improved image of the police in the public’s perception. Again, there is no specific
data presented to corroborate this assessment.
In the second area, “it is not possible to bring about real change in the police
institution without a profound change in the mentality of its members” (Informe, June
2007: 13). In order to bring about real change in the police institution, it is necessary to
change its members’ ideas about their mission and function as officers of the law. This
change was to come about through new information, technology, and education for police
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personnel. The report provides a long list of training opportunities offered by the PN and
other institutions outside the country, including with the Miami, New York, and
Colombian police forces. Some of these opportunities were made available to both police
personnel and community leaders. What is not clear is whether these trainings were
mandatory or if the participants who attended trainings were high level officers, the rank
and file, or both. Considering the idea that institutional culture is strong and difficult to
change, it might be prudent to know which members attended. Clearly, new recruits can
be trained in the new attitude and yet have to confront the old ways in their daily work.
To address the third area, in addition to training, police need the right equipment
and techniques or technical supplies in order to apply their new knowledge on the job.
Development and implementation of a modern criminal investigation system is part of
that. The report indicates that the Dominican police need a system that is “adequate for
the realities of Dominican democracy” (Informe, June 2007: 41). This is recognition that
democratic practices are developing and all institutions need to progress in that same
direction.
The new system of justice requires new kinds of evidence, procedures, protocol,
and of course more training and equipment. In March 2006 the United States donated
eight kits for the recovery of fingerprints. In mid-2007, the police were about to open
several new offices and labs. The system also needed a well-formed police force and an
“investigator with a very different profile from the one we have traditionally known”
(Informe, June 2007: 41). This is an apt observation again considering the entrenchment
of the old ways of doing things through patronage and favors. At the same time,
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according to the numbers in the report, the new procedures have also resulted in more
cases solved.
In the area of intelligence, the report notes an increased capacity for electronic
“servicios de vigilancia” (surveillance), but “always within the letter of the law and
respect for the rights of citizens” (Informe, June 2007: 46). In other words, the police
have found better ways to obtain information and keep track of suspected criminal
activities but without any arbitrary spying on the citizens. This appears to be in keeping
with the spirit and letter of individual rights as written in the Dominican constitution and
discussed in the preceding chapter.
In addressing the fourth area, the report says Barrio Seguro is an opportunity to
bring the police closer to the community. The negative history of the institution is still
alive in the minds of the people, and is a major reason for creating a community-centered
police force. The report sites numbers showing decreases in crime, deaths in particular,
in all neighborhoods except La Cienaga (though the numbers there do not show any
increase either) as a result of community police. The future of the plan was to extend it
to another 21 neighborhoods, some if which has already been done at the time of writing.
Working toward the goal of organized and efficient management of police
administration involves making sure each area has what is needed to fulfill its duties, but
most important is regulating the contracting of goods and services within the institution
to ensure fairness and oversight. The report indicates that the police were working to
create an ethics committee to help promote the prevention of corruption. The
administration had already reached an agreement with a major bank, Banco de Reservas,
to pay police employees directly and electronically. This was meant to eliminate the
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practice of intermediaries whereby disbursement was controlled by employees’ superiors
or other private companies and could be used as leverage. The implementation of
something as simple as payroll direct deposit was hoped to reduce a significant amount of
intra-institutional corruption and influence over subordinates, thereby eliminating
personal patronage and enhancing professionalism and fulfillment of the institution’s new
mission.
Finally, to address the sixth area of focus, the police acquired a new location with
14 offices for the administration of Internal Affairs (IA). Complaints or accusations
could then be made away from central police locations and are therefore more discreet
and secure. The department was increased to 159 members, and during the first three
months of operation at its new location (through April 2006), IA conducted 1,863 drug
tests on members of the police force, of which 98% came back negative (Informe, June
2007). Of the 30 cases that were positive, 25 were for cocaine and two were for cocaine
and marijuana. All of these officers were relieved of their posts. By September of 2006,
a total of 3,884 drug tests had been administered, of which 88 or 2.2% were positive
(ibid.). The report indicates that all of these cases came from within the lower ranks of
the institution. What it does not indicate is whether upper-level employees were also
tested.
At the time of the report, internal affairs had created a plan of action against
corruption which was to be implemented during 2007 and included lectures and talks,
6,000 drug tests, depurar or the purging of as many as 6,000 officers 4 , formal publication
4

For example, DR1 Daily News reported on June 22, 2007 that a major, a captain and two low level
officers in the National Police were dishonorably discharged from their duties for being part of a
contraband ring and sent to justice. Police Chief Bernardo Santana Paez said that there is no place for
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of the rules of the institution, and the adjustment of salaries based on function and quality
of performance, among others. It is striking and somewhat shocking to think that the
formal publication of the rules is something that was new and still in need of
implementation at that stage, and yet it is also not surprising when one considers the
history and nature of the institution and its role as an extension of the executive for so
many years.
As part of the evaluation of the results of these efforts, the PSD is hailed as the
most profound process of transformation the police institution has “suffered” through
since its formation in 1936 (Informe, June 2007: 63). The report asserts that the plan has
proven to be functional and is “the most suitable instrument for modernizing the
institution and for fighting crime in the country through scientific methods” (ibid.). Even
so, the report recognizes the need to develop an aggressive campaign to reach the citizens
and to continue improving the police image, their salaries, and quality of life. There is
still work to be done to fulfill the need to change the vision, mission, and values of the
institution overall.
A number of questions are raised by the information contained in this report. The
brief time period covered by the data presented leads one to ask whether the reductions in
crime are a direct result of the Barrio Seguro program or can even be considered an
indication of any trend at all. Other factors that may have influenced rates of crime for
the time period are not addressed. The report also offers no specific explanation for why

corrupt cops in the Dominican police force. The chief said that proof of the efforts to purge the police is
that in the past these events would have been kept private and would not have made headline news. On
July 25, 2008 DR1 Daily News reported that in the previous 23 months the DNCD had fired more than
5,000 agents found to be involved with drugs, and on August 29, 2008 reported that 947 police officers had
been removed from their duties over the past year.
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there was an increase in homicides in the years immediately before the program began –
nor does it address whether or not any of them are directly attributable to police action or
misconduct. Last, there is no mention whatsoever of bribes within the section discussing
internal affairs. Drug use and domestic violence by police personnel are certainly
important issues but they are not the only possible areas for investigation. One wonders
again if upper-level officers are as highly scrutinized as the individuals at lower levels.
For further insight into the police, I attended a meeting of the chiefs of the
National Police in Juan Dolio, Dominican Republic on June 26, 2007. They had gathered
for a day-long conference to discuss and strategically evaluate various initiatives within
the institution as a part of the PSD. At the time, General Bernardo Santana Paez was the
head of the organization and he gave the opening presentation. He began by saying that
authorities had not been able to count on a coherent contingency plan. From 1996
through 2007 the number of homicides in the capital steadily increased, though he noted
that the number of homicides dropped from 2005 to 2006 specifically. 5 During the
previous ten years the city experienced a loss of communal space, especially after 6 p.m.,
and there had been a change in commerce, nighttime activity, and recreation.
Paez called for the reestablishment of the authority of the state in order to
guarantee basic citizen rights for all, and this meant developing an effective preventive
police force. He did not say how this would be possible, but noted that the recent

5

Coronel Brown Perez presented at a later conference data from January 2005 to August 2007 that was
collected in one section of the capital city. The area is in the northeast section, bounded by the Rio Isabela,
Rio Ozama, and the Avenues Gomez, 27 de Febrero, Kennedy, and San Martin. This area is known for
being poor and prone to crimes, and is divided into 14 supervisarias, 11 of which were within the Barrio
Seguro program. He found that the number of violent deaths dropped 20% from 2005 to 2006 and 24%
from 2005 to 2007 (59 to 47 to 45).
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decrease in the homicide rate was evidence of some success already within the program.
He also noted a certain typology of homicides in the city, in particular “muertes en
acciones legales” or people killed by police officers in the course of carrying out their
duties. Citing a report published in collaboration with the World Bank and Amnesty
International, and the U.S. State Department Report on Human Rights in the Dominican
Republic March 2007, Paez claimed that the number of people killed by the police had
dropped, while transparency within the police institution increased and internal affairs
had improved. Historically, there have been times when the number of people killed by
the police was huge; therefore, it is significant to have the number drop, especially as a
result of legal police action. The question is whether or not the increase and decrease in
deaths was a direct result of police work or something else. Paez concluded that the
program has been a success and will continue to be, and he found much reason for
optimism.
At the same conference, General Daisy Liriano – the only female chief in the
organization – spoke about her work in IA. She reminded the audience that there is a
question of institutional capacity to be addressed, especially for continued success in the
future, including the organization’s ability to track people and follow leads. The police
needed access to technology such as fingerprinting or listening devices that were not
being used or were not allowed by law. A number of these are things discussed within
the INCSR as having been planned or implemented, though perhaps not on the domestic
level or independently of U.S. operations. Efforts made within the DNCD, for example,
may not have an immediate effect on police work, and it is interesting to note that there is
no separate drug unit within the PN’s structure.

152

I sat with General Santana Paez during lunch at the conference and he offered
additional comments on the PN as an institution. The PN does not have the manpower to
control drugs in the country, especially in the rural areas. There are not enough police
officers, and so the danger of the police being outnumbered by members of the local drug
syndicates is ever-present. Their corrupting power over both the civilian population and
the police and government institutions is also a constant threat.
The police and the military each have a different raison d’etre, and separate
spheres of power and responsibility. This is true in theory if not always in practice,
especially in the Dominican Republic where the police have been more of a military-like
body under the control of the president or others. They have been historically more apt to
imprison and destroy than to serve and protect. An illustrative comment Paez made was
that he believes the term ‘chief’ of police is less intimidating in its English translation
than is the term ‘jefe’ in Dominican perception. In the historical context of civil-military
relations in the country, a police boss is indeed a more powerful and intimidating figure
than a local police chief in the U.S. context. Others at the table mentioned the efforts
being made to improve and create a professional police force, including training and
cultivating the next generation of police officers as civil servants rather than as part of a
political or militaristic body. Some felt this kind of transformation was the key to
improving relations with the public and perceptions of the institution.
It was exciting and interesting to sit and listen to the conversation amongst the top
police official and his consultants, all the while surrounded by men in earpieces. It was
also informative to attend the conference and see the top officers looking bored,
answering their phones, and talking or surfing the internet during the others’
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presentations. What might have appeared as a lack of discipline or professionalism can
also be seen as a reminder of the humanity of these officers. Indeed, there was overall a
sense of great ideas and vision for the police as an institution with much potential.
Additional presentations during the afternoon session discussed the importance of
perceptions of law enforcement institutions among the population. The supposedly
improved public opinion of the jefe has not yet translated into an improved opinion of the
institution as a whole. By the police’s own statistics, crime rates may have gone down in
the country, but the perception among the people that crime is rampant and not welladdressed by the police continues. It is difficult to find concrete solutions to the various
problems with reform and reform plans, and the ways those plans are received both
internally and externally. There is also the question of the role of the press in creating
perceptions of crime and police: How can all the entities that help form public opinion
nationally and internationally be influenced and communicated with effectively? The
problem the police have is making sure their work is accurately represented. Public
opinion, and that of external governments, affects how programs are funded and how
they function in practice.
In a 2007 report by Major General Vinicio A. Hernández of the Internal Affairs
division, several of the department’s goals and activities were evaluated. The goals were
to establish methods of preventing police misconduct, to help the population learn about
the function and services performed by IA, to make quick and effective response to
investigations, to make intelligence work more efficient, to broaden the coverage of
services, to improve capacity among IA members, to reorganize internally, to increase
motivation among IA members, to improve administrative and budgetary control, and to
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make operations more efficient. All of this was to be done by IA and the PN, along with
other national and international organizations and civil and community organizations.
Internally, the plan was to provide training for personnel in domestic and international
programs. Externally, information would be provided to the community through
newsletters, meetings, and talks with the PN at various places such as training centers and
through central and regional units.
In 2006, 14,292 people were the beneficiaries or participants in these programs.
At the time of reporting in the fall of 2007, another 12,976 people had participated. The
number of internal investigations dropped from 773 in 2006 to 364 in the first eight
months of 2007. Intelligence indicated that in 2006, nine percent or 35 of these cases
were of police involved with drugs. In 2007 the number of cases was 13, or 11%. The
police implemented drug testing of its personnel during this period. In 2006, only two
percent of the 4,168 officers tested were positive. In 2007, of 3,259 individuals tested,
only one percent came back positive.
In 2006, 166 officers attended training courses, and another 345 attended in 2007.
The report offered several pictures of public meetings and talks with police, as well as of
newly purchased equipment, but no other data about them. The positive aspect of the
programs came from the lessons learned: Education and information is important for
members of the police in order to prevent misconduct, continuity of planned actions is
necessary to keep services operating well, and more personnel need to be integrated into
the planning and execution of activities. The obstacles, of course, are resources and
money to keep programs going and the need for better technology to carry out the process
of investigation and intelligence.
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The community has helped by inviting officers to speak and by reporting cases of
misconduct. The report also notes that the police are gaining the support of the public as
evidenced by the number of cases brought to their attention and the closer relationships
the police have with civil society institutions. Not surprisingly, the report’s final
conclusion is that the program needs to be maintained and given all the money and
resources that have been requested.
According to an internal government evaluation of the PSD (2006), the results of
Barrio Seguro have been optimal and progressive, but some state and civil institutions
have proven to be deficient at carrying out their own plans of action to confront the
multiple causes of violence and crime. While some results have been achieved, the
conditions have not necessarily changed. A lack of ability or capacity within the PN
makes expansion of the program to other areas difficult. The PN has worked with police
academies in New York City and in Colombia, as well as with programs at John Jay
College in New York and officials from the Miami police department to train program
leaders. An additional 106 participants were set to begin their training in July
immediately after this report was released.
Efforts to address structural issues are less well-covered by the various official
reports under consideration here. There is some mention of school programs in the form
of science and technology scholarships and reading programs, as well as health programs
overseen by the first lady and food rationing programs as a part of the general PSD.
Twelve homes, one in each of the neighborhoods where Barrio Seguro operated, were
built for the poorest families as selected by community organizers. Sports activities
organized, efforts to reduce power outages, distribution of clothing and medicines, and of
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the computers to be installed in some community centers are also mentioned briefly.
While all are important aspects of the PSD and speak to its “multi-causal” approach, the
information given is vague, with few numbers or specifics about where and how they are
being implemented or will be sustained. Last, the report shows a list of 21 different
organizations and institutions that are involved with the PSD, but there is little other
specific information about their involvement. This last point reflects the major criticism
voiced by several evaluations of the program (discussed further below) about the lack of
follow-through by many of the institutions involved with PSD and the lack of interest in
the plan’s goals among the individuals working within these institutions.

Press Evaluations of the Drug Predicament
During the last week of June, 2007, the Dominican newspaper Diario Libre
published an editorial stating “Este país se jodió” (this country is screwed) because
democracy is not truly representative and money is not spent where it should be. The
writer’s sentiment is similar to the general pessimism about the state of affairs in the
government that I noticed among many of the Dominican people I have met. It made me
wonder if there could be much hope of creating any optimism among the citizenry and
the kind of community involvement in police, government, and civil affairs that the PSD
envisions.
An article published on June 30, 2007 discussed the new police graduates
becoming community patrol officers. More than 500 new patrol officers joined over
2000 already in Santo Domingo. Paez called upon them to respect human life and rights,
saying that this is a new era – old practices had reduced citizen confidence and now was a
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chance to move forward. The new program sought education and professionalization of
the police, especially for the young student recruits. In contrast to the optimism of these
words, the paper also noted that the salary for patrol officers is $3000RD per month, plus
food and health care for family members. The reality is that this is a small amount to live
on, roughly $85 U.S. and hardly enough to pay for a home.
The July 4, 2007 edition of Diario Libre contained coverage of the major protests
west of the city of Santo Domingo that shut down the main roadway. People in the
protests had been living without running water since my arrival in the country ten days
earlier. General Paez was quoted in that day’s paper saying that the National Police were
there to preserve order. Their job was to protect the citizens in these situations, not to kill
anyone. I find it interesting and informative that this was something that needed to be
pointed out. An article like this one highlights both the problems of infrastructure and
basic services in the Dominican Republic as well as the recognition that the repressive
tendencies of the police continue. Articles like this illustrate the context in which drugs
and drug money can easily penetrate society through both corrupt institutions and needy
individuals.
Another paper in Santo Domingo, Clavo, is a free weekly featuring mostly
opinion pieces. One article published on July 5, 2007 addressed another topic that had
been in the papers that same week: the GODR’s proposed purchase of eight airplanes
called tucanos from Brazil for the purpose of anti-drug air patrols. The author felt that
the money spent on these planes was a waste and would be better spent on water,
education, and other pressing needs for the people of the country. A familiar complaint
in many countries, including the United States, where more money is spent on defense
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measures than on social programs, it also shows how everything eventually comes back
to drugs: the logic behind such a major purchase, the training of new police recruits, and
the reorganization of neighborhood patrols is to fight drugs.
The tucanos airplanes have been a frequent topic in Dominican newspapers. A
number of people have felt a certain amount of incredulity about how the administration
has the money to buy them, or why the money was not going to be spent elsewhere on
other basic services the population needs. 6 I would argue that this purchase is led by
international cues and fits with the models and methods being used elsewhere in the
international drug war. This purchase looks like fulfillment of international obligations
to stop north-bound drug traffic from South America. It is likely to impress authorities in
the United States and elsewhere abroad and appears a more direct approach to drug traffic
than efforts to change the underlying structural problems within the Dominican Republic
– even if those same structural issues contribute to the problem in the first place.
In the November 18, 2008 edition of Listin Diario, Senator Wilton Guerrero
criticized the proposed purchase of the tucanos. By this time both the Senate and the
Chamber of Deputies had approved a $93.6 million loan from the U.S (see DR1 Daily
News September 17, 2008; DR1 Daily News November 12, 2008). Guerrero argued that
the planes are just as likely to be used to bring more drugs into the country as they are to
stop them. He claimed that military boats are already involved in the drug trade and that
6

As reported in DR1 Daily News June 19, 2007 President Leonel Fernandez announced the purchase of
nine Super Tucano airplanes from Brazil. The US$45 million deal was to be financed by the Brazilian
National Economic Development Bank (BNDES). The planes are intended for use in the fight against drug
trafficking operations using the Dominican Republic as a transshipment point to the United States. The
airplanes would be paid from a new 12-year scheme funded by US$1 levied on tourists visiting the
Dominican Republic. DR1 noted in the November 16, 2007 edition that controversy continued to surround
the purchase of these planes as many feel they are too expensive, out of date, and unsuited for combating
the drug trade.
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there is a lack of oversight and a clear idea of who is responsible at the top, which makes
it possible for any corrupt senior official to appropriate government equipment for illicit
use. The debate over the funding for these planes was taking place against the backdrop
of the recent and not insignificant corruption scandal in the Peravia province. In August
2008, seven suspected drug dealers were killed in Paya, just outside of Baní, a town about
65 kilometers from Santo Domingo (Listin Diario, August 5, 2008).
After news of the massacre broke it was not long before the complicity of the
authorities in the case was called into question (DR1 Daily News, August 7, 2008).
Senator Guerrero noted that for years in Peravia the PN, DNCD, and state prosecutors
had aided in the growth of the drug trade and had profited from it. Eye-witness accounts
claimed drug enforcement authorities were involved in the murders. While no arrests
were made immediately, all officials in the Paya Police Department were replaced (Hoy,
August 8, 2008). The DNCD fired back at Guerrero claiming his accusations were
irresponsible; meanwhile, President Fernández established a commission to investigate
the allegations (Listin Diario, August 8, 2008).
One month later, Senator Guerrero was in the news again criticizing the
commission’s work and calling it a comedy (El Diario Nuevo, September 3, 2008). By
mid-September, the PN announced that 13 men would be charged. Unfortunately, this
announcement did not boost confidence in the police work being done to bring those
responsible to justice, or to pursue official complicity in the case:
In an editorial in Diario Libre, Homero Figueroa says that the police report and
accusations are surprising, not for the 13 names that are on the list of accused,
but for the ones that are omitted. ‘The report on the Paya case provides details
about the men who carried out the murders, but it says nothing about the
mastermind moving the pieces,’ he writes. ‘The body of the criminal is
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headless,’ he comments. ‘The Dominican public was expecting a report that
would disclose the denounced complicity entanglements. The country will be
shocked, the Police had said. The shock did occur, without doubt, but because
of what was not said, more than for what was said. The capture of the workers,
leaving the boss free, only paralyzes the criminal factory momentarily. But the
abundant criminal labor force will put it back into production,’ he concludes
(DR1 Daily News, September 18, 2008).
The newspaper Hoy echoed this sentiment a few days later:
Many Dominicans continue to find it strange that the investigators, especially
from the National Drug Control Department, have not been able to locate the
drugs and money that was up for grabs on the night of the massacre of seven
suspected drug dealers in Paya, Baní. As has been said, it is known who was
there, who was waiting for the shipment that came by sea, who participated in
the murder, the vehicles that were used, etc. Then how is it possible that the
authorities remain silent about the whereabouts of the drug shipment or the
money? Or could it be that they do not want to reveal what was found out in the
investigation to the general public? (September 22, 2008).
Throughout October and the following months, Senator Guerrero continued to argue that
the Presidential commission on the crime had not gotten to the bottom of the case, though
the police did name a Navy officer as the operational chief behind the murders (Listin
Diario, October 15 and 20, 2008). Senator Guerrero continued to question why the
authorities still had yet to disclose what had happened to either the drugs or the money
that was recovered the day the investigation began (Listin Diario, November 18, 2008).
In the same day’s paper, another official commented that the Baní incident has had a
positive effect as well. It has drawn attention, especially from the United States, to the
true depth and severity of the problem – both of drug traffic and official complicity in it –
within the Dominican Republic. It was not until the next day that the President made an
official statement about the incident:
Issuing his first comments in response to the massacre of seven suspected drug
traffickers in Paya, Baní in August, and other cases involving Navy officers and
their affiliation to international drug rings, President Leonel Fernández
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described the scandal as shameful, as reported in Hoy. Critics had found it odd
that the President has failed to issue any public statements about the cases of
corruption and drug involvement by top-ranking military officials that threatens
the DR's national security and stability. Nonetheless, Fernández said that he was
sure that the Navy was still in a position to redeem its image (DR1 Daily News,
November 19, 2008).
The ongoing dialogue in the press reveals public frustrations with the government
and police reforms, as well as the difficulty of finding solutions to both drug crime and
official corruption. It is clear from these accounts that the positive achievements the
police have found for themselves in Santo Domingo have not yet extended elsewhere in
the country. At the same time, the ability of the press and the public to express opposing
points of view on these and other topics is one important piece of a free democratic
society though this freedom may only be enjoyed by certain sectors of the society. As we
shall see later, resistance that is easily expressed by elected officials or academics and
written about in the papers is not necessarily mirrored by all people in all neighborhoods.

Independent Evaluations of the PSD
In this section, I look at surveys conducted with police personnel and the general
population in the Dominican Republic and published between 2006 and 2008 that
evaluate the state of citizen security and the effects of government reform programs.
While this represents only a brief period of time, the surveys provide a picture of the
levels of citizen confidence in government institutions and some preliminary results of
the new programs, as well as their potential for the future. The data are comparable
across time and offer contrasting points of view when assessed alongside the official
reports discussed earlier.
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A number of private or independent organizations have conducted studies
evaluating the effect of the PSD and Barrio Seguro on citizen perceptions of security.
The studies show that some effort has been made to reduce criminal activities, improve
police work, and create positive relationships between the police and the public. At the
same time, the interpretation of the data can be subjective, reflecting both pessimism and
optimism about the achievements of the programs and their future potential (interview
with Bielka Polanco, 2008).

-- Police -In a study carried out by Newlink Political published in 2007, 1031 police
personnel from all over the Dominican Republic were interviewed during October 2006
about communications within the institution. Fifty-four percent of police personnel said
they do not receive any information or internal communications. Of those who do, only
38% said they received this information on a daily basis. When asked about the kinds of
information received, the most popular answers were information about work and
obligations, orders or instructions, general information about the institution, and
standards or lessons for improving work. Among the least popular answers was
information about how to treat citizens and police discipline.
Internal communications are most frequently made in person or by phone. Fewer
respondents mentioned written methods such as memos, bulletins, email, or written
orders. The majority, 69% of those surveyed, said they stay informed through their direct
supervisors and feel satisfied with that arrangement. These numbers show little variation
across regions one through four (Distrito Nacional, Santo Domingo, Northwest, and
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Northeast), with length of service, or rank, although in the South only 52% said they are
satisfied, while in the East 100% said they are satisfied. It is possible that in spite of the
anonymity of the study, police officers interviewed in the eastern region, which includes
known drug-trafficking towns like San Pedro de Macoris, were less likely to speak
against the institution.
When asked how much they know about the police as an institution, 38% said
they know it well (49% of those on the force 10 years or longer), 39% said they have a
general idea (50% of those with the highest rank chose this option), and 22% said they
know very little, with 50% of those with less than one year on the force choosing this
option. Only one percent of all respondents said they knew nothing at all. Some lack of
awareness on the part of police officers about the institution’s history could be considered
problematic as that may mean less appreciation for the current goals associated with
reforming the institution. Interestingly enough, when asked what kinds of information
they would like to receive, the most popular answers given were information about police
reform (27%) and opportunities for promotion (17%).
In another study conducted by Newlink Political also published in 2007, police
personnel were interviewed about their work practices. For location of work, or where
they do the bulk of their service on the force, 39% said in the police stations, the most
popular answer. Only one percent each said investigations or communications. The
highest ranking officers do not work as police escorts or in foot patrols.
The most surprising part of the survey were the answers given for work schedules.
The majority of police personnel, 58%, work during the morning shift, while only 24%
worked rotating shifts, and a mere five percent worked at night. This is striking when
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compared to data that shows the bulk of crime taking place at night. In addition, only
four percent of those surveyed claimed to be employed on a full-time basis. One wonders
about the efficacy of any efforts to increase salaries and improve the image of a
professional police force when the vast majority of them are employed part-time. Of
those surveyed, 81% intend to stay in the police force for as long as they are able to.
Most feel there are good opportunities for a career in the police and that it will provide
them with a wide variety of tangible benefits including pensions, life insurance,
healthcare, stable work and income, homes, cars, and so on. Seventy-five percent said
they are very motivated by their work, but 72% do not feel they are paid well for their
rank. Sixty-six percent see their work in the police as a profession, 23% see it as a
mission, and only about 11% see it as just another job. This shows an attitude of
professionalism in spite of the part-time status and low pay for the majority of officers.
Although few are employed full-time, 89% of the officers surveyed said they do not have
another job. This may be a reason that police officers are vulnerable to corruption, as a
means to supplement meager salaries and because they have extra time on their hands in
which to engage in illicit activities.
Police were asked about their feelings of security in different situations they
encounter on the job. When helping victims, 72% say they feel secure and an additional
15% said very secure. The number drops slightly to 69% when officers are called to
respond to questions in the street, and more significantly to 44% when they must knock
on the door of a private residence. In the latter instance, 37% said they feel insecure,
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indicating that police personnel are aware of their own vulnerability in certain situations,
and that some mistrust of the population continues to exist. 7
Most police, 64%, are not assigned to a particular barrio or sector. Of those who
are, 69% say they know the inhabitants of that area and 57% know the community
leaders. This is in contrast to the surveys discussed below that show the opposite from
the neighborhood populations themselves. Most citizens do not claim to know the police
even though the numbers here indicate the police know the citizens to some degree.
When asked which infractions they encounter most often during the course of
their work, the most popular answer at 33% of those surveyed was none at all. Street
fights (21%) and assaults or robberies (13%) were the next most popular answers. Drugs
was cited by only 4% of the respondents. When asked if they have ever had to draw their
weapons, 55% said never and 25% said almost never. There are a variety of reasons or
situations given in which an officer might be motivated to use his or her weapon. The
most popular answers given are during muggings or robberies (14%), hold-ups by
individuals (13%), and perceived intent of aggression toward the officer (10%).
Confrontation with an armed criminal was cited by only one percent of respondents, even
though this scenario might be considered the general rule in police work of when it is
acceptable for an officer to use his or her weapon. When asked how many times they had
drawn their weapons during their careers, 45% said one to three times, 14% said four to
seven times, and 7% said eight to eleven times. What is striking is that 32% said they
7

A report in September 2007 noted conspiracies by drug trafficking networks to murder enforcement
officials. A December article said that fifteen drug control agents and police officers had been murdered
during the previous three months. The National Drug Control Department (DNCD) reported 237 attacks
against their agents and that they had lost three while on duty. In September and October, 12 police
officers died in confrontations with criminals. From January to August, 48 policemen died on the job (Hoy,
September 14, 2007; Listin Diario, December 6, 2007).
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had drawn their weapons more than 12 times, and 87.5% of those serving for less than a
year had already drawn theirs at least once. In addition, 81% said they had never been
investigated for doing so. There may be an overall feeling of insecurity among officers
that justifies the drawing of their weapons, or a generally lax attitude about doing so. The
survey does not show whether the respondents who were more prone to going for their
weapons were primarily assigned to the higher crime neighborhoods or not. The lack of
investigation of such incidents also shows a shortage of oversight within the police
institution which may allow for increased police aggression toward alleged offenders and
suspects. Particularly troubling is the high number of the least experienced officers
employing their weapons. It appears the new training does not necessarily include
specifics about using one’s weapon as a last resort. These practices are not likely to
inspire confidence or increase feelings of security among the citizens.
When asked to choose the characteristics most identified with the police and their
activities, 36% and 32% say efficiency and intelligence, respectively. Another 18% said
humanity while only 8% said integrity. When asked which basic principles guide police
work, the most popular answer was protecting the community at 19%. Preserving the
public order and justice or fulfillment of the law came in lower with 8% and 4%
respectively. The first question had a list of options to choose from while the latter was
open ended and the answers more varied. The answers to the questions above show an
internal perception of the institution that is at odds with the public’s perception of it, the
officers, and their mission.
The survey also included specific questions about the Plan de Seguridad
Democrática and Barrio Seguro. Only 66% of respondents said they had heard of PSD
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but 95% were familiar with Barrio Seguro. The vast majority of police personnel agrees
(61%) or strongly agrees (36%) that the program has improved relations between the
police and the community. The numbers are similar (63% agree and 33% strongly agree)
that the program has controlled crime in the areas where it has been implemented. When
asked about the work being undertaken by the police to prevent crime, 49% said it was
good and 45% said it was very good. As for the areas where the police need
improvement, narcotics control was mentioned by only two percent of respondents.
In the final analysis by Newlink Group, the authors argue that there needs to be a
better distribution of officers throughout shifts in a 24-hour period since only five percent
of officers work at night, and because the majority of violent crimes occur between the
hours of 6 p.m. and 6 a.m. If 33% of officers report that they do not encounter infractions
of the law during their work, then it is likely they are not really working in police
activities, especially considering the level of crime in the country, or they are not being
put to work during the times of day when they are most needed. Since so many already
work only part-time, this appears an inefficient use of what man-power is available.
The analysis also asserts that “the concept of a modern police force is one that is
local or localized so that the officers know the community and are integrated into it. This
ought to be considered a major flaw in the Dominican system” (Newlink, 2007: 61).
There appears to be a good level of internal cohesion within the police institution, but it is
troubling that so many officers claim they confront no crime at all, that many resort to
weapons in any variety of circumstances (which may lead to high numbers of people
injured or killed by police), and that few officers see drug control as an area in need of
improvement. It is difficult to make change when few think it is necessary. As we shall
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see in the next section, a gap clearly exists between the perception the police have of
themselves and the perception the public has of them.

-- General Population -A study conducted by Newlink Political (December 2006), sought to identify
baseline perceptions of security, crime, and the corresponding institutional responses
among the inhabitants of eight neighborhoods in the Distrito Nacional and Santiago
where the pilot program of Barrio Seguro had just been implemented. The researchers
found a general sense of insecurity, and a feeling that crime had gotten worse in recent
years. This group of respondents was most likely to name street crime, drugs, or lack of
education among the youth as the main problem facing the community. Drugs were
mentioned especially frequently in Santiago. When asked which problem must be
resolved in order to increase security, the majority said street crime or the lack of
neighborhood organizations, though drugs and lack of electricity also received high
numbers in Santiago.
The majority of respondents – up to 83% – said the traffic and sale of drugs had
increased in the recent past. As many as 87% said gang activity had also increased.
Indeed, drugs, gangs, and official collusion were acknowledged as well-known by the
community. For example, one of the respondents described how in his neighborhood of
Capotillo, a known drug trafficker was the major benefactor of a sports team. He said it
is a shame that the politicians spend lots of money on their campaigns and platforms –
which frequently are anti-drug and anti-crime – and but it is a known drug dealer who
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pays for the uniforms. Everyone is against drugs and gangs but looks the other way when
there appears to be some benefit to the community.
When asked to qualify police work in controlling crime, 70% said it is bad, very
bad, or just average. The perception of the police is that they are not well informed,
trained, or equipped to deal with neighborhood crime. Most people think the police are
closely associated with the criminals or the main gangs themselves. Victims of crime are
afraid to make reports to the police for fear of infiltraciones. Some respondents
recommended rotating officers frequently or replacing them with the military all together.
Upon visiting the police stations, the researchers found that the number of
officials or officers there is between two and six, usually one detective and the rest
uniformed. Detectives work long hours because there are not enough of them to rotate,
especially in Santiago. Most criminal investigations rarely extend beyond the
questioning of the regular informants, who are often part of the group being investigated.
Other witnesses are few and participation by those in the community is not common
practice, thereby limiting the information detectives are able to gather and use.
The study also found inadequate equipment for police officers, especially
bulletproof vests for those confronting gangs and other armed suspects, and a lack of
“locomotion” within the barrios, particularly the larger zones within Santiago such as
Cienfuegos. Researchers found a lack of record keeping about which areas had the most
incidents, and little or no follow-up in cases under investigation. The study found no
clear objectives for officers and little supervision for patrols, all of which could limit the
institution’s ability to provide the kind of results that would inspire citizen confidence or
effectively reduce crime and insecurity.
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When asked which feelings the police gave them, between 23 and 57% of those
surveyed said fear. In only two of the eight barrios was fear not the most popular answer
(security and a sense of protection were the other available options for this question).
Many think the justice system favors those with money and connections, and the police
are thought to be both incapable and unscrupulous. They were seen as far too willing to
release or not process those detained. Trust in the police was low. As one respondent
said: “It’s that the police don’t pay attention to us. We call them and they don’t come.
We go to the station and they say take care of it yourself as best you can.” Another said:
“When I need to recover something, I prefer to go to the perpetrators themselves before
going to the police. They are a part of the problem.” The majority, 68% to 82%, said
that police corruption had increased.
Rotating locations for police assignments was deemed preferable to permanent
assignments by those surveyed in all eight areas, though the two options were more
evenly matched in Santiago. When asked why, about half said rotation does not allow
police to create relationships with the criminals and their organizations. When asked
about the relationship between the police and the residents, in all cases the majority said
either the police abuse their authority and lack respect, or they just barely fulfill their
obligations. The former was especially prevalent in Santiago.
The study concluded that low social cohesion in the community inhibits
socialization and the development of cooperative initiatives to confront crime. Most
people react to violence and crime in an individual way, and find ways to ignore or
tolerate it as a form of survival, particularly when the formal institution charged with
confronting crime fails to deliver. This is another indicator of low levels of social and
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civic development among the Dominican population and a critical area for improvement
and democratization. Police reform within the PSD is meant to counter these conditions,
to improve police work and relations with the community in order to create space for
peaceful civic engagement.
Another study intended to capture perceptions of the Barrio Seguro program was
conducted by the Santo Domingo-based NGO Centro Juan Montalvo in 2006. This study
drew a sample from four neighborhoods in Santo Domingo: Los Gandules, La Cienaga,
27 de Febrero, and Guachupita. This is a very small section of the city under study but
one considered rather dangerous, especially the locations along the Rio Ozama. The
sample included people ages 16 to 95. When asked about Barrio Seguro, 65% of
respondents said they knew the program and 29% said they had heard something about it.
Respondents were then asked what had been done in their neighborhoods because of the
program, by indicating yes or no to each example. For military presence, 89% said yes.
The vast majority – 73% or higher – said no to police stations, building schools,
improving basic services, technological centers, and sports events. These responses are
informative in light of the PSD’s goal of addressing the multiple causes of violence and
crime and its pledge to work with various organizations to create different kinds of
programs and services. From these results it appears that the only visible change is an
increased military presence. When asked if they felt the level of security had improved
with the introduction of Barrio Seguro, 49% of those surveyed said yes a lot, and 42%
said yes, some. When asked if they felt safe moving about the neighborhood, 52% said
they felt secure and 30% said very secure. Perceptions of security thus appear to be
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linked to increased militarization rather than other social and civil programs or
opportunities for participation for the residents of these four neighborhoods.
Respondents were asked if they had visited a police station since the initiation of
the program and 68% said no, they had not. Those surveyed were also asked to respond
yes or no to possible answers for how the police treat the people. For cordial and
friendly, 63% said yes, while aggressive and indifferent received only 7% each. This
seems to be a different result than the Newlink study above that identified high levels of
mistrust in the police, albeit in a different urban location. When asked how they felt
about the treatment they received at the police stations, satisfied and very satisfied were
each selected by 27% of respondents, but 39% said very unsatisfied, which is more
congruent with the Newlink results.
Since the start of Barrio Seguro, 88% said they had not been the victim of a crime.
Of those who had, the majority were victims of robberies in the street or at home. Twothirds said they did not know anyone who had been the victim of a crime. The survey
showed some variation amongst the four barrios, but most of the respondents said that
crime had diminished some or considerably. When asked how they now felt in their
neighborhoods, 57% said secure and 26% said relatively secure, while five percent still
said very insecure and one percent said they felt they were in danger. The most popular
reasons given for these feelings of insecurity were drugs, few police, fights, poor lighting,
known “crime zones”, apathetic or complicit police, and gangs. About half of all those
surveyed said they perceive more security since the start of Barrio Seguro, and about
29% said they feel the same level of security as before. The two studies by Newlink and
Centro Juan Montalvo, published the same year, show different results. This may be
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attributed to the areas in which they were conducted, and the two studies may not be
completely comparable. Even so, the results highlight the challenges faced by these
programs and the different levels of success they have been able to achieve in the shortterm.
In a study conducted by Newlink Political for the Secretary of State of the Interior
and the Police (2007), a sample of men and women ages eighteen and older was surveyed
in sixteen neighborhoods in the Distrito Nacional. The sample size ensured that an equal
number of people from each neighborhood was included. The Distrito Nacional consists
of the suburban neighborhoods around Santo Domingo. The study was intended to
capture any progress made by PSD after another year of implementation and in additional
areas.
The first question asked respondents to identify the principle problems facing
their communities. The top answers given were the lack of electricity, crime, lack of
drinking water, drugs, pollution and a lack of garbage collection, flooding, the condition
of the streets and highways, unemployment, and corruption. Note that the majority of
those identified are structural problems within the country rather than direct law
enforcement issues or specific crimes. In most of the barrios, fewer than 50% of
respondents felt that drug traffic, sales, and consumption had increased or remained the
same in the previous 12 months. The response was roughly the same when asked about
levels of police corruption. More than half felt these problems had actually decreased.
Despite this, the people surveyed had a generally negative or neutral opinion about the
parks and organized community activities in their neighborhoods, indicating no real
improvement in the areas outside law enforcement that PSD claims to address. The same
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was true for the activities of health institutions, police patrols, and the church, though in
many cases a number of people preferred not to answer these particular questions. This
refusal to answer might be interpreted as a lack of trust in the survey and the anonymity
of the answers given. This phenomenon is also captured in several of the other surveys
discussed below.
When asked about their feelings of security, most were more positive about it
between the hours of 6 am and 8 pm, and definitely more negative from 8 pm to 6 am.
The proportion of respondents who had been the victim of a crime or whose family
member had been the victim of a crime in the previous year was only 27% in the worst
case. In some neighborhoods no one claimed to have been a victim of crime at all. The
most common type of crime mentioned was a theft like pick-pocketing or pursesnatching. While some reported the crimes to the PN or local police station, just as many
did not and in some cases more did not. When asked to explain why, more than half said
it was because they did not have any confidence in the authorities despite the perception
that corruption had decreased, as indicated above. Corruption may have diminished but it
had not been eliminated enough to increase confidence in the institution overall.
Between 62 and 96% of respondents said they did not know the police officers
who patrol their neighborhoods, and 27 to 85% said the police do not treat them with
courtesy and respect. These numbers paint a different picture than those from the survey
of police personnel as described earlier. It seems the police at the national level have a
better perception of themselves, or that these neighborhoods in particular have a worse
relationship with the police. About half of those surveyed said the police do not do their
job well, though fewer than half believe the police abuse the authority they have. In all
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cases, at least half and up to 85% said the police do not use excessive force, but the
majority noted that police do not treat everyone equally.
A majority said the police patrol their neighborhood either an average amount or
never. In only a few cases did the majority say the police patrolled frequently. More
than half said they know of no other activity the police actually do in their
neighborhoods. More than half said the police give them a feeling of security or
protection, though in some cases a third or more said they fear the police. This can be
taken as an indicator of inconsistent police practices, or lingering corruption and abuse of
authority in some areas.
About half of the respondents said police do an average job controlling crime.
Low salaries was selected by 63% of those surveyed as the main reason the police are not
doing their jobs as well as they could be. Lack of honor and corruption were the next
most popular answers. Interestingly, the top suggestion for how to improve police work
in the neighborhoods was to increase the number of patrols. This was selected by 62% of
those surveyed. In no case was an increase in salary the number one choice.
In spite of the fact that so few residents know their local police, there was no
overwhelming support indicated for the idea of having permanent assignments for
officers in the neighborhoods. This idea received between 8 and 58% of responses, while
rotating officers received 35 to 73% in the various neighborhoods. No more than 19% of
respondents in any particular area said they had sought police help or information in the
previous six months, and no more than eight percent had reported witnessing a crime.
There was in general a low level of interaction with the police – good or bad.
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The majority answered yes to the question of whether the police are helping with
solutions to citizen security, but there was no consensus on the quality of the work the
police are doing to control drug traffic. A majority said bad, very bad, or average, though
in some cases up to 35% said good or very good. It is important to note that in certain
areas, drugs are considered a problem needing urgent attention; in only one of the 16
neighborhoods included in the study did people think the problem had diminished. A
large majority (up to 96%) said they do not know anyone involved in drug traffic and that
drugs have not affected their lives or families directly. The study states that in the
majority of the neighborhoods people have been offered drugs, which is important even if
the percentages are low because it indicates that drugs have infiltrated everywhere, as
have the gangs associated with the trade. Those who said there are gangs know their
names, recognize the members, and say they are involved primarily in the sale and
consumption of drugs, robberies, and creating disorder in the neighborhoods.
As for the perception of how crime and disorder are dealt with, a majority of those
surveyed know little to nothing about the criminal procedures code in the country. They
think the police know a lot about it and that others in the community know some or a
little. Less than half view the code as something that exists to protect victims. Many
more think it helps criminals: “Los delincuentes se esconden bajo las garantias que
brinda el codigo procesal penal” (Newlink, 2007: 129). They believe criminals can hide
behind the protections the code provides and that it favors them over the victims of crime.
The PSD is almost completely unknown amongst this sample. More than half of
those who do know something about it had no response when asked what they hoped it
could do for them. Fewer than 50% were familiar with Barrio Seguro and gave a wide
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variety of answers about what they hoped it could do for them, such as provide more
security, reduce crime, improve life, bring more patrols, reduce drug traffic, and help the
community. This shows some improved perception but again it is difficult to assess the
direct impact of the program in the short term.
Similar to previous studies, another Newlink study of the PSD from May 2008
analyzes perceptions of security and victimization among the population in the
neighborhoods that are a part of the Barrio Seguro program. The randomly selected
sample included people ages eighteen and over, both men and women, of all
socioeconomic levels within nine selected areas of Santo Domingo and Santiago. This is
an additional effort to evaluate the impact of the program after yet another year of
implementation.
When asked what the fundamental problem is that needs to be solved in order for
there to be more security in the neighborhood, the top three answers given were street
crime, lack of police vigilance, and drugs. In this open-ended question, these same three
responses were the top as a first answer given, as well as in the totality of answers. There
is little mention of the broader structural problems named in prior surveys, which may
indicate that crime has risen and remained acute.
When respondents were asked if they were familiar with PSD, nearly 73% said
no. This number was not significantly different in areas where PSD and Barrio Seguro
had been started in 2005 versus 2006 or 2007. It is surprising considering the program
had been around longer by then and the program’s institutions and leaders could have
taken the opportunity to raise awareness and educate the public. In spite of this lack of
knowledge of PSD, 94% did say they were familiar with Barrio Seguro, and 42% said it
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is a good program. An additional 19% called it average while 13% said it is very good.
Only 10% said it was bad or very bad.
Half of the respondents said that fear and insecurity among the populace had
diminished since the implementation of PSD and Barrio Seguro. When asked about
levels of confidence and trust between the police and the citizens, 39% said it was the
same but 24% said it had increased. Similarly, 41% said relations between the police and
the community were the same but 25% said they had improved. Yet in half of the areas
surveyed, 50% or more said fear and insecurity among the population had increased or
remained the same. Responses were also mixed for confidence and trust between the
police and citizens. Between 16 and 61% said it had increased, 25 to 50% said it had
remained the same, and 4 to 44% said it had actually diminished. These numbers show
some inconsistency in the implementation of the program in different areas, that
inconsistent outcomes are likely the result of greater challenges in some neighborhoods,
or that improved relations between the police and the community alone are not enough to
reduce crime and increase security.
The majority of respondents said that the participation of the community in
matters of security had increased or stayed the same. No more than 36% said it had
decreased. The numbers regarding relations between the police and the community are
similar. About half said that public institutions and the community working together had
increased or stayed the same, though anywhere from 7 to 50% of respondents said it had
diminished. In Santo Domingo Este for example, 50% of respondents agreed this
relationship had diminished while 29% either said they did not know or gave no response
at all. This leaves only about 21% to agree the relationship has improved or remained the
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same, a discouraging result since the goal of PSD is to bring the community and the
institutions closer together – the opposite of what this data seems to indicate has
happened.
When asked if they, or the organization that represents them, participated in some
project of PSD and Barrio Seguro since the start of the program, 93% of respondents said
no. Sixty percent of respondents said that they personally do not participate in or belong
to any organization. Of those who said they do, 23% (the largest group) belong to a
religious organization. When asked how an effective citizen participation can be
obtained in the security problems of the neighborhood, the top answers were to unite or
bring together the community and the authorities (22%), to call meetings and invite the
community (20%), and do not know (18%). The obstacles to participation named by
respondents were having never been summoned or invited (75%) and a lack of time
(17%). It seems that perhaps more people would get involved if there was a mechanism
by which to recruit more of them. It does not appear that many feel compelled to
volunteer their time or are even aware that there are ways for them to be involved in
projects in the community.
Since mixed patrols began in the neighborhoods, 57% of those surveyed said
crime has diminished, though only one-third give this response in the area of Santo
Domingo Este. When asked if they know the police officers who patrol their
neighborhoods, 71% of respondents said no. Again, there was some variation across
geographic areas. In one part of Santiago nearly 50% said no, while in Santo Domingo
Este, more than 90% of respondents do not know their local patrol officers. This is likely
related to the attitudes reflected in this and prior surveys about permanent assignments
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for police officers. Some in the higher crime areas may prefer not to know their officers.
They may be more likely to see a familiar police officer not as the friendly neighborhood
civil servant but as an entrenched participant in local crime and corruption.
About 36% of those surveyed said that the police treat residents with courtesy and
respect, while about 29% said they just barely fulfill their obligations. An additional 17%
believe the police abuse their authority, and 19% did not respond or did not know. When
asked if the police use violence, 32% said rarely, but about 30% said frequently or the
majority of the time. In one sector where nearly 55% said the police rarely use violence,
25% still said frequently or the majority of the time. In only two areas did as many as 30
or 40% say never. Equally telling and troubling is that in Santo Domingo Este, the top
answer was do not know or no answer at all. This may be another instance or indication
of a lack of trust in the survey and a lack of confidence about the anonymity of responses
in an official survey of any kind, or a lack of police presence that would make any
impression on the residents. Whichever the case, it appears to be an indication of a
problem.
In the five areas surveyed in Santo Domingo, more than half the respondents said
the number of patrols had increased or remained the same as a result of Barrio Seguro,
but in Santo Domingo Este, the top answer was “there is no Barrio Seguro program,”
followed by do not know or no response. In Santiago, nearly 46% said patrols had
decreased, and about two-thirds said police never or rarely patrol the areas where young
people congregate, where the gangs are, where the most conflict is, where drugs are sold,
or where the most assaults occur. In other words, police officers are not taking the
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initiative to do their work where it is most needed. They are not visible or making an
impact that is noticeable in some areas.
When asked what other activities besides patrols the police do, 52% said none and
27% said do not know or gave no response. These two options combined were slightly
higher in all four areas of Santiago as well as in Santo Domingo Este. When asked to
qualify the work done by police controlling drugs, 30% said good, 32% said average, and
31% said bad. About 10% more in Santo Domingo Este and one area of Santiago said
bad. Respondents were similarly split on whether or not police are involved in drug
sales, with 36% saying yes, 30% saying no, and 34% saying they do not know or not
responding at all. Respondents were divided again when asked whether or not PSD and
Barrio Seguro have had any effect on drugs, with nearly 34% saying yes, 30% saying no,
and nearly 37% did not know or gave no response, although there were three cases in
Santo Domingo where as many as 47 to 55% said yes, PSD and Barrio Seguro have had a
positive effect. By the same token, in Santo Domingo Este, 74% of respondents did not
respond or did not know, and between 37 and 46% in Santiago said no. Again, we can
discern the limited ability of these programs to make an impact in the most crime-prone
areas in the short term, and the reluctance of many residents in these areas to go on record
about these issues.
When asked about what feeling the police inspire in them, 42% of respondents
said security. This percentage was as high as 63% in some cases. Protection and fear
received 26% each. Security received the highest percentage of responses in all areas
surveyed except for Santo Domingo Este, where 33% said fear (the most popular
answer), and 31% said security. Only four percent separated the responses of security
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and fear in one area of Santiago (36.4% vs. 32.6%, respectively). This is likely an
indication that in some areas of the cities, the police still have a reputation for violence
and corruption, and are still engaging in practices to earn them this reputation.
When asked for suggestions about how to improve police work in the
neighborhoods, the most popular answers were hire more police officers (21%), raise
police salaries (21%), training (20%), and rotation (10%). When asked if they prefer to
have designated, permanent police officers assigned to specific areas or officers that
rotate, 63% overall, and up to 81% in some cases, said rotate. When asked to explain
why, 60% of respondents said rotation does not allow for relationships to develop
between officers and criminals, which is consistent with prior surveys.
The people surveyed were also asked if they had heard anything about the new
Penal Process Codes. Overall, 42% said they had heard nothing and 40% said they had
heard a little. No more than 26% in any of the neighborhoods surveyed said they had
heard a lot. Two-thirds of respondents think the code favors criminals over victims: 38%
agree and 30% strongly agree. Half think criminals can hide behind the guarantees the
code offers them: 48% agree and 2% strongly agree. This is again consistent with
previous surveys.
When asked if the code protects victims, 33% disagree, though 38% agree that it
helps the police and the administration of justice in general. In spite of that, 62% do not
think the police are capable of properly implementing the code, but 71% do think that the
police are capable of collecting evidence and 69% think they are capable of completing a
criminal investigation. This does appear to be some improvement in the perception of
police capacity since the code was introduced. Those surveyed were split 50/50 on

183

whether or not judges apply the code correctly. Sixty-percent think judges are too
permissive and 65% said the public prosecutors let criminals off the hook. 8
When asked if, since the start of the Barrio Seguro program, they or anyone in
their families had been the victim of a crime, 70% of respondents said no. This
percentage was as high as 93% in one area of Santiago. Twenty-six percent said they
reported these crimes to a local police station and 21% reported them to the PN, but 47%
said they did not report the crimes at all. This high percentage – consistent with other
surveys – indicates a continued lack of trust in the police despite reform efforts aimed at
creating closer relationships between the police and the community.
Newlink finds the results positive overall and concludes that “this positive
evaluation [of various PSD programs] calls for continuing to implement the programs,
but for strengthening and spreading them out in a more efficient manner among all the
communities so that there is a larger number of beneficiaries” (Newlink, May 2008:
n.p.). The results of the survey indicate very limited participation by the community in
matters of security, and the report argues that this is unfortunate considering that one of
the objectives of the PSD is to incorporate the community into its programs. While there
are some positive results, many areas for improvement have been revealed by the survey.
One might argue not only for strengthening and spreading the program to all areas but for
strengthening and reworking them in the areas they already exist but have had the least
positive evaluations (i.e.: Santo Domingo Este).
Of all types of crime, drugs are perceived to have increased the most and there is
no definitive opinion among the people about whether the PSD has helped. The image of
8

An article published in El Caribe on January 8, 2008 supports this perception by noting that about 42% of
accused drug dealers were released by the courts.
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the police has improved in most areas with the implementation of the PSD and the police
presence in the neighborhoods has contributed to an improved perception of security in
general. Sixty-seven percent of the population surveyed felt some confidence in the
police though 26% still said the police make them fearful. The impact of PSD and Barrio
Seguro programs on public opinion of the police is nowhere near as dramatic or
revolutionary as the police chief would have us believe, though this is not to say that
there has been no improvement whatsoever.
In spite of some increased security and confidence, there is still a lack of
integration of the police as a part of the community. Few citizens know the men and
women who patrol their neighborhoods – and few seem to want integration. A
preference for rotating police assigned to the neighborhoods is consistent with previous
surveys, reflecting a desire that individual officers not be attached to any particular area.
More than half the people agree the police act with violence rarely or never, and:
This is significant because it demonstrates an evolution in respect to the
application of violent practices of the past, which is to say that the process of
reforming the institution is having positive results on current police practices
toward the community (Newlink, May 2008: n.p.).
Still, in some areas fear of police persists, whether it is explicit in the survey answers or
indicated by those who refused to give answers at all for certain questions. Police work
on drugs is not well-perceived and many still note the complicity of police personnel in
drug transactions in particular.
The final external evaluation examined here is one written by Newlink in June
2008 as an overall assessment of all their prior research, surveys, and focus group studies
on the efficacy of the PSD and Barrio Seguro. Newlink uses this data to determine the

185

successes as well as the challenges to the programs to assess whether they have been
efficient and effective, and if they will be sustainable in the longer term. These questions
are particularly important for those programs affecting citizen rights and democratic
culture. By the time of the evaluation, 101 neighborhoods had been a part of PSD
programs, all of which were in Santo Domingo or Santiago.
The evaluation finds a correlation between people’s assessments of Barrio Seguro
and the date of its implementation in their neighborhoods. This assessment is poorer in
places where the program began earlier – the opposite of what one might expect, and
certainly not what was intended. This pattern holds in both Santo Domingo and Santiago.
In Santo Domingo Este, nearly 35% of those surveyed could not give an evaluation of the
program at all (also the most frequent answer). This could indicate that the program has
not had any relevant impact in these neighborhoods. The report suggests that the
program lost its impulse or momentum in the second year when it was expanded to
additional areas. Some institutions were unable to fulfill their duties and thus the
people’s expectations could not be met. Early positive results caused too much
expansion too soon without adequate resources, and the results could not be replicated.
Regarding police reform, Newlink says concrete action has been taken to make
the police force more effective and efficient in preventing and controlling crime, but so
far that has not been sufficient for making profound changes or having a positive impact
on citizen security. The reform process has changed direction and leadership at least
three times, which has meant corresponding changes in strategy and personnel, all of
which have caused reform projects to move backward or remain stationary rather than
moving forward. “Police reform remains the greatest challenge for the PSD” (Newlink,
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June 2008: 34). Indeed, the recent scandal in Baní demonstrates the extent to which
corruption has affected not only the police but also the DNCD and the military, and how
reform in two of the largest cities in the country has not been able to influence drug
traffic elsewhere, other than to move it into areas where the program does not yet reach.
Despite these challenges, there have been some significant advances that indicate
concrete steps in the reform process. These include the development of an institutional
structure that is more able to keep up with modern criminality, the obtainment of modern
equipment, and the additional training of personnel with the objective of improving
service to the community. Efforts have also been made to dignify and improve the image
of police work as a career, and to purge the ranks of corrupt officers. It may be tempting
to label these mere drops in the bucket but it is also too early in the process to dismiss
them outright.
Newlink’s analysis of surveys of the general population and institution
employees, of changes and actions undertaken, and of crime statistics shows that the
PSD, and especially the Barrio Seguro program, has had an “unquestionable impact” on
communities participating in the programs, as well as on public institutions, and for
promoting a change of attitude toward security as the responsibility of all (June 2008:
37). Unfortunately, while levels of violent crime had begun to drop from the time the
program began, the data available in mid-2008 indicated another increase. Indeed, the
number of people killed in an exchange of fire with the police is worrisome (Newlink,
June 2008). The evaluation suggests this increase in violence during the first half of
2008, despite the decline during the first two years of PSD, is evidence of the extent and
strength of organized crime and drug trafficking networks in the country. It may also be
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a problem of the capacity and sustainability of the program. The effort and ideas are
right but the actual man-power available is not sufficient to meet the level of the problem,
nor are the program and practices well-enough established yet to call them successful. In
spite of the fluctuating crime statistics, the report says that public perception of security
has improved and that crime in general has decreased as a direct result of PSD programs.
Improved perceptions of security notwithstanding, “the perceptions of the
inhabitants of the neighborhoods participating in Barrio Seguro of the police in their
neighborhoods continues to be poor” (Newlink, June 2008: 45). But where Barrio
Seguro has been operating longer, there seems to be slightly greater acquaintance and
closeness of the people to the police. The worst assessments in Santo Domingo Este are
attributed to the very short time that police have been assigned to and carrying out patrols
there. After longer times, the report finds more people give positive evaluations of how
the police relate to the community, and claim that one can see favorable changes in the
way the police behave in the community. Some negative evaluations of patrol efforts can
be attributed to the challenge of maintaining enough officers to do them while
simultaneously completing the process of purging the ranks of corrupt individuals. This
process has clearly created shortages in some areas. It can also be seen as a growing pain
of the reform process – but a necessary one.
Drugs and drug crime remain a problem. The evaluation finds that the number of
people who see little or no improvement in drug control is an indication of the minimal
impact police work is having; 63% of respondents in the surveys say the work done by
police in this area is either average or bad. As one focus group member put it, the police
will not even go into the places where people are selling drugs. The number of people
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who believe the police are involved with drugs in their neighborhoods is also worrisome,
especially since most of them are afraid to speak out against it: “Here there is no security
for those who go to the police and that’s why drugs keep accumulating in our
country…that’s why there is no progress against drug traffic” (Newlink, June 2008: 50).
Just over a third of those surveyed say police are involved in drugs, and the evaluation
says that this proportion has dropped – especially where PSD has been operating the
longest. And yet there are still an equal portion of do not know/no response answers in
all cases. Plenty of people may still be afraid to put their opinions on the record.
The neighborhood public attorney’s offices are “responsible for guaranteeing
citizens access to the system of justice” but the perception that the system lets too many
criminals go free also persists (Newlink, June 2008: 52). The evaluation points out that
there are good reasons for this which are basic to the system itself. The new system is
working to apply the penal code vigorously and thus it depends on evidence and legality.
There are a series of conditions and regulations that must be adhered to and respected by
police officers and others in order to arrest, detain, and investigate cases legally and
properly. This procedure is clearly the norm in a democratic system but has not
necessarily been the norm in the Dominican Republic. The public is likely to need time
to adjust to the new process – and see it actually work successfully – before negative
perceptions will go away.

-- Personal Interviews -Based on her research, Dr. Rosario Espinal of Temple University confirms there
has been some drop in crime in the Dominican Republic between 2006 and 2008. She
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also suggests that the major criticism of the Barrio Seguro program is that regardless of
its stated goals, it does not address the main underlying problems that contribute to
criminal activity within society: poverty and lack of education. She told me that police
programs may be successful at reducing crime in one area but that crime relocates to
another where the programs have not yet been put in place, echoing all the literature on
the balloon effect of drug control policies. Finally, a program like Barrio Seguro,
whether it is effective or not, is a way for the government to show it is taking some kind
of action.
Bielka Polanco of Newlink describes gangs in the Dominican Republic as both an
old and a new problem. Most of the crime committed by these groups is drug related,
and has increased significantly within the last ten tears. More recently, crime has been
controlled, though not always by the best methods (Polanco, 2008). A number of gang
leaders have been put in jail or killed by the police. This latter method is unofficial and
yet the general public knows what extra-legal methods have been used to remove
criminals from the streets (ibid.).
Ms. Polanco believes that the gangs have reorganized themselves in response to
the Barrio Seguro program. One perception of the police that is related to this
reorganization is that they are paid by the gangs to look the other way and provide
protection for them. The gangs have reduced conflict amongst themselves and Barrio
Seguro provides the semblance of security in the neighborhoods even if the amount of
drug traffic has not diminished. Barrio Seguro has provided a cosmetic fix she says. In
other words, as Dr. Espinal suggested, the program gives the image of government action
even if the results are dubious.
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According to Ms. Polanco, police reform has not been institutionalized but has
instead proceeded on a personal basis led by the particular chief in charge. Police salaries
are low, but the institution provides some incentives through opportunities to specialize,
such as Barrio Seguro. There has been some effort to create schedules so that officers
can have other jobs, but the ranks are still heavily susceptible to corruption because of
low wages. The traffic police, AMET, have slightly higher salaries and this has helped
relieve corruption somewhat. Ms. Polanco said she would not offer a bribe to an officer
who stopped her in her car, but that even five years ago one could easily attempt to avoid
tickets that way. At the same time, low salaries are a problem in most sectors in the
country, not just for the police, making drug money attractive to many more widely. For
example, a study by Centro Juan Montalvo found that the average monthly income was
RD$12,435 (approximately $343 US) but about 70% of workers actually earn less than
that average (DR1 Daily News, August 6, 2007).
Recent reforms to the criminal code have emphasized human rights and the rights
of detainees. The public’s perception of the code is that it gives more rights to the
accused. People want stronger measures, or mano dura, for dealing with criminals
(Polanco, 2008). The problem according to Ms. Polanco is with the implementation of
the new code, rather than with the code itself. The system is not prepared to properly
execute the things required of it and the people involved need more training. Often the
police themselves claim ignorance of the new code, which may very well be true in some
cases. The fundamental issue of course is that if the police do not follow the procedures,
then the public attorneys cannot prosecute. As the first step in the justice system, the
future processing of all cases hinges on correct handling by the police at the initial stages.
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There is also a certain amount of ignorance of the new code on the part of the public.
People may see the police working and place blame on the judges or attorneys for
problems in the system. Police also blame a lack of action on the part of judicial
authorities as a cause of continuing crime and increasing vigilantism (see for example
“Chief of police blames justice for lynchings,” DR1 Daily News, August 4, 2008).
Reform is a process and it will take many more years before significant progress is
achieved. The most challenging area for reform will continue to be internal affairs and
police discipline.
On that topic, anthropologist Dr. Tajira Vargas says it is an old and common
practice for reports in Dominican newspapers to say that criminals, especially suspected
drug traffickers, were killed in an “exchange of fire.” In reality, she says, the police
intentionally kill these suspects and the public knows it. Dr. Vargas also notes this kind
of action by the police has gotten worse rather than better in recent years, and it has
become more common for the authorities to injure and leave behind other young victims
in the process. These kinds of incidents are rarely if ever investigated by the police. In
addition, many officers do not see the judicial process as necessary when they can handle
suspects in this manner instead, which then sets an example for the citizens to take the
law into their own hands (Vargas, 2008). In other words, a democratic judicial process is
not seen as necessary, valuable, or expedient.
Dr. Vargas is not optimistic that the situation will improve, but suggests that
strategies must change and the entire jefetura or leadership and its structure must also
change. There need to be definite sanctions within the police for violations of human
rights. She says the government needs to regulate the police even more than they do.
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She does not trust the police and believes most Dominicans do not either. It is still
common practice to offer bribes to police officers, though she agrees with Ms. Polanco
that this is less true for the AMET. 9
Dr. Vargas claims that local police officers receive as much as 20,000 pesos
(approximately $550 U.S.) each week to allow drug traffic to continue. Military
checkpoints along the country’s borders typically receive 300 pesos per bus wishing to
cross. Indeed, investigative reporters Minerva Isa and Eladio Pichardo reported
extensively on this topic in Hoy during July 2009. Other types of crime can also be
excused with similar payments. This money works its way up through the ranks within
the police system – bribes are not confined to patrol officers. Dr. Vargas argues that the
current scandal surrounding the government purchase of the tucanos airplanes is an
example of the way that those within the government and at the highest levels can be paid
off as well. She, like others, asks where the money for such a purchase actually came
from.
The United States aids Dominican efforts in the war on drugs by providing more
guns to the military and the police, but this is a pantalla. It is a screen or a cover; as both
Dr. Espinal and Ms. Polanco suggested with Barrio Seguro, it is a way for the
government to make itself look good by providing some kind of effort. Dr. Vargas is not
convinced there is truly a method or a particular group that can effectively control drugs
in the country. The primary sources of drug crime are now the microtraffickers. Larger

9

Listin Diario noted that bribery is a way of life in the Dominican Republic, citing a study conducted in
three provinces – La Vega, La Romana, and Peravia -- that revealed 71% of the population believes that
"macuteo" - Spanish for small bribes - takes place in the Attorney General's office and that corruption and
extortion practices are commonplace (November 30, 2007).
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shipments are the focus of government programs, and shipments are often seen entering
the country, yet few ask where they are destined. How to control and follow through on
the subdivision of major drug traffic into and through smaller organizations is the
question that is not being asked or adequately pursued (Vargas, 2008). 10
The most serious problem facing the Dominican Republic is structural: electricity
and flujo de servicio or inconsistent service. Power outages have negative effects on the
entire economy and individual security. Equally important are problems with the
educational system. For Dr. Vargas, both of these affect everything else and contribute to
insecurity. Community organizations are primarily formed to address issues like
education, electricity, and neighborhood security rather than human rights abuses. Most
people do not like to speak out against the police. There is still much fear of the
repercussions and this fear impedes the development of civil society and real citizenship.
The Dominican Republic continues to have a high level of unemployment, and
clientelism is still a major factor within the government. Vargas says the level of
democracy in the country is extremely low in part because there is no sector of the
government that is under the control of the citizens. Most people are not even aware of
their rights and what citizenship is. Many are ignorant of the tax system, state monies,
and how the system functions. Institutionalized corruption is the norm and seen as fine
by many – and so the killing of criminals by the police is thought to be a good thing. As
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President Leonel Fernandez announced on August 13, 2009 he was declaring war against the microtrafficking of drugs. Diario Libre says that the DNCD has pinpointed 19,000 of the micro-positions for
distributing drugs nationwide. The goal is to dismantle the sales points. Fernandez wants more aggressive
action against drug dealers by the state's security organizations. The President also promised to create new
job opportunities for youths. The President says the micro-traffic is the principal threat to Dominican youth.
DR1 Daily News, August 14, 2009.
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for new police trainees, Vargas says the institution will adjust and the culture will
eventually absorb them. New ideas might be introduced but old practices will remain.

Conclusions
The various reports and surveys analyzed here provide a picture of some of the
achievements and progress made by the PSD and Barrio Seguro programs toward the
goal of improving citizen security and professionalism within the police. They also show
that whether you are inclined to interpret the data in an optimistic or pessimistic manner,
there are clearly still areas in need of further improvement. Unfortunately, the latest
news reports also point to little advancement in the longer term and perhaps even some
movement backward. We need to be concerned about the number of violent deaths still
occurring – up to 959 during the first five months of 2009 alone (DR1 Daily News, July
20, 2009), the continuing sentiment that the programs and the institutions involved are
not working (DR1 Daily News story ‘‘Safe barrio’ residents complain of crime,” June 9,
2009, and “The police reform that wasn’t,” Hoy, June 18, 2009), and the rise of vigilante
justice (see articles DR1 Daily News, June 2, 2008, June 19, 2008, and August 4, 2008).
Even as some progress has been documented in certain cases, the problem is still much
larger than the efforts to address it.
Where basic services are few, there also exist “a series of social problems like
criminal and domestic violence, drug addiction, alcoholism, teen pregnancy” and so on
(Newlink, June 2008: 16). The PSD was created to address these by providing
“educational, sports, cultural, and work opportunities, and promoting participation of the
community in the development and security of their communities” (Newlink, June 2008:
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16). At the start of Barrio Seguro, the level of community participation was very low.
Many people did not consider community involvement to be a fundamental part of citizen
security. There were also few opportunities for participation, and those groups that did
exist were not very inclusive.
With the PSD the people in the areas involved have opened themselves to the idea
that community participation is a means through which to gain security, and that as
subjects with rights and obligations to that security, the members of the community have
much to contribute and reason to be involved. Even so, this is an incipient or fledgling
idea, not yet well ingrained or accepted as true. Only about 19% of the people
interviewed by Newlink overall had been invited to participate in meetings discussing
security issues. In some areas, citizen participation has gone down since the beginning of
Barrio Seguro, and while people may be interested in becoming more involved, often
there is no opportunity to follow through or programs have lost their momentum over
time.
Low levels of recognition exist among the public about which institutions were
actually a part of PSD, aside from the police and a few others, and there were frequent
complaints among those interviewed about minimal or weak participation by certain
public institutions. As one focus group member said, “Barrio Seguro is only known for
its repressive elements. Other things like health and education are hardly noticeable”
(Newlink, June 2008: 27). We might see this criticism as a symptom of state desire to
deal with domestic and structural issues broadly while answering to international pressure
to deal with crime specifically. The program promises wide-reaching reforms and
opportunities, but the punitive measures are the most prominent and visible.
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An increased presence for the state is not just about police reform or creating a
larger police force. Police-focused efforts must also be integrated with all other kinds of
government programs that comprise the PSD and contribute to increased feelings of
security overall. These are the programs aimed at providing adequate food and health
care, improvements in education and housing, and providing ways for the people to feel
that they have a stake and a role to play in the reclaiming of public space.
The emphasis in political reform in Latin America has been on decentralization,
“returning to the local level as the ideal place to bring the government closer to the
people” (Morgan et al., 2006: 105). Ideally, the object is to increase citizen
participation, with the assumption that this increased citizen participation means more
efficiency in public administration, thus increasing the possibility of authentic
democracy. To what extent the PSD and Barrio Seguro programs are truly forms of
political decentralization is up for debate. The programs aim to bring the state’s presence
back to all areas of the country and in effect re-centralize the population by bringing them
into the institutions of their communities. The community police and patrols that make
up the Barrio Seguro program can be seen as local, decentralized components of a new
central state presence through the same program. Whether this strategy will improve
civic engagement, democratic participation, and the rights of all still remains to be seen.
In the meantime, the mixed results of the programs, particularly the continuity of
a preference or tolerance for repressive and extra-legal measures for dealing with
criminals, do not appear to support our notions of justice in the war on drugs. Some
improvement in the police profession bodes well for maintaining the Dominican state as a
legitimate authority in the war, but at the same time, drug crime, corruption, and the
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violent measures undertaken by both police and private citizens come at a cost to
democracy. The necessity of suspending these norms has not been justified by the same
evaluations of these programs which are beginning to show that measures short of war
may still have some positive effect.
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VII: Discussion
The preceding chapter demonstrated the ways the state has tried to increase its
presence in Dominican society, to reduce crime, and to reform the police. The goal was
to improve perceptions of the institutions and to protect citizen rights and security. This
final chapter briefly discusses how these efforts have affected citizen security, civil
society, and the quality of democracy for all. I then revisit the discussion of justice in the
war on drugs to see if and how the effects of the war have undermined its own goals or
violated the principles of a just war. Finally, I discuss the positive outcomes and possible
future directions for continuing the drug war and its related reform programs.

Security and Democracy
“The opinion that democracy is preferable to other forms of government
remained stable in the last decade, above 70%, even despite the 2004 crisis.
Nonetheless, a preference for order has also retained a consistent and important
degree of support, even if it means there might be less democracy” (Morgan et
al., 2006: 59-60, emphasis added).
The percentage of people in the Dominican Republic who felt unsafe rose from 42% in
1994 to 79% in 2006 (ibid.: xi). The number who reported being a victim of a crime
doubled from 2004 to 2006, and 70% of the people think the police are involved in crime.
This assessment is supported by continuing reports by news outlets on such incidences as
the arrests of military officials who are involved in drug traffic, and about drug
manufacturing operations that exist within the same building as police stations (Diario
Libre, October 6, 2007). It should come as no surprise then that “the percentage of
people who support acting outside the law to capture criminals [has] increased” and
“people who feel unsafe show a greater propensity to condone acting outside the law to
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capture criminals” (Morgan et al., 2006: xi). This attitude contradicts support for
democratic practices and the protection of civil rights within a democratic society, and
underscores the young stage of civil society development in the Dominican Republic, as
well as the ways that crime and insecurity work against its development.
This begs the question of whether there has been any improvement at all at the
end of the time period covered here and again points to the inconsistency of the results of
the PSD and Barrio Seguro programs. Recent news articles in the Dominican Press even
call it “the reform that never was” and suggest the population feels less secure than
before the programs began. Indeed, while Police Chief Santana Paez announced an
increase in foot patrols for over twenty neighborhoods as of July 2007, and Interior and
Police Minister Franklin Almeyda praised the decrease in crime during the first half of
the year, by October Hoy reported that the largest number of officers were employed in
the service of high-ranking government officials or the private sector – not on the streets
(see DR1 Daily News, July 25, 2007 and September 4, 2007; Hoy, October 10, 2007).
The increase in crime in the Dominican Republic has coincided with a decreased
capacity to deal with it. As a result, “the percentage of the public who favors acting
outside the law to capture criminals rose” (Morgan et al., 2006: 96). In fact, the
proportion of people who support the idea of acting outside the law to capture criminals
nearly doubled from 23% in 2004 to 41% in 2006 (ibid.). This view can be correlated to
people’s conceptions of democracy, as described in the preceding chapters, and we see
that “people without any clear conception of what democracy means…are equally
disposed to permit acting outside the law to capture criminals as people with normative
visions of democracy” (ibid.: 99). This indicates that even these normative values
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cannot stand up to high levels of crime and insecurity, and thus security becomes more
highly valued than freedom. The development of a functioning system of justice that
respects the rights of all is less of a priority when personal safety is thought to be at risk.
Democratic ideals are less well connected to individuals and their day-to-day practical
lives.
“In a country where the vast majority of people consider crime to constitute a
threat to the nation’s future, it is important to have a functioning system of justice to
combat this problem and improve perceptions” (Morgan et al., 2006: 95). So it is
“worrisome that the survey captured a decline, between 2004 and 2006, in the public’s
perception of the judicial system’s capacity to address the crime problem” particularly
since it was during this same time frame that efforts were begun to improve those
institutions (ibid.). The “data synthesize the violent turn that has occurred in Dominican
society and the anti-democratic attitudes and the lack of trust that this situation has started
to generate” (ibid.: 104). This then begs the question once again of whether or not the
situation is better or worse than in 1996. It also makes the future of reform efforts and
additional development of civil society and democratic practices uncertain at best. If the
capturing of criminals and the preservation of security are important above all else, then
the measure and definition of justice changes and is no longer reflective of what is
written in the constitution and the laws of the country.
Drugs have infiltrated the Dominican government at all levels. No one appears to
be immune from their influence. Even the president has been linked to those wanted in
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relation to drugs and trafficking. 11 Officials claim that no one in government has direct
or indirect connections to drug trafficking and that the government’s increase in drug
fighting efforts should be considered proof of their commitment. Even so, Servio Tulio
Castanos of the Foundation for Institutionalism and Justice has criticized the recent
purges of the army and police, calling them useless and merely a reaction to unstoppable
situations. The state is perceived as a criminal state, which rather than responding to
problems has become the principal problem. If the entity charged with the duty of
controlling and punishing crime is perceived as complicit in it, then it is no wonder
people look to other means to protect themselves.
In September of 2007 the National Human Rights Commission of the Dominican
Republic asked the attorney general to order an investigation in to a particular incident
where three unarmed prisoners were killed by police. In discussing the case, the head of
the investigation characterized the police in general as “trigger happy” (Diario Libre,
September 6, 2007). In October 2007, the Minister of the Interior and Police Franklin
Almeyda denied there was any lack of control within the police, telling reporters that
incidents in areas supposedly under the control of the Barrio Seguro program did not
reflect any reduction in the program's effectiveness. Almeyda told reporters that Barrio

11

As reported in DR1 Daily News January 31, 2008, the PRD is asking President Leonel Fernández to
explain his relationship with Nelson Solano Guzmán. A Supreme Court document indicates that Solano
had ties to numerous mega-projects in the DR at the time of his extradition to the US on heroin trafficking
charges. During a press conference held at the PRD headquarters, party general secretary Orlando Jorge
Mera displayed pictures of Fernández and Solano together on five separate occasions. Attorney General
Radhames Jimenez denied that President Fernández has any links to Solano. Jimenez said that the DR
supported and signed the papers on Solano's extradition, and according to him that is enough to prove there
is no connection between the two. As of October 8, 2008 a pilot who "occasionally" piloted the
Presidential helicopter was dismissed, according to reports from the Presidency. Major General Joaquin
Perez Feliz of the Air Force said that Lieutenant Colonel Harold Manzano Garcia was dismissed for
"serious proven faults." As reported in the El Castrense website, Manzano Garcia was dismissed for his
alleged "ties" to drug dealers.
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Seguro "is a process, and we are hoping that the local population and the media will
cooperate." The minister emphasized that it was not possible to eradicate crime from one
day to the next (DR1 Daily News, October 17, 2007). Even so, the extra-legal measures
taken by the police to confront criminals are well documented by the local press. Stories
abound of those wounded in “confusing incidents” where officers are indistinguishable
from the gang members, and of suspects killed in shoot-outs with police. 12 On
November 29, 2007, Diario Libre reported that in the previous 20 days alone, 39
suspected criminals had been killed during shoot-outs with police. On January 25, 2008,
DR1 Daily News highlighted the contradiction between these incidents and police reform
programs by running the headline “Barrios not so ‘Seguro’" and reported on a study done
by the Centro Juan Montalvo questioning the efficacy of the Barrio Seguro program.
Jenny Torres, a member of the center's research team, said that the study revealed higher
murder rates and criminal activity than what is presented by the police. The story also
claimed that if you calculated the homicide rate in 2007, including murders committed by
the police, the rate is 22.5%, higher than before Barrio Seguro was implemented, and that
the police are interested in presenting figures without acknowledging the murders
committed by their own officers. According to Hoy, police records in Santo Domingo
and Santiago show that in December 2007, police killed 52 suspected criminals, and

12

Three people were wounded in an incident that occurred when police officers in Santiago confused
plainclothes DNCD agents with a gang of assailants. The DNCD agents were traveling in a vehicle with an
improper license plate, and the police officers were also in an unmarked car (DR1 Daily News, October 24,
2007). The National Police announced that two men had been killed during a shoot-out in the Vista de
Cerro Alto section of Santiago de los Caballeros. They belonged to a gang that murdered four people in the
Pastor section of Bella Vista, Santiago in October. The police spokesperson said that the group members
had carried out contract killings and drug trafficking and were wanted for 15 different crimes committed
over the past two years (DR1 Daily News, November 26, 2007).
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another eight in just three days during the last weekend of January 2008 (Hoy, February
4, 2008).
While in some cases the citizens support police actions against suspected
criminals, even without due process, in others citizens do not wait for the police to take
action and carry out vigilante justice on their own. 13 In others still, the community has
come forward to accuse the police of using excessive force and unlawfully executing
suspects. Both El Caribe and Listin Diario carried the story of the family members of
four men shot and killed by police in July 2008 in Santo Domingo Este. Family members
said the police shot the four men even after they came out with their hands up. Listin
Diario reported that family members admitted to the victims' criminal behavior, but said
that was no reason to shoot them "and throw them in the trunk of a car, as if they were
dogs." According to police, the suspects belonged to a gang, and the lone survivor of the
confrontation with police admitted that he and his friends were part of the gang and sold
drugs in the neighborhood. Incidents like these, with clouds of tear gas and multitudes of
armed individuals in uniform, certainly invoke an image of a battlefield and the
destruction of the enemy as the ultimate goal. It is kill or be killed; shoot first and ask
questions later. The rules of law, procedure, and protocol, have been suspended
completely by the citizens as well as the authorities. The only silver lining is the

13

For example, a 15-year old minor and one unidentified man were killed by groups of civilians after they
tried to carry out muggings in separate incidents in the Cristo Rey and La Fe barrios in Santo Domingo.
The police reported that the minor died as a result of gunshot wounds when together with nine other young
men between the ages of 18 and 20, he attempted to rob a man on the street in the La Fe barrio. The police
said that the minor and his companions had committed several robberies in the past. Meanwhile in Cristo
Rey another alleged assailant died and a three-year old child was wounded in a robbery attempt. The police
say that the man who was shot was with a group of alleged criminals on several motorcycles and had taken
a gold chain from someone at the intersection. An unnamed passer-by who witnessed the mugging opened
fire on the attackers (DR1 Daily News, February 24, 2009).
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willingness of some to come together to speak out against these kinds of actions.
Unfortunately, the ability to do just that may now be taken away. 14
To further add to the atmosphere of war, in September of 2008 Presidential drug
trafficking advisor Marino Vinicio Castillo issued a challenge to drug traffickers, saying
that if they want a war they can have it. Castillo added that the authorities would not give
an inch in the fight against drugs, and that recent crimes were clear signs that drug
traffickers have declared war on the Dominican Republic. His statement demonstrates
both that authorities are under renewed pressure to act since Senator Wilton Guerrero
embarked on his crusade against alleged complicity between government officials and
drug traffickers, and that they are willing to escalate the war. If the “enemy” is seen as
declaring war, then there are likely to be few restraints placed on the responses to them.
Escalation is also evident in the words of National Police Chief Rafael Guillermo
Gúzman Fermín when making a stand against the rise in crime. He has refused to
apologize for the deaths of eight alleged muggers in two separate confrontations with the
police. Gúzman said that the National Police would "not back down one millimeter"
against crime (DR1 Daily News, February 14, 2008). Gúzman denied that the deaths
could be considered executions by the officers, adding that executions do not exist in the
Dominican legal system. Shortly thereafter, his words were supported and given
credence by the leader of the Catholic Church in the Dominican Republic, Cardinal
López Rodríguez, who told the nation's police force that the criminals they confront
14

The new Constitution agreed on by the PRD and PLD majority in Congress and the party leaderships
includes a clause eliminating Dominican citizens' right to protest against violations of the Constitution or
the violation of rules or judicial acts. The change was made on the grounds that citizens "do not have a true
judicial or legally protected interest." This means that Dominicans will not be able to protest when they
believe that laws, resolutions, or decrees issued by the government are in violation of the Constitution (El
Caribe, September 30, 2009).
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should not be treated with any "pious thoughts" (DR1 Daily News, February 18, 2008,
emphasis added). Despite being an opponent of the use of force, the Cardinal said that
people who commit crimes do not have more rights than their victims, and therefore
police officers, who are responsible for protecting the public, are obliged to go after these
criminals in their own territory. Cardinal López Rodríguez said that any society was
obliged to put a halt to attempts by criminals to take over through the use of violence.
Therefore, police shootings should not be an unexpected response to the number of
criminals who are trying to impose their control on the public. With righteousness from a
higher authority on their side, police can do whatever they want or need to control crime.
But perhaps it is not all bad news. The newspapers also publish stories that point
to some positive steps in improving police work. In September 2007, El Caribe
discussed the new tactic of mapping out areas where the most crimes occur as a way of
stepping up the fight against crime, as well as the addition of more patrols in these sectors
of the capital. In December of that year, the chief of police announced increased patrols
during the holiday season, and just after the New Year, Interior and Police Minister
Franklin Almeyda confirmed a salary increase for police officers (DR1 Daily News,
December 21, 2007, and January 8, 2008). The chief of police also announced a new
vacation program and an eight-hour work day for officers, both steps to normalize and
professionalize police employment.
The Attorney General for the National District, Jose Manuel Hernández Peguero
and president of the Human Rights Commission Manuel Maria Mercedes, have said that
every month more than 2,000 Dominicans are arrested during police raids and thrown in
jail without justification (DR1 Daily News, June 27, 2008). To counteract this
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phenomenon, and in good news for citizenship, the PN began a new campaign to inform
citizens about their rights. The campaign included posters placed in neighborhoods
saying:
If I am arrested I have the right to:
- know who is arresting me, where I am going, and why I am being arrested.
- be treated well
- be allowed to talk to a person of my choice or my lawyer
- not answer questions during interrogations
- see the Attorney General immediately
- meet in private with my lawyer.
The poster also explains that if these rights are violated, citizens can call a hotline (ibid.).
Awareness of one’s rights is crucial to the development and practice of democracy and
for improving citizenship and security. These measures to change police work for the
better may seem small and may not be extremely affective in the short term, but they do
still indicate an awareness by all that something needs to be done and is being done.
Most important, they provide at least some role and hope for the public, and show
balance in the press’s treatment of the topic.

Just War Theory Revisited
The drug war is a metaphor used to simplify and make sense of something
confusing and complex, but the impact of such a metaphor should not be underestimated.
“It seems that where the war metaphor was once intended to be interpreted and used
figuratively, current drug war trends demonstrate a literal application” (Kraska, 1997:
298). This statement was made over ten years ago but the literal trend continues. The
New York Times reported on August 10, 2009 that drug traffickers had been added to the
“kill or capture” list in Afghanistan. Where Dominicans once looked the other way when

207

up

ublic but it may reflect another code of ethics and justice in
the minds of the citizens.
According to Brian Orend (2006) war is “actual, intentional and widespread
armed conflict between political communities,” where political community means an
entity that is a state or intends to become a state (2). By this definition, neither drugs nor
terrorism are appropriate targets for war. Even so, “it tends to be the most questionable
wars…which provoke the most soul-searching” (ibid.: 23). While I would hesitate to
add the war on drugs to a list that contains the Spanish conquest of the west, two World
Wars, and the Vietnam conflict, perhaps this study can still advance some aspect of just
war theory and the ways that policy and rhetoric about difficult international issues are
formulated and carried out.
The ethics of war and peace has a long history. “Almost all major
civilizations…have featured fairly fixed beliefs about acceptable reasons for going to
war, and permissible means of fighting it” (Orend, 2006: 9). Just war theory is an
example of a comprehensive consideration of both war and peace. Reed and Ryall
(2007) see “just war thinking as a dynamic tradition for reflecting on the nature of
international society rather than as a set of prescriptions to be rigidly applied to crises”
(1). This approach is probably more applicable to the war on drugs since the war is not
an acute international crisis but an on-going problem within international society.
Diverse thinkers, of various secular and religious backgrounds, who are involved in post-
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World War II discussions show that “the just war way of thinking remains a developing
tradition, a method of moral reasoning that has evolved, amidst considerable debate, to
meet the political, technological and military challenges placed before it by history”
(Weigel, 2007: 20). The late 20th century interest in individual human rights has been
part of a resurrection of just war theory which has made it more applicable to questions of
international relations and law, academic research, human rights theory, and the work
done by human rights activists. Justice in the war on drugs relates to all of these.
“A state resorts to war justly only if it satisfies each of the six major rules: just
cause, right intention, public declaration by proper authority, last resort, probability of
success, and proportionality” (Orend, 2006: 32). Each of these conditions or rules has
been discussed previously, but creating a way to measure and test them in the case of the
war on drugs is still illusive. I will address each of these areas below.
A just cause exists when one state is the victim of an armed attack, or when a state
is acting on behalf of a victim of an armed attack (Orend, 2006). In other words, a state
has the right of self-defense when actual physical violence is inflicted upon it, but “for an
international act to count as aggression, it must not merely be objectionable or even
damaging to a country’s interests” (ibid.: 33). It seems clear then that the war on drugs
does not fit this criterion. In spite of Dominican officials’ statements that traffickers have
declared war, and while there is physical force used by drug gangs or paramilitaries in
certain cases, this is technically internal conflict. We see turf wars among drug dealers
but we generally do not see an organized attack against the state that merits the
deployment of U.S. troops to foreign lands, the attacks against Dominican anti-drug
personnel notwithstanding, though these can be categorized as murder rather than war.
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The use of military and law enforcement personnel for training may be justified and
effective, at least by the United States’ own accounts, but this strategy is also not actually
war. The U.S. is acting on behalf of the Dominican Republic, but not in defense against
another state. The use of the police and the military within the Dominican Republic may
be war-like but insurgency or other domestic level threats are generally not addressed by
just war theory. Drug syndicates may be multinational and a part of the violence, but so
far just war theory still has not fully developed comprehensive means to deal with these
entities. There is cause to respond to drugs, but it seems clear the justification should be
as crime rather than as aggressive war.
Intention makes the difference between first degree murder and manslaughter.
Unlike just cause, right intention is a subjective matter (Orend, 2006). There may be
several different intentions behind the war on drugs, and we may not always be able to
tell which ones are the most pure. It is easy to speculate on the supposed motives for the
war: Is the United States Government a benevolent leader in the war, or does it seek to
maintain control over others through its policy and by extending its military presence
beyond its borders? Joint operations in the Caribbean are beneficial and cooperative
arrangements amongst various governments and agencies in the region make them run
efficiently, but are these states giving up control of their territory in the process? The
United States is large and powerful, able to command and direct policy in the region. It
may appear that others have no choice but to follow. At the same time, these small states
need cooperative efforts to confront the myriad problems that drug trafficking presents,
and the generalized lack of resources and control they may have to begin with.
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Public declaration by a proper authority seems straightforward enough: A public
declaration must be made to alert citizens, but also to gain their consent and to announce
government intentions. The war on drugs has been publicly declared numerous times in
the second half of the twentieth century, and possibly earlier. Whether it was declared by
the proper authority is another question. It is Congress that officially has the prerogative
for declaring war, but perhaps we accept a declaration as official when it comes from the
president as commander in chief of the armed forces. The rhetoric of the war on drugs
primarily comes from presidents and other officials. Since we can argue that the war on
drugs is almost strictly rhetorical, the president’s declaration of it would not have to be
officially authorized by Congress, except perhaps for the money that is spent on it as a
policy. As mentioned earlier, a certain portion of this money is hidden in other budgets
and is free from congressional oversight, which makes the war even less public as time
goes on.
According to Orend’s assessment of Michael Walzer’s writing on the subject,
there is no such thing as a last resort. And yet, official diplomacy is really not an option
when dealing with a criminal organization. The use of some sort of sanctions might be,
such as the policies and laws that are cracking down on money laundering and cutting off
the chemical supplies used in drug-making processes. These practices are often still
accompanied by the use of force. Toleration, legalization, and removal of the profit
incentive for illegal drugs are more likely to be considered last resort options. These
options could be effective but are less palatable to most people in the U.S. than is the use
of force. The full spectrum of options is rarely on the table for consideration in a setting
where drugs are purely evil and must be eliminated at all cost. It is “more plausible to
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contend not that war be the literal last resort…but, rather, that states ought not to be hasty
in their resort to force” (Orend, 2006: 58). We must consider then whether the current
war on drugs began without exhausting other non-violent options first, and which other
options might still be considered in the future. The PSD is an attempt to reduce crime by
addressing a broad spectrum of issues that cause it. With the right support (i.e.: more
than just money and training for the police and military elements), these efforts could be
effective at reducing demand for drugs and the need for drug money, and limit the need
to use force in the long run.
The probability of success is a traditional criterion in just war theory aimed at
eliminating lethal action known ahead of time to be futile. Like the criterion of right
intention, it is not officially a part of international law. Orend (2006) contends that this is
likely because smaller or weaker countries would have a harder time fulfilling this
obligation but they still have a right to respond to aggression. In addition, predicting the
outcome of war is nearly impossible and history has shown us many upsets. In spite of
this difficulty, the probability of success is still something that ought to be considered by
any community before engaging itself and its resources in a war. In the case of the war
on drugs, we have considered questions such as whether the costs of operations support
the gains, whether the gains accumulate over time, and how we can know if we are
winning. Clearly, drugs are still crossing U.S. and European borders, among others, and
police corruption in the Dominican Republic remains. This corruption is especially
entrenched in the areas where reform efforts have not yet reached, as the Baní case
demonstrates. We might also consider questions such as whether the development of
functioning democracy and civil society have even been considered as an indicator of
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success in this war. Or if the reduction of drug traffic to the level of a “manageable
nuisance” is truly the most realistic goal. Neither appears to have been fully realized yet
in the Dominican Republic.
Proportionality is “one of the most contentious and challenging jus ad bellum
criteria” (Orend, 2006: 59). It requires calculations weighing expected costs and
benefits, which often cannot be measured concretely. How can one know what amount
of money freeing the United States from drugs is worth, or how many deaths – criminal
or otherwise – are acceptable while working toward this goal? Equally important is to
ask how much loss to liberty is acceptable, how to measure the justice within a system,
and how the war has affected it. The reform of the Dominican Penal Process Code can be
considered a victory, though perhaps only a small step, especially since the new code has
not been well-received. At the same time, the giant task of reforming the police and
judicial systems of an entire country could easily be seen as proportional to the size of the
drug trade – even if some may not see it as a direct attack on that trade itself. Returning
to the principle of a reasonable chance of success – and partly to necessity – for a
moment, no country can successfully fight drug traffic without a functioning police and
judicial system. While not war in the sense of armed conflict, it certainly ought to be
considered a necessary component of the fight.
There is still some value to the concept of proportion, even if it is “unrefined and
imprecise,” and most people would agree that “we know much better what
disproportionality is than proportionality” (Orend, 2006: 60). The concept can serve as a
guide or a constraint, even if it is not a concrete formula. It is something qualitative
rather than quantitative. By this line of reasoning, we know when war is a
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disproportionate response to a problem, and yet U.S. leaders are fond of calling their
responses to a variety of problems “war.” Perhaps the U.S. public has become
accustomed to overly aggressive solutions. Perhaps we are accustomed to using guns and
the military to confront problems because we have so many of both at our disposal. In
the case of the war on drugs, though, we must consider whether it is proportionate and
appropriate to involve the military in matters of law enforcement. One might argue that
the line between the two has to be blurred in order to compete with the money and
arsenals the drug trafficking organizations have at their own disposal, especially at the
international level. The danger at the domestic level comes, as we have seen, when law
enforcement personnel act like soldiers in a war zone and disregard procedure and the
rule of law in a democracy, and when the citizens in turn take matters into their own
hands.
One wonders if drug traffickers and suspected traffickers are treated differently
when taken into custody or when processed for extradition. They do not clearly fall into
the war captives category so much as the criminal category. And yet, the war involves
both military and police so it is not clear whether they should be treated as suspected
criminals or as prisoners of war – assuming they are taken prisoner at all and not killed in
an exchange of fire with the authorities instead. Equally problematic is that Dominican
citizens are less concerned that those who are taken into custody are treated and
processed properly, and are more concerned that they are not treated more harshly.
Corruption has eliminated any attachment to the principle of innocent until proven guilty,
or concern that anyone might be falsely accused.
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“Just war theory and international law command…that you may only attack the
true adversary in warfare (i.e. that entity directly engaged in physical harm)” and thus
many would claim police actions that result in the deaths of traffickers are in fact justified
(Orend, 2006: 113). But this also provides another complication for the war on drugs.
Which is the entity directly involved in physical harm? Is it the growers who are causing
physical harm? Some, along with the drug refiners and processors, may be physically
harming and degrading the natural environment. The traffickers violate the law and often
harm each other in disputes over money or turf, or harm those who are trying to stop
them. Or is it the drug users who harm themselves with drugs? In a society that values
security most, could it become permissible to eliminate all who use drugs as enemy
combatants and without due process? The “exchange of fire” tactic could be used to
reduce demand for drugs by killing off consumers in the same way that it has been
deployed to remove supply and suppliers. Harm reduction advocates suggest there may
be more justice in providing treatment instead and limiting the use of force against those
on the wrong side of the law. Abandoning all restraint in war, including forgetting the
opponent’s humanity, eliminates the hope for peace and an end to conflict (French,
2007). The way drugs, drug traffickers, and those who grow the crops and produce drugs
have been demonized by the war on drugs allows us to forget the human beings involved
at every step.
Reed and Ryall (2007) propose an additional jus as bellum criterion: the pursuit
of peace. Their other criteria are not drastically different from those posed by most
scholars and thinkers in the history of just war theory, but the idea of war in the pursuit of
peace has not been discussed extensively here. It may prove fruitful to consider it in the
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context of the case study, and again to recognize the limitations in the war on drugs as
one that might not be winnable. “The peace that must be the goal of a justified war is
neither a purely military victory nor the absence of violence, but the restoration of
community” (Reed and Ryall, 2007: 12). Peace in the war on drugs may be conceived of
as a community where no one needs the money gained from the drug trade because they
have other viable means of income, or a community where no one desires the effects
from the use of drugs. The first may be easier to achieve than the second, particularly
when one considers the often competing moral or religious values and standards in
relation to drug use throughout the world. For example, an altered state induced by drugs
is considered one where a person is without the spirit in many Christian traditions, but
other groups may view the use of altered states as a way to commune with gods or spirits.
The religious tolerance that is a part of the U.S. Constitution does not extend to
recreational cocaine use in this way, but we can still call into question the idea of
extending one society’s rules worldwide and to communities where ritual use of coca leaf
is historically and culturally significant. As noted in the INCSRs, this can certainly be
source of tension between nations.
The restoration of community, or more exactly, the creation of community
through institution building, seems to be at the heart of the U.S. war on drugs in the
Dominican Republic and the Dominican policies and programs of the PSD. How well
these efforts are working is still not entirely clear, as the preceding chapters demonstrate.
It is a question of proportion as the programs are in their early stages, and real results
may not be possible without more comprehensive, systematic, and consistent
implementation. Involvement of the domestic community and civil society, as well as the
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international community, will be key to rooting out corruption and keeping the successful
elements of the programs going.
Conclusions
It is difficult to talk about drug control without using words like “fight” and
“combat,” but the case of the Dominican Republic suggests that our emphasis should
shift from war to justice and community building, not to mention the treatment of drug
abuse as a health issue rather than a crime. Justice is a police force that serves the people,
is paid a decent wage so officers are less likely to be corrupted, and whose officers know
the procedures for handling suspects and placing them in the system for processing.
Justice is a system where there is due process of law, that is free of corruption, and where
few are tempted to make or accept bribes. Clearly this ideal kind of system takes time to
develop. Corruption and patronage cannot be eliminated overnight. The ideas are there
and efforts are being made. Despite some shortfalls, improvements have been made and
some of the obstacles that still need to be addressed have been brought to light. One must
ask whether it is just to spend money on airplanes, for instance, when the Dominican
Republic could benefit as much or more from investments in energy, education,
economic reform and control of money laundering, and continued expanded police
reform.
A shift from war to justice could also be made in the U.S. through increased
efforts at demand reduction, treatment for addicts, and equitable treatment and logical
classification under the law of drugs themselves. This may take the form of following the
lead of countries like the Netherlands and Spain to decriminalize certain drugs, and to
place the focus of interdiction efforts and valuable resources on others that are the most
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addictive and lethal. If reform of policy in the U.S. means demand reduction and
treatment, then in the Dominican context it has to mean addressing basic societal
elements that allow the drug trade to infiltrate the economy. It means infrastructure and
economic development; programs like Barrio Seguro are an attempt to re-create and
reform specific elements of local and national infrastructure and institutions that have
been affected by drug crime.
Drugs infiltrate a state in one of two ways: The organization buys off someone at
the top who controls many others below him or her, or it buys off so many people at
lower levels that it becomes impossible for anyone at the top to control and reign in the
others. Both have happened in the Dominican Republic. The Fernández administration’s
implementation of the PSD is an attempt to recreate and reform institutions in order to get
rid of corruption and prevent future corruption, from the top down and bottom up
simultaneously. These efforts have been successful and not so successful, depending on
whom you ask. There is also no doubt that the drug trade is rich and corrupt. They will
always seek someone to buy off and have the means to do so. Unfortunately, in a state
like the Dominican Republic, there are likely to be plenty to choose from.
The war on drugs depends on functional military organizations. Dominican
forces were too small to deal with the amount of coastline available to would-be
smugglers, nor could the army deal with the entire land border with Haiti. Cooperative
efforts with the U.S. and other nations in the Caribbean have helped to address these
issues. At the same time, the war on drugs has further exposed additional internal
institutional weaknesses. As more drugs entered the country, crime increased to the point
that the state, especially the newly democratic government, could no longer ignore it. By
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trying to create and achieve a police force capable of competently dealing with drugs and
drug-related crimes, corruption within the system that may have been tolerated or denied
for years was ultimately exposed.
The Dominican response to the war on drugs has been to increase the state
presence in the country, but in a way that respects democratic ideals and popular
sovereignty. Unfortunately, at the same time there are negative unintended consequences
to declaring a war on drugs. The tone of the international drug war is one that allows
undemocratic practices to continue, particularly the suspension or disregard of civil rights
in a war zone. The idea that drug criminals are enemies allows violence without due
process to continue. The continued militarization of the drug war may actually be
undermining the U.S.’s goal to spread democracy throughout the world, especially where
drugs are well entrenched but democracy is not. Rigidity in policy circles, supported by
righteousness in some cases, makes creating justice and balance or proportion in this war
a near impossibility.
At first glance, this study may appear to show that the war on drugs in the
Dominican Republic has been a failure or had very little effect, if any, at stopping the
movement of drugs through the country and into the U.S. If we are only looking at that
as the ultimate goal, then such a conclusion is merited. But if we consider that the
international war on drugs, led by the U.S., has spawned additional internal efforts to
improve a variety of institutions that are involved with the various aspects of drug
control, then it becomes clear that the cascading effects of the policy may ultimately find
success. Perhaps the first person to utter the phrase “war on drugs” never imagined that it
could include the tactic of reforming a civilian police force and judicial processes, or a
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strategy to provide scholarships and housing assistance to the poor, but perhaps this is
precisely where more effort needs to be made. Law enforcement clearly should be a part
of the picture, and efficiency and adherence to principles and procedure are a vital part of
the reform process. Even so, demand for drugs does not necessarily decrease in the
presence of a capable police force. The U.S. and many European countries know this all
too well. Myriad conditions increase the probability of drug use, abuse, and profiteering,
especially a lack of education and opportunities for sufficient employment. By moving
away from the war metaphor, a broader strategy can be employed. For those who wish to
keep the war allegory, perhaps they would incorporate the idea of post-war rebuilding
into future policy plans.

Epilogue – War on Supply vs. War on Demand: Policy Alternatives
We cannot legislate our way out of the drug problem by passing mandatory
sentencing and asset forfeiture laws, we cannot police our way out of the drug
problem by further expanding narcotic enforcement activities both domestically
and internationally, and we cannot build our way out of the drug problem by
constructing more penitentiaries and prison cells. The alternative is sciencebased treatment and prevention activities to reduce the demand for drugs. For
after all, if there were no drug users, there would be no drug problem (Inciardi,
2008: 321).
As I write this, more than 30 defendants in the Baní case are preparing to go to trial, and
drug violence is reasserting itself along the Mexico-U.S. border and within the Southern
United States. No matter what the positive outcomes of the PSD and Barrio Seguro
programs in the cities, there is still widespread corruption and infiltration of drug interests
in the far reaches of the Dominican Republic. Whether the state is equipped to expand its
programs and confront the problem to its fullest extent remains to be seen. A further
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shifting of drugs routes out of the Caribbean is likely to continue, once again raising the
question of whether the interdiction strategy is effective in the long run.
History and trends show a tendency toward “abuse of almost any substance that
promises significant changes in perception and consciousness” especially among teens
and adults in the U.S. and Western Europe (Inciardi, 2008: 86). Historically there has
been a neglect of demand reduction in U.S. policy, though more recently the sentiment
that the supply reduction strategy is not effective has been growing (Boyum and Reuter,
2005). Interdiction efforts only reduce imports of drugs into the U.S. by about tenpercent at most, and inspection of cargo is costly, paralyzing to ports and markets, and
potentially lethal to some countries’ economies (Nordstrom, 2007). On the other side, the
merits of legalization are speculative at best, and the repeal of drug laws does not have
support within either political party in the U.S.
I was not certain about including this subsection as part of the dissertation, but I
feel it does merit at least some mention when one is discussion drug policies. During the
time I spent researching and writing about the topic, I heard stories in the news almost
daily about this celebrity or that caught using drugs – or worse, dead from them. For
young and old alike, it seems a trip to rehab or a mug shot is par for the course for those
we call famous. The demand for drugs is alive and well in our country, and even
celebrated by some. So what place do demand reduction, harm reduction, and
decriminalization have in the drug war? We can argue that proportion in the war on
drugs also means the balanced and equal treatment of demand as well as supply. Might
some of these strategies prove to be effective – and if so, more just – than the use of
armed force against the supply side?
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Drugs are a veritable hydra monster of a problem. As previously discussed, when
the head of crop production or trans-shipment is cut off in one area, another one tends to
grow elsewhere and quickly. The monster analogy also applies to demand – heroin and
LSD consumption in the 1960s was replaced by cocaine in the 1970s and 1980s; the
crack epidemic the Reagan administration so adamantly fought against and tried educate
children and youth about seems to have been replaced now by rave culture and the
popularity of party drugs like ecstasy. The same “Just Say No” generation is at the helm
of efforts to address the rising tide of methamphetamine, or crystal meth, consumption, a
drug made in the U.S. Recent data from various surveys conducted in the U.S. show that
young people, ages 12 to 25, are more likely to abuse prescription drugs – pain relievers
specifically – than cocaine (Inciardi, 2008). But demand is not just a U.S. or European
phenomenon. Cocaine has re-emerged in Brazil from the 1990s onward, especially in the
large urban slum areas as well as its “pleasure spots” that make for good transshipment
zones, and Brazil is today the second largest consumer of cocaine after the United States
(Bagley, 2009; Gootenberg, 2008). According to the DNCD, Ketamine, aka Special K,
has recently come on the scene and gained popularity among recreational drug users in
Santo Domingo (DR1 Daily News, July 24, 2007). Near the end of the time period under
investigation here, additional evidence has been found that drug consumption has
increased in the Dominican Republic, while prices have fallen (DR1 Daily News,
September 6, 2007). In particular, the CDN found that consumption among grade school
and middle school students has increased between 2005 and 2009 (Hoy, February 24,
2009).
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Except for recent cuts, over the years the budget for the war on drugs has
increased in total but the proportions delegated for supply and demand reduction stay the
same, in spite of little evidence of the benefits from the war on supply, while the benefits
of treatment are more tangible and measurable. It has been said that if all drugs were
decriminalized and if narcotics were dispersed by medical doctors to addicts, the problem
would eventually go away with education. Inciardi (2008) shows that treatment efforts
can help increase employment among former addicts, reduce crime, and reduce costs for
hospitals and the criminal justice system. He also suggests that this means something
about the relative importance of supply and demand reduction. More efforts in the latter
could provide cascading effects for the former.
Stopping production and traffic is only part of the equation. In the spirit of
capitalism, suppliers will always seek to fulfill a demand. The criminal nature of drugs
only makes doing so more profitable. Is the removal of the profit incentive and
regulation by government at all viable? We might be able to draw some lessons from the
country’s experience with prohibition. But if the rhetoric of the drugs war makes drugs
the embodiment of pure evil, discussion of these options may never happen.
The USG is officially opposed to harm reduction, seeing it as a slippery slope. It
is neither a policy nor a program specifically, but is instead the idea that the problem of
drug abuse should be managed since trying to eliminate it all together would be
impossible. Agencies like the Center for Disease Control & Prevention, National
Institutes of Health, and Department of Justice have been practicing harm reduction for
years, though perhaps under a different name. Diversion programs in place of jail time
for drug offenses are one example from the justice system. Unfortunately, there has been
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little comprehensive evaluation of most diversion or treatment programs in general.
Treatment is known to work, yet each treatment center is different and uses different
methods. Thus, alternatives to incarceration are only as good as the treatment programs
to which the offenders are sent. At current rates of funding, there are not enough to meet
the need, either in the public sector or within the prison system. Much like with the
police and judicial reform programs in the Dominican Republic, more consistent
implementation is needed in order to achieve the desired results.
Thoumi (1995) argues that there are two kinds of policy approaches to the drug
problem: moralistic and pragmatic.
The degree of success of moral-based policies depends…on the existence of a
wide normative consensus in the society about imposing social and moral
constraints on individuals and /or on a strong, authoritarian government that
believes in those constraints and is willing to impose policies on society that
sacrifice individual freedoms (Thoumi, 1995: 276).
Whether moralistic or pragmatic, policies will also be affected by other factors, such as
policy constituencies or groups that have a particular interest in keeping a policy in place.
The political force of moralistic vantage points as well as policy constituencies can make
changing a policy difficult, even if it is not very effective from a practical standpoint.
This truly seems to be the case with illegal drugs in the Americas. Whether U.S. decision
makers can move away from the moralism that is embodied in drug policy and the
rhetoric of the war on drugs to something more practical is questionable. Those who
work in drug enforcement want to keep their jobs, and those who set policy are
constrained by public opinion that shares the same moral slant. It is my hope that
continued research on all sides of the drug issue will eventually help to shift policy in the
direction of pragmatism.
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“If peripheral sites and actors had much to do with the making of cocaine in the
first place, perhaps their renewed agency (or conscious resistance) can help undo the
global drug conflict that has enveloped this drug since the 1980s” (Gootenberg, 2008:
319). In other words, the solution is not necessarily to be found within the U.S.’s
imposed prohibitions. We will need cooperative arrangements that incorporate best local
practices and most important an openness to other ways of viewing the drug and its reach.
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